§1.33.17ὡς δʼ αὕτως οὐδʼ οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότην ἐστὶ δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἐστιν ὁ οἰκέτης.
And in the same way, nor is there justice for a slave towards a master for the same reason; for the slave is something belonging to the master.
ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν.
But indeed, even if there is justice for him, it is household justice towards him.
οὐ τοῦτο δέ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικόν· ἐν ἰσότητι γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι.
Yet this is not what we are seeking, but the political; for political justice seems to consist in equality and similarity.
§1.33.18ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνίᾳ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου· χεῖρον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλʼ οἰκειότερον, καὶ μετέχει ἰσότητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἐγγὺς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα μάλιστά πως ἤδη τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν.
But indeed, the just in the association of wife and husband is close to the political just; for though the wife is inferior to the husband, she is more akin, and shares in equality in some way more, because their life is close to the political community, so that the just for a wife towards a husband is now, in a way, most of all political among the others.
§1.33.19ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστι δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὅν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔσται.
Since, then, the just is that which exists in political community, justice and the just man will be concerned with the political just.
τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμῳ.
And of just things, some are by nature, others by law.
δεῖ δʼ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἂν μεταπεσόντα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς.
But we must understand this not as if they could never change; for even things that exist by nature partake of change.
§1.33.20λέγω δʼ οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῷμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βαλλειν, γινοίμεθα ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστίν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὐδὲν ἧττον φύσει βελτίω ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, κἂν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθάπερ τῇ δεξιῷ.
I mean, for example, if we all always practiced throwing with our left hand, we would become ambidextrous; but yet by nature the left hand is left, and the right is no less by nature better than the left, even if we do everything with the left hand just as with the right.
οὐδʼ ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οὖκ ἔστιν φύσει· ἀλλʼ εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὕτω διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ οὖσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιά, τοῦτο φύσει ἐστίν.
Nor does it follow that, because they change, they are not by nature; but if, for the most part and for the greater part of the time, the left remains left and the right remains right, this is by nature.
§1.33.21ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίων, μή, εἰ μεταβάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν χρῆσιν, διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν.
Similarly in the case of things just by nature, let it not be thought that, if they change because of our use, they are for this reason not just by nature, but they are.
τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές.
For that which remains so for the most part, this is clearly just by nature.
ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι δίκαιον ἤδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον.
For whatever we establish and ordain, this is now indeed just, and we call it just by law.
βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον.
Therefore, the just by nature is better than the just by law.
ἀλλʼ ὃ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν.
But what we are seeking is political justice.
τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.
And the political is that by law, not by nature.
§1.33.22τὸ δ' ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὕτω ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἐστιν τὸ νόμῳ ὡρισμένον, οἷον τὸ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι ἄδικον ἐστί, τὸ δʼ ἀδίκημά ἐστιν τὸ ἤδη ἀδίκως τι πρᾶξαι.
The unjust and the act of injustice might seem to be the same in this way, but they are not; for the unjust is that which is defined by law, for example, to withhold a deposit is unjust, but the act of injustice is already to have done something unjustly.
ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα οὐ ταὐτόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγημα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.
And similarly, the just and the act of justice are not the same; for the just is that which is defined by law, but the act of justice is the doing of just things.
§1.33.23— πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὖ;
— When, then, is it just, and when is it not?
ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἑκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἑκουσίως ὃ ἦν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω ἡμῖν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει.
To speak simply, it is when one acts in accordance with deliberate choice and voluntarily (what the voluntary was has been stated by us above), and when one acts justly knowing whom, with what, and for the sake of what he is acting.
ὁμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.
Similarly and in the same way, the unjust man also will be the one who knows whom [and with what] and for the sake of what [he is acting].
ὅταν δὲ μηθὲν τούτων εἰδὼς πράξῃ τι ἄδικον, ἄδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχὴς δέ.
But when, knowing none of these things, one does something unjust, he is not unjust, but unfortunate.
εἰ γὰρ οἰόμενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνειν τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἄδικον μέν τι ἔπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μέντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ.
For if, intending to kill an enemy, he killed his father, he did indeed commit an unjust act, but he does not commit injustice against anyone, but is unfortunate.