§1.33.31ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἆρά γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν;
But perhaps here again someone might raise a difficulty, whether it is possible for someone to treat himself unjustly.
ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς σκοπουμένῳ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχεσθαι. καὶ πάλιν οὕτως.
From the viewpoint of the incontinent man, it indeed seems to be possible.
εἰ γὰρ ἃ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτά ἐστιν δίκαια, ὁ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὃν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα εἶναι, οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τἆλλο τὰ τοιαῦτα,· ὁ ἄρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεῖ αὑτόν.
And again in this way: for if the things that the law commands to do are just, he who does not do these commits injustice; and if, in relation to the person whom the law commands him to act, in relation to this person he does not act, he treats this person unjustly. But the law commands one to be temperate, to possess property, to take care of one's body, and all other such things; therefore, he who does not do these things treats himself unjustly.
εἰς οὐθένα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων ἡ ἀναφορὰ ἐστίν.
For to no one else is the reference of such injustices directed.
§1.33.32— ἀλλὰ μή ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἦν, οὐδʼ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν αὑτόν.
— But perhaps these things were not true, and it is not even possible for someone to treat himself unjustly.
τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν. αὐτὸν χρόνον πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, οὐδʼ ἑκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα·
For it is not possible for the same person at the same time to have more and less, nor voluntarily and at the same time involuntarily.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀδικῶν, ᾗ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὁ δʼ ἀδικούμενος, ᾗ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον.
But indeed, he who commits injustice, insofar as he commits injustice, has more, and he who is unjustly treated, insofar as he is unjustly treated, has less.
εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον.
If, therefore, he himself treats himself unjustly, it is possible for the same person at the same time to have both more and less.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
But this is impossible; therefore, it is not possible for someone to treat himself unjustly.
§1.33.33— ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἑκὼν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἂν ἅμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἑκουσίως πράττειν τι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδʼ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
— Furthermore, he who commits injustice does so voluntarily, while he who is unjustly treated is treated so involuntarily, so that if it is possible for someone to treat himself unjustly, it would be possible at the same time to act both involuntarily and voluntarily; but this is impossible; therefore, not even in this way is it possible for someone to treat himself unjustly.
§1.33.34— ἔτι εἴ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων.
— Furthermore, if one were to take cases from particular injustices.
ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἤτοι παρακαταθήκην ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιοῦντες· οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὑτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρησεν, οὐδʼ ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, οὐδʼ ἔκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστίν, τούτων δὲ μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
For all commit injustice either by defaulting on a deposit, or committing adultery, or stealing, or doing some other of the particular injustices; but no one has ever defaulted on a deposit to himself, nor committed adultery with his own wife, nor stolen his own things; so that if committing injustice is in such things, and it is possible to do none of these in relation to oneself, it would not be possible to treat oneself unjustly.
§1.33.35— εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ τό γε πολιτικὸν ἀδίκημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ οἰκονομικόν.
— Otherwise, at least it is not civic injustice, but domestic.
ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ εἰς πλείω μεμερισμένη ἔχει τι αὑτῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ὥστ᾿ εἴ τι ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ ἀδίκημα, τῶν μερῶν ἐστι πρὸς. ἄλληλα·
For the soul, being divided into several parts, has a certain part of itself that is worse and another that is better, so that if any injustice arises among the elements in the soul, it is of the parts against one another.
τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δὲ ἀδίκημα διειλόμεθα τῷ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ βέλτιον· ὡς γίνεσθαι πρὸς αὑτὸν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον.
But we distinguished domestic injustice by its relation to the worse and the better, so that unjust and just relations come about toward oneself.
οὐ τοῦτο δʼ ἡμεῖς ἐπισκοπούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικόν.
But we are not examining this, but civic injustice.
§1.33.36ὥστʼ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀδικήμασιν, ἐν οἵς ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
So, in such injustices as we are investigating, it is not possible for someone to treat himself unjustly.
πότερος δὲ πάλιν ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἐν τῷ ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ἔχοντι; ἢ τῷ κρίναντι καὶ τῷ ἀπονείμαντι, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;
But again, which of the two commits injustice, and in which of the two is the injustice: in the one who unjustly has whatever it is, or in the one who has judged and distributed it, as in the games?
καὶ γὰρ ὁ λαβὼν τὸν φοίνικα παρὰ τοῦ ἐφεστῶτος καὶ ταῦτα κρίναντος οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, κἂν ἀδίκως αὐτῷ ἀποδοθῇ· ἀλλʼ ἤδη ὁ κρίνας κακῶς καὶ δούς, οὗτος ἀδικεῖ.
For indeed, the one who receives the palm from the official who presides and judges these things does not commit injustice, even if it is unjustly awarded to him; but rather, the one who judged badly and gave it, he commits injustice.
καὶ οὗτος ἔστι μὲν ᾗ ἀδικεῖ, ἔστι δὲ ᾗ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει ἄν δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν, ταύτῃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ᾗ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ δοκοῦν εἶναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ.
And this latter person commits injustice in one way, but in another way he does not; for insofar as he did not judge what is just in truth and in nature, in this way he commits injustice, but insofar as he judged what seemed to him to be just, he does not commit injustice.