§1.13.1— ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἄλλος λόγος ἐναντιοῦται, ὅς φησιν οὐχ ἑκούσιον εἶναι.
— But again, another argument opposes [this], which says that [it] is not voluntary.
ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς ἑκὼν πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· ἐπαινεῖται γάρ, ἐπαινοῦνται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις.
For the continent person acts voluntarily in performing actions in accordance with continence; for he is praised, and people are praised for voluntary actions.
εἰ δ᾿ ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον, τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον· ὁ δ᾿ ἐγκρατὴς παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει· ὥστε ὁ ἐγκρατὴς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἂν εἴη ἐγκρατής.
But if what is in accordance with appetite is voluntary, what is contrary to appetite is involuntary; and the continent person acts contrary to appetite; so that the continent person would not be continent voluntarily.
ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δοκεῖ οὐδ᾿ ἄρα τὸ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον ἐστίν. §1.13.2πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοίως· οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ λόγοι οἵπερ καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἁρμόττουσιν, ὥστε τὴν ἀπορίαν ποιήσουσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ ὀργῆς εἶναι. §1.13.3ἔτι λοιπή ἐστιν τῶν ὀρέξεων ὧν διειλόμεθα ἡ βούλησις, πρὸς τὸ ἐπισκέπτεσθαι εἴ ἐστιν ἑκούσιον.
But this does not seem [to be the case]; therefore, neither is what is in accordance with appetite voluntary. Again, in the case of things in accordance with passion, it is likewise; for the same arguments apply as in the case of appetite, so that they will produce the difficulty; for it is possible to be incontinent and continent in respect of anger. Furthermore, wish is the remaining one of the desires we distinguished, with a view to examining whether it is voluntary.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε ἀκρατεῖς ἐφ᾿ ἃ ὁρμῶσιν, ταῦτα τέως βούλονται· πράττουσιν ἄρα οἱ ἀκρατεῖς τὰ φαῦλα βουλόμενοι.
And yet incontinent people indeed wish for the things toward which they rush, at least for the time being; therefore, incontinent people perform base actions wishing [to do them].
ἑκὼν δέ γε οὐθεὶς τὰ κακὰ εἰδὼς πράττει ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής, εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά, πράττει βουλόμενος.
But no one voluntarily performs evil actions, knowing that they are evil; yet the incontinent person, knowing that evil things are evil, performs them wishing [to do so].
οὐκ ἄρα ἑκών, οὐδ᾿ ἡ βούλησις ἑκούσιον ἄρα ἐστέν. §1.13.4— ἀλλ᾿ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀναιρεῖ ἀκρασίαν καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ.
Therefore, [he does so] not voluntarily, and so neither is wish voluntary. — But this argument does away with incontinence and the incontinent person.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἑκών, οὐκ ἔστιν ψεκτός· ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ὁ ἀκρατὴς ψεκτός· ἑκὼν ἄρα· ἡ ἄρα βούλησις ἑκούσιον.
For if [he does] not [act] voluntarily, he is not blameworthy; but the incontinent person is blameworthy; therefore, [he acts] voluntarily; therefore, wish is voluntary.
ἐπεὶ οὖν λόγοι τινὲς ἐναντίοι φαίνονται, σαφέστερον λεκτέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑκουσίου.
Since, then, certain arguments appear to be opposed, we must speak more clearly about the voluntary.