§1.33.24ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἄδικα πράττοντα ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ὅταν μὴ εἰδὼς μήθʼ ὃν βλάπτει μήθʼ μηθ’ οὗ ἕνεκεν·
Therefore, the fact that one who commits unjust deeds does not act unjustly lies in ignorance, which was also said a little above, when one acts without knowing either whom he harms or for the sake of what.
ἀλλʼ ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διοριστέον ἐστίν, πῶς ἂν γινομένης τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὃν βλόωττει, οὐκ ἀδικήσει.
But now ignorance also must be defined, how, when ignorance occurs, one who harms someone will not commit injustice.
ἔστω δὴ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός.
Let this, then, be the definition.
§1.33.25ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, οὐχ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος, καὶ πράττῃ τι κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἧς αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἐστίν, οὗτος ἤδη ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως ἄδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται.
For when ignorance is the cause of doing something, one does not do this voluntarily, so that he does not commit injustice. But when he is himself the cause of his ignorance, and does something in accordance with the ignorance of which he is himself the cause, this person already commits injustice, and such a person will justly be called unjust.
οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντές τι κακὸν ἀδικοῦσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ὥστʼ ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα.
For example, in the case of those who are drunk; for those who are drunk and do something bad commit injustice, because they are themselves the cause of their ignorance, since it was open to them not to drink so much that they beat their father in ignorance.
§1.33.26ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὅσαι μὲν γίνονται διʼ αὐτούς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικοῦντες ἄδικοι·
Similarly, in the case of other ignorances, as many as come about through themselves, those who commit injustice in accordance with these are unjust.
ὧν δὲ μὴ αὐτοί εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἄγνοια κἀκείνοις ἐφτὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πρᾶξαι, οὐκ ἄδικοι.
But in cases where they are not themselves the cause, but ignorance is the cause of the doing for those who did it, they are not unjust.
ἔστιν δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄγνοια ἡ φυσική, οἷον τὰ παιδία ἀγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἄγνοια φυσικὴ οὖσα οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἄδικα·
And such ignorance is natural, for example, children beat their fathers in ignorance, but the ignorance in them being natural does not make the children be called unjust because of this action.
ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δʼ ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια, διὸ οὐδʼ ἄδικα λέγονται.
For ignorance is the cause of doing these things, and they are not themselves the cause of the ignorance, wherefore they are not even called unjust.
§1.33.27ὑπὲρ δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖδθαι πῶς;
But concerning being unjustly treated, how is it?
πότερον ἑκόντα ἔστιν ἀδικεῖσθαις ἢ οὔ;
Is it possible to be unjustly treated voluntarily or not?
δίκαια μὲν. γὰρ καὶ ἄδικα πράττομεν ἑκόντες, ἀδικούμεθα δὲ οὐκέτι ἑκόντες· τὸ γὰρ κολάζεσθαι φεύγομεν, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοίμεθα ἑκόντες.
For we do just and unjust things voluntarily, but we are no longer unjustly treated voluntarily; for we flee from being punished, so that it is clear that we would not be unjustly treated voluntarily.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν βλάπτεσθαι ὑπομένει· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι βλάπτεσθαι ἐστίν.
For no one voluntarily submits to being harmed; and to be unjustly treated is to be harmed.
§1.33.28ναί, ἀλλʼ εἰσί τινες οἳ δέον αὐτοὺς τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν παραχωροῦσι τισίν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἦν δίκαιον, τὸ δʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστίν, ἔλαττον δὲ ἑκὼν ἔχει, ἑκὼν ἄρα, φησίν, ἀδικεῖπται.
Yes, but there are some who, though they ought to have an equal share, yield to certain people, so that if to have an equal share was just, and to have less is to be unjustly treated, and one has less voluntarily, then voluntarily, he says, one is unjustly treated.
ἀλλʼ ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον πάλιν ὅτι οὐχ ἑκών.
But from this it is clear again that it is not voluntary.
πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἔλαττον λαμβάνοντες ἀντικαταλλάττονται ἢ τιμὴν ἢ ἔπαινον ἢ δόξαν ἢ φιλίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων·
For all who receive less obtain in exchange either honor or praise or glory or friendship or some other such thing.
ὁ δʼ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενός τι ἀνθʼ οὗ προΐεται, οὐκέτι ἀδικεῖται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖται, οὐδὲ ἑκὼν ἄρα.
But one who gets something in exchange for what he gives up is no longer unjustly treated; and if he is not unjustly treated, then neither is it voluntary.
§1.33.29ἔτι πάλιν οἱ τὸ ἔλαττον λαμβάνοντες καὶ ἀδικούμενοι, οὐκ ἴσον λαμβάνουσιν, οὗτοι καλλωπίζονται καὶ σεμνύνονται ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅτι φασὶν ῾῾ ἐξόν μοι ἴσον λαμβάνειν οὐκ ἐλάμβανον, ἀλλὰ παρῆκα τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ τῷ φίλῳʼ᾿. ἀδικούμενος δέ γε οὐδεὶς σεμνύνεται.
Furthermore, again, those who receive less and are (supposedly) unjustly treated, not receiving an equal share, pride themselves and boast about such things, because they say, "Though it was possible for me to receive an equal share, I did not take it, but yielded to the elder or to the friend." But no one who is unjustly treated boasts.
εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδικήμασι μὴ σεμνύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις σεμνύνονται, ὅλως οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοῖντο οὕτως ἐλατττούμενοι.
And if they do not boast about acts of injustice, but boast about these things, they would not be unjustly treated at all by receiving less in this way.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀδικοῦνται, οὐδʼ ἂν ἑκόντες ἀδικοῖντο.
And if they are not unjustly treated, neither would they be unjustly treated voluntarily.
§1.33.30— πρὸς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς λόγος ἐναντιοῦται·
— But against these arguments and those of this kind, the argument concerning the incontinent man opposes.
ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτὸν τὰ φαῦλα πράττων, καὶ ἑκών γε ταῦτα πράττει, βλάπτει ἄρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰδώς, ὥστε ἑκὼν αὐτὸς ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ ἀδικεῖται.
For the incontinent man harms himself by doing bad things, and he does these things voluntarily; he harms himself therefore knowingly, so that he is voluntarily unjustly treated by himself.
ἀλλʼ ἐνταῦθα [ὁ] διορισμὸς προστεθεὶς κωλύσει τὸν λόγον τοῦτον.
But here a definition, if added, will prevent this argument.
ἔστιν δὲ ὁ διορισμὸς οὗτος, τὸ μηδένα βούλεσθαι ἀδικεῖσθαι.
And this is the definition: that no one wishes to be unjustly treated.
ὁ δέ γε ἀκρατὴς βουλόμενος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὥστε αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ βούλεται ἄρα τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν αὑτῷ.
But the incontinent man acts in accordance with his incontinence wishing to do so, so that he treats himself unjustly; he wishes therefore to do bad things to himself.
ἀλλʼ οὐδεὶς βούλεται ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ὁ ἀκρατὴς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἑκὼν 〈ἂν〉 ἀδικοίη.
But no one wishes to be unjustly treated; wherefore not even the incontinent man would voluntarily be unjustly treated by himself.