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Aristotle · Great Ethics §1.14.1-1.14.3

The Concept of Force and External Causes of Action

Passage 16 of 71 · Greek

Summary

As a preparation for defining voluntariness, the text discusses how the concept of "force" applies to inanimate things, animals, and humans, distinguishing the presence of force based on whether the cause of action is external or internal.

§1.14.1πρότερον τοίνυν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον ὑπὲρ βίας καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνάγκης.
Therefore, we must first speak about force and necessity.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ βία ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις.
For force exists even in inanimate things.
ἑκάστοις γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀψύχων οἰκεῖος τόπος ἀποδεδομένος, μὲν πυρὶ ὁ ἄνω, τῇ δὲ γῇ ὁ κάτω· ἔστι μέντοι γε βιάσασθαι καὶ τὸν λίθον ἄνω φέρεσθαι καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω.
For to each of the inanimate things there is assigned a proper place, for fire the upper, and for earth the lower; yet it is possible to force even the stone to be carried upward and fire downward.
§1.14.2ἔστι δε καὶ τὸ ζῷον βιάσασθαι, οἷον ἵππον ἐπ᾿ ὀρθὸν θέοντα ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ἀποστρέψαι.
And it is also possible to force an animal, as for example to turn back a horse running straight ahead by holding it back.
ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκτὸς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν τι ἢ παρ βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἐροῦμεν βιαζομένοις ἂν ποιῶσι ποιεῖν· ἐν οἷ δ᾿ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία, οὐκέτι τούτους βιάζεσθαι ἐροῦμεν.
Therefore, in the case of all those for whom the cause of doing something contrary to nature or contrary to what they wish is external, we shall say that they act under force if they act; but in the case of those in whom the cause is in themselves, we shall no longer say that these are forced.
§1.14.3εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀντερεῖ, οὐ φάσκων φαῦλος εἶναι· βιαζόμενος γάρ φήσει ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν.
Otherwise, the incontinent person will object, denying that he is base; for he will say that he performs base actions because he is forced by his appetite.

Notes

  1. 1188bἔστι μέντοι γε βιάσασθαι — The impersonal ἔστι ("it is possible") is followed by the infinitive βιάσασθαι ("to force"), which in turn takes two accusative-with-infinitive clauses as its objects: τὸν λίθον ἄνω φέρεσθαι ("the stone to be carried upward") and τὸ πῦρ κάτω [φέρεσθαι] ("fire [to be carried] downward").
  2. 1.14.2ἀντιλαμβανόμενον — The present participle ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ("holding back") does not modify the horse (ἵππον, accusative), but is a masculine accusative singular agreeing with the implied subject of the infinitive ἀποστρέψαι ("to turn back"), referring to the generic agent (the handler).
  3. 1.14.2παρ — The reading παρ is understood as an elided form for παρ' ἅ ("contrary to what [they wish]"), where the preposition παρά governs the relative pronoun ἅ, corresponding to the preceding παρὰ φύσιν ("contrary to nature").
  4. 1.14.2βιαζομένοις ἂν ποιῶσι ποιεῖν — βιαζομένοις is a dative participle agreeing with the relative pronoun ὅσοις as its complement. ἂν ποιῶσι is a conditional clause (ἐάν + subjunctive, "if they act"), and ποιεῖν is the complementary infinitive depending on ἐροῦμεν ("we shall say that they act...").

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §1.14.1-1.14.3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:1.14.1-1.14.3

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