§1.17.1ἔτι δὲ λοιπόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι τὴν προαίρεσιν, πότερόν ἐστιν ὄρεξις, ἢ οὔ.
Next, it remains to examine choice, whether it is desire or not.
ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐγγίγνεται, προαίρεσις δὲ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐστίν.
For desire is found in the other animals as well, but choice is not; for choice is accompanied by reason, and reason is not in any of the other animals.
ὄρεξις μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἔη·
Therefore, it would not be desire.
§1.17.2ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε βούλησις;
But is it then wish?
ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;
Or is it not even this?
βούλησις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον βουλόμεθα μὲν ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρούμεθα δὲ οὔ.
For wish is also directed toward impossible things; for instance, we wish to be immortal, but we do not choose it.
ἔτι δὲ προαίρεσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν προαιρούμεθα, περιπατεῖν, τροχάζειν· βουλόμεθα δὲ τὰ τέλη.
Furthermore, choice is not of the end, but of the means to the end; for instance, no one chooses to be healthy, but we choose the means to health, such as walking or running; but we wish for the ends.
§1.17.3ὑγιαίνειν γὰρ βουλόμεθα.
For we wish to be healthy.
ὥστε δῆλον καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡ βούλησις καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις· ἀλλὰ ἡ προαίρεσις ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομαι αὐτῆς ἔχει, οἷον προαιρούμεθα τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε, οἷον τὸ βέλτιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος.
So it is clear also from this that wish and choice are not the same; rather, choice seems to be just as its name indicates, as when we choose this instead of that, for example, the better instead of the worse.
ὅταν οὖν ἀντικαταλλαττώμεθα τὸ βέλτιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἐν αἱρέσει ὄντος, ἐνταῦθα τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δόξειεν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
Whenever, then, we exchange the better for the worse when choice is possible, in that case "to choose" would seem to be appropriate.
§1.17.4— ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ προαίρεσις οὐθὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἆρά γέ ἐστιν τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐν προαιρέσει;
—Since, then, choice is none of these things, is it that which is in accordance with thought that constitutes choice?
ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;
Or not even this?
πολλὰ γὰρ διανοούμεθα καὶ δοξάζομεν κατὰ διάνοιαν· ἆρʼ οὖν ἃ διανοούμεθα, ταῦτα καὶ προανρούμεθα;
For we think and hold opinions about many things in accordance with thought; do we then also choose the things that we think of?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
πολλάκις γὰρ διανοούμεθα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, ἀλλʼ οὔτι καὶ προαιρούμεθα.
For we often think about things in India, but we certainly do not choose them.
§1.17.5οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ διάνοιά ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις. — ἐπεὶ οὖν καθʼ ἕκαστον τούτων οὐθέν ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, ἀναγκαῖον [δὴ] συνδυαζομένων τινῶν τούτων εἶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν.
Therefore, choice is not thought either. —Since, then, choice is none of these things individually, and these are the things that come to be in the soul, it is necessary that choice should consist in some combination of them.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέχθη, ἡ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ τέλους, καὶ τῶν δυνατῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογίαν παραδιδόντων πότερον τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο αἱρετόν, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν πρότερον διανοηθῆναι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ βουλεύσασθαι, εἶθʼ ὅταν ἡμῖν φανῇ κρεῖττον διανοηθεῖσιν, οὕτως ὁρμή τις τοῦ πράττειν ἐστίν, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράττοντες κατὰ προαίρεσιν δοκοῦμεν πράττειν,
Since, then, as was said before, choice is of the goods that lead to the end and not of the end, and of things possible for us, and of things that present a dispute as to whether this or that is to be chosen, it is clear that we must first think about them and deliberate, and then, when after thinking it appears better to us, there is in this way a certain impulse to act, and when we act in this way, we are thought to act in accordance with choice.
§1.17.6εἰ τοίνυν ἡ προαίρεσις ὄρεξίς τις βουλευτικὴ μετὰ διανοίας, οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἑκούσιον προαιρετόν.
If, therefore, choice is a certain deliberative desire accompanied by thought, the voluntary is not identical with the chosen.
ἑκόντες γὰρ πολλὰ πράττομεν πρὸ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι, οἷον καθίζομεν καὶ ἀνιστάμεθα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἑκόντες μὲν ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν πᾶν ἦν μετὰ διανοίας.
For we do many things voluntarily before thinking and deliberating; for instance, we sit down and stand up, and do many other such things voluntarily but without thinking, whereas that which is in accordance with choice was entirely accompanied by thought.
§1.17.7οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἑκούσιον προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἑκούσιον· ἄν τι γὰρ προαιρώμεθα πράττειν βουλευσάμενοι, ἑκόντες πράττομεν.
Therefore, the voluntary is not identical with the chosen, but the chosen is voluntary; for if we choose to do something after deliberating, we do it voluntarily.
φαίνονται δέ τινες ὀλίγοι καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν διορίζειν τό τε ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἕτερον ὄν, ἐλάττους τὰς ζημίας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τπροαίρεσιν τάττοντες.
And some few of the legislators also seem to distinguish the voluntary and that which is of choice as being different, by appointing smaller penalties for voluntary acts than for those done in accordance with choice.
§1.17.8— ἔστιν οὖν ἡ προαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἐν οἷς ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι, καὶ οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ διὰ τί.
—Choice, then, is among things doable, and among those that are up to us both to do and not to do, and to do in this way or not in this way, and in which it is possible to grasp the "why".
τὸ δὲ διὰ τί οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν.
And the "why" is not simple.
§1.17.9ἐν μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρίρ, ὅταν φῇ τὸ τετράγωνον τέτταρσιν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ διὰ τί, ὅτι, φησίν, καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡρισμένης ἔλαβον τὸ διὸ τί· ἐν δέ γε τοῖς πρακτοῖς, ἐν οἷς ἡ προαίρεσις, οὐχ οὕτως (οὐδεμία γὰρ κεῖται ὡρισμένη), ἀλλʼ ἂν ἀπαιτῇ τις, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἔπραξας; ὅτι οὐκ ἐνῆν ἄλλως, ἢ ὅτι βέλτιον οὕτως. ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν συμβαινόντων, ὁποῖʼ ἂν φαίνηται βελτίω εἶναι, ταῦτα προαιρεῖται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα.
For in geometry, when one says that a quadrangle has its angles equal to four right angles, and one asks "why", one says, "because a triangle also has its angles equal to two right angles." In such matters, then, they grasp the "why" from a defined principle; but in doable matters, where choice is concerned, it is not so (for no defined principle is laid down), but if someone demands, "Why did you do this?", the answer is "Because it was not possible otherwise," or "Because it is better this way." From the very results that occur, whichever appear to be better, these they choose and for these reasons.
§1.17.10διὸ δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ βουλεύσασθαί ἐστι τὸ πῶς δεῖ, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις οὔ.
Therefore, in such matters deliberation is about "how one ought to act," but in the sciences it is not.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ βουλεύεται πῶς δεῖ γράψαι τὸ ὄνομα Ἀρχικλέους, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὡρισμένον πῶς δεῖ ῎ξγράψαι τὸ ὄνομα Ἀρχικλέους.
For no one deliberates how one ought to write the name of Archicles, because it is defined how one ought to write the name of Archicles.
ἡ οὖν ἁμαρτία οὐ γίγνεται ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ γράφειν.
The error, therefore, does not occur in thought, but in the activity of writing.
ἐν οἷς γὰρ μή ἐστιν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, οὐδὲ βουλεύονται ὑπὲρ τούτων· ἀλλʼ ἐν οἷς ἤδη ἀόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ, ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἁμαρτία.
For in matters where error does not occur in thought, neither do they deliberate about them; but where "how one ought" is already undefined, there is error.
§1.17.11ἔστιν δʼ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἐν οἷς διτταὶ αἱ ἁμαρτίαι.
And the undefined is in things doable, and in those in which errors are twofold.
ἁμαρτάνομεν οὗν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁμοίως.
We err, then, both in things doable and in things in accordance with virtues in like manner.
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς στοχαζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν ἐπὶ τὰς πεφυκυίας ὁδούς.
For in aiming at virtue we err with respect to the natural paths.
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ἁμαρτία, ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα δὲ τούτων φερόμεθα διʼ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τὰ καλὰ φεύγομεν.
For there is error both in deficiency and in excess, and we are carried toward both of these by pleasure and pain; for because of pleasure we do base things, and because of pain we flee noble things.