§1.12.1ἐπεὶ οὖν φαίνεται ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὂν τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἑκουσίου, τί ἐστι τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸ ἑκούσιον.
Since, therefore, being virtuous appears to be up to us, it is necessary next to speak about the voluntary, what the voluntary is; for this, the voluntary, is the most crucial thing for virtue.
ἔκούσιον δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν οὕτως ῥηθῆναί ἐστιν ὃ πράττομεν μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι· ἀλλʼ ἴσως σαφέστερον λεκτέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. §1.12.2ἔστιν οὖν καθ᾿ ὃ πράττομεν ὄρεξις· ὀρέξεως δʼ ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἐπιθυμία θυμὸς βούλησις.
Simply speaking, then, the voluntary is what we perform without being forced; but perhaps we must speak more clearly about it. There is, then, that in accordance with which we perform actions, namely desire; and of desire there are three species: appetite, passion, and wish.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν πρᾶξιν ἐπισκεπτέον, πότερον ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀκούσιον.
First, then, we must examine action in accordance with appetite, whether it is voluntary or involuntary.
[οἷον]τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀκούσιον οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν.
Now, it would not seem to be involuntary.
διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν;
Why and on what ground?
?ὅτι ὅσα μή ἑκόντες πράττομεν, ἀναγκαζόμενοι πράττομεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης πραττομένοις πᾶσιν ἕπεται λύπη, τοῖς δὲ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν πραττομένοις ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστε οὑτωσί γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν πραττόμενα ἀκούσια, ἀλλʼ ἑκούσια. §1.12.3— ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἄλλος λόγος τις τούτῳ ἐναντιοῦται, ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.
Because all that we do not voluntarily, we do under compulsion, and pain follows upon all things done under compulsion, whereas pleasure follows upon things done through appetite; so that, in this way at least, things done through appetite would not be involuntary, but voluntary. — But again, another argument opposes this, namely the one concerning incontinence.
οὐθεὶς γάρ, φησί, πράττει ἑκὼν τὰ κακά, εἰδὼς ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μήν, φησίν, ὅ γε ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι ταῦτα φαῦλά ἐστιν ὅμως πράπττει, καὶ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν γε πράττει· οὐκ ἄρα ἑκών· ἀναγκαζόμενος ἄρα. §1.12.4ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀπαντήσεται.
For, it says, no one performs evil actions voluntarily, knowing that they are evil; yet, it says, the incontinent person, knowing that these things are base, nevertheless performs them, and indeed performs them in accordance with appetite; therefore, not voluntarily; therefore, under compulsion. Here again, the same argument will confront this.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῇ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. — καὶ ἄλλως τοῦτ᾿ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον, ὅτι ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν πράττει.
For if it is in accordance with appetite, it is not under compulsion; for pleasure follows upon appetite, and things done through pleasure are not under compulsion. — And in another way too, this would become clear, that the incontinent person acts voluntarily.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν· ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν ἂν πράττοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν.
For those who do injustice do injustice voluntarily, and incontinent people are unjust and do injustice; so that the incontinent person would perform actions in accordance with incontinence voluntarily.