§1.11.1οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ὁμοίως τούτοις καὶ ἐπε᾿ ἀνθρώπου.
In this way, then, and similarly to these things, it is also the case with man.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γεννητικόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος οὐσίας, ἔκ τινων ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν πράξεων ὧν πράττει ἄνθρωπος γεννητικὸν ἔστίν.
For since man is generative of substance, he is generative, from certain principles, also of the actions which man performs.
τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο;
For what else could be the case?
οὔτε γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν λέγομεν πράττειν οὔτε τῶν ἐμψύχων τῶν ἄλλων ἔξω ἀνθρώπων.
For we do not say that any of the inanimate things perform actions, nor any of the other living things besides man.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πράξεών ἐστι γεννητικός.
It is clear, then, that man is generative of actions.
§1.11.2ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁρῶμεν μεταβαλλούσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πράττομεν εἰσὶν δὲ αἱ πράξεις γεγενημέναι ἔκ τινων ἀρχῶν, δῆλον ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ αἱ πράξεις μεταβάλλουσιν, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πράξεων, ἀφ᾿ ὧν εἰσί, μεταβάλλουσιν, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν παραβάλλοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ.
Since, therefore, we see actions changing and we never perform the same actions, and actions have come to be from certain principles, it is clear that, since actions change, the principles of actions too, from which they are, change, just as we said by way of comparison in the case of the things in geometry.
§1.11.3ἀρχὴ δ᾿ ἐστὶ πράξεως καὶ σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης προαίρεσις καὶ βούλησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν.
And the principle of action, both of virtuous and of base action, is choice and wish and everything in accordance with reason.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ αὗται μεταβάλλουσιν.
It is clear, then, that these too change.
μεταβάλλομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἑκόντες· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ [καὶ] ἡ προαίρεσις μεταβάλλει [γὰρ] ἑκουσίως.
And we also change in our actions voluntarily; so that the principle, namely choice, also changes voluntarily.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ἂν εἴη καὶ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ φαύλοις.
Therefore, it is clear that to be both virtuous and base would be up to us.
§1.11.4— ἴσως οὖν λέγοι ἄν τις, ἐπειδήπερ ἐπʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν τὸ δικαίῳ εἶναι καὶ σπουδαίῳ, ἐὰν βούλωμαι, ἔσομαι πάντων σπουδαιότατος. οὐ δὴ δυνατὸν τοῦτο.
— Perhaps, then, someone might say: "Since to be just and virtuous is up to me, if I wish, I shall be the most virtuous of all." But this is certainly not possible.
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γίγνεται τοῦτο.
Because neither does this happen in the case of the body.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις βούληται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ σώματος, καὶ δὴ πάντων ἄριστον ἕξει τὸ σῶμα.
For it is not the case that if someone wishes to take care of the body, he will at once have the body which is the best of all.
δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μόνον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ φύσει γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα καλὸν κἀγαθόν.
For it is necessary not only for the care to be present, but also for the body to be noble and good by nature.
βέλτιον μὲν οὖν ἕξει τὸ σῶμα, ἄριστα μέντοι πάντων οὔ.
Thus, he will have his body in a better state, but certainly not the best of all.
§1.11.5ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ προαιρούμενος εἶναι σπουδαιότατος, ἂν μὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπάρξῃ, βελτίων μέντοι ἔσται.
And one must assume similarly also in the case of the soul; for he who chooses to be most virtuous will not be so, unless nature too is present, yet he will be better.