§1.1.19ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἐν μὲν. ἰατρικῇ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν, ἐν δὲ κυβερνητικῇ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἑκάστῃ δʼ ἕκαστος.
But indeed, when it is good (the right time) is known by the physician in medicine, by the helmsman in helmsmanship, and by each in each of the others.
πότε μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τεμεῖν ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν, πότε δὲ δεῖ πλεῖν ὁ κυβερνήτης.
For when it is necessary to make an incision is known by the physician, and when it is necessary to sail by the helmsman.
ἐν ἑκάστῃ δὲ τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἕκιαστος τὸ καθʼ ἑαυτὸν εἰδήσει· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ κυβερνητικῇ ἀγαθὸν πότε εἰδήσει, οὔτε ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ ἐν ἰατρικῇ.
In each case, each will know when it is good for his own part; for neither will the physician know when it is good in helmsmanship, nor the helmsman when it is good in medicine.
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδʼ οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον· τὸ γὰρ πότε ἐν πάσαις κοινόν.
Therefore, not even in this way must we speak about the common good; for "when" is common to all.
§1.1.20ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πρός τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας κοινὸν μὲν ἀπάσαις, οὐδεμιᾶς δʼ ἐστὶν οὔτε δυνάμεως οὔτʼ ἐπιστήμης εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πότε ἀγαθοῦ, οὐδʼ αὗ τῆς πολιτικῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν.
Similarly, both the good in relation and the common good according to the other categories are common to all, yet it belongs to no capacity or science to speak of when it is good in each, nor is it again the task of politics to speak about the common good.
ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀρίστου.
Therefore, we must speak about the good, and about the best, and about the best for us.
§1.1.21—ἔσωος δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμενόν τι δεικνύναι, τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς αἰσῦητ??ῖς.
—And perhaps one who wishes to show something ought not to use examples that are not clear, but rather use clear things for unclear things, and sensible things for intelligible things.
[καὶ] ταῦτα γὼρ φανερώτερα.
For these are clearer.
ὅταν οὖν ὑπὲρ τὰγαθοδ τις ἐγχειρ λέγων, οὐ λε??τέ??ν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας.
When, therefore, one attempts to speak about the good, one must not speak about the Idea.
§1.1.22καίτ οἴσνταί γε δεῖν, ὅταν??τὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθ??ῦ λέγωσιν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας δεῖν λέγειν· ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ μάλεστα ἀγαθοῦ φασι??ν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον μάλιστʼἐστὶν [τὸ] τ??ιοῦτον, ὥστεμάλιστ’?? ἀμαθὸν ἣ ἰδέα, ὡ σἴονται.
And yet they think they must, whenever they speak about the good, speak about the Idea; for they say they must speak about the most good, and each thing itself is most of that sort, so that the Idea would be most good, as they think.
§1.1.23ὁ δη τοιεῦτος λόγος ἀληθὴς μέν ἐστιν ἴσως· δλλʼ οὐχ ἡ πωολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δύνκρπς, ὑπὲρ ἧς νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τούωτου σκοπεῖ τἀγ??θ??, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀγαθοῦ, [οὐδεμία γὰρ οὔτʼἐπιφκήμη οὔτε δύναμις ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ὥστε οὐδʼ ἡ πολιτεή.
Such an argument is perhaps true; yet political science or capacity, with which our present discourse is concerned, does not consider about this good, but about the good for us [for no science or capacity says of its end that it is good, so that neither does politics].
] διὸ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ νὴν ἰδέαν ὠγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον ποιεπεῖται.
Therefore, it does not make its discourse about the good according to the Idea.
§1.1.24ἀλλʼ ἴσας [φησὶ] τούτῳ τὰγαθ ἀρχῇ χρησάμsνος ὑπὲρ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα, ἐκ τούτου πρ??βάς, ἐρεῖ οὐδʼ οὕτ??ς ὀρθῶς.
But perhaps one will say that, using this good as a starting-point (principle) for particular goods, and proceeding from this, he will speak. Not even so would it be correct.
δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς οἰκείας λαμβάνειν.
For one must assume appropriate starting-points.
ἄοπον γάρ, εἴ πις βονλόμ??ν??ς τὸ τρίγωνον ὡς δυσῖν ὀρθαῖς ἴας ἔχον δεῖξαι, λάβοι ὡφχὴν ὅτι ἡ ψυγὴ ἀθάναως.
For it is strange if someone, wishing to show that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles, should assume as a starting-point that the soul is immortal.
§1.1.25οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία, δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀργὴν οἰκείαν εἶναι καὶ συνημμένην· ν??ν δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον δείξει τας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσκς ἔχ??ν τὺ τρίγωνον.
For it is not appropriate, whereas the starting-point must be appropriate and connected; but as it is, even without the soul being immortal, one will show that the triangle has angles equal to two right angles.
§1.1.26ὁμ??ίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστα θεάσασθαι τὰ ἄλλα ἄνευ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀγαθρῦ δα οὐκ οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τούτου τὰγαθσῦ. — * οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδʼ ὁ ἐποίει τὰς ἀρενάς.
Similarly in the case of goods, it will be possible to contemplate the other goods without the good according to the Idea, so that this good is not an appropriate starting-point. — Moreover, neither did [Socrates] treat the virtues correctly.
ἐκεῖνας γὰρ οὐὰὲν ᾤετρ δεῖν μάτ??ν εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶν??ι συνέβαινεν αὐτ τὰς ἀρετὰς μάτην εἶναι.
For he thought that none of them ought to be in vain, but from the virtues being sciences it resulted that the virtues themselves were in vain.
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι?? τῶν ἐναστημῶν συμβαίνει ἅμα εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστι καὶ εἶναι ἐπισνήμονα (εἰ γὰρ ἐατριπήν πις οἶδεν?? ἐστέν, καὶ??ς οὗτος εὐθέως ἐστίν,??μ??ίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισ??ημῶν) ἀλλʼ οὐπ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τοῦτ?? σ υμιβαίνει οὖ γὰρ εἴ τις??ἶδεν?? δικαιοσύνην τέ ἐκτ??ν, εὐθέως δίκαιος ἐστίν, ὡς δʼ αὕτως κἀπὶ υῶν ἄλλων.
Because in the case of sciences it happens that one simultaneously knows what the science is and is a scientist (for if someone knows what medicine is, he is also immediately a physician, and similarly with the other sciences); but this does not happen in the case of the virtues; for if someone knows what justice is, he is not immediately just, and likewise also in the case of the others.
σημβαίνει οὖν καὶ μάπην τὰς ἀρεκὰς εἶναι κε μὴ εἶναι ἐπ??στήκας.
It results, therefore, both that the virtues are in vain and that they are not sciences.