§1.18.1— ἔτι δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια οὐχ ὥσπτερ αἴσθησις, οἷον τῇ ὄψει οὐκ ἂν δύναιτʼ οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο ποιῆσαι ἢ ἰδεῖν, οὐδὲ τῇ ἀκοῇ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.
— Furthermore, thought is not like sensation; for instance, by sight one would not be able to do anything else but see, nor by hearing anything else but hear.
ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευόμεθα πότερον δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι τῇ ἀκοῇ ἢ ἰδεῖν.
And likewise, we do not deliberate whether we ought to hear with hearing or to see.
ἡ δὲ διάνοια οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δύναται πράττειν καὶ ἄλλα.
But thought is not of this kind; rather, it is capable of doing both this and other things.
§1.18.2διὰ τοῦτο βουλεύεσθαι ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ὑπάρχει.
For this reason, deliberation is already present here.
ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῇ αἱρέσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ περὶ τὰ τέλη (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντες ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὴν ὑγίεικν ὅτι ἀγαθόν), ἀλλʼ ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὸ τέλος, οἷον πότερον ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ὑγίειαν φαγεῖν τοῦτο ἢ οὔ.
Therefore, error in the choice of goods is not about the ends (for about these everyone is of one mind, for instance, that health is a good), but rather about the things related to the end, for instance, whether eating this is good for health or not.
μάλιστα οὖν ποιεῖ ἐν τούτοις τὸ σφάλλεσθαι ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· τὴν μὲν γὰρ φεύγομεν, τὴν δὲ αἱρούμεθα.
Thus, pleasure and pain especially cause stumbling in these matters; for we flee the latter and choose the former.
§1.18.3τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ στοχαστική, πότερον τοῦ τέλους ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον πότερον τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ καλόν.
What does virtue aim at? Is it at the end or at the means to the end? For instance, is it at the noble or at the means to the noble?
§1.18.4πῶς οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη;
How is it then with science?
πότερον τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἰδεῖν;
Is it the part of the science of building to set up the end well, or to look to the means to the end?
ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο καλῶς προθῆται, οἷον καλὴν οἰκίαν ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλος τις εὑρήσει καὶ ποριεῖ ἢ οἰκοδόμος.
For if this end, for instance, making a beautiful house, is set up well, no one else will find and provide the means to this than the builder.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπασῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
And likewise also in the case of all other sciences.
§1.18.5ὡσαύτως ἄρα δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρετῆς, μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτῆς τὸν σκοπὸν [πρὸς] τὸ τέλος, ὃ δεῖ ὀρθῶς προθέσθαι, τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· καὶ ἐξ ὧν τοῦτʼ ἔσται οὐθεὶς ἄλλος ποριεῖ, καὶ εὑρήσει ἂ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο.
Likewise, then, it would seem to hold also in the case of virtue, that its target is rather the end, which must be set up correctly, than the means to the end; and no one else will provide and find what is necessary for this, and what one ought to do for this.
καὶ εὔλογον δὲ τούτου εἶναι προθετικὴν τὴν ἀρετήν· ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, ἕκαστον καὶ προθετικὸν καὶ ποιητικόν.
And it is reasonable that virtue should set up the end; for where the principle of the best exists, each thing is both capable of setting up the end and producing it.
οὐθὲν οὖν βέλτιον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν· ταύτης γὰρ ἕνεκα καὶ τἆλλα ἐστίν, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ τούτου ἕνεκεν μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἐστίν
Nothing, then, is better than virtue; for on account of this all other things exist, and the principle is directed toward this, and it is rather for the sake of this that the means to this exist.
§1.18.6τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀρχῇ τινι ἔοικεν, καὶ τούτου ἕνεκέν ἐσπτιν ἕκαστον.
And the end is like a certain principle, and for the sake of this each thing exists.
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τρόπον τοῦτο ἔστκι.
But this will be in a proper manner.
ὥστε δῆλον ὡς κἀπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐπειδὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν αἰτία, ὅτι τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ στοχαστικὴ μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος.
So it is clear that in the case of virtue also, since it is the best cause, it aims at the end rather than at the means to the end.