§1.2.1ἐπεὲ δʼ ὑπὲρ τούτορν διώρισται, πειραθῶμςν ποσαχῶς λέγ??αι.
Now since these things have been defined, let us try to say in how many ways [the good] is spoken of.
ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀμκθῶν τὰ μὲν τέμια, τὰ δʼ ἐπαινι??ά, τὰ δὲ δ??νάμες.
For of goods, some are precious, some praiseworthy, and some capacities.
τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγα?? τοοιῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτι??ν, οἷον ψυχή, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχ??τ??ρον, ἡ ἀρχή, τὰ τοιωῦτα·
By precious I mean such a thing as the divine, the better, such as the soul, the intellect, the older, the starting-point, and the like; for precious things are those for which there is honor, and honor accompanies all such things.
τίμια γὰρ ἐφʼ οἷς ἡ τιμή, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις πᾶσιν τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ οὐκοᾶν καὶ ἡ ἀρευ άμιεν, ὅταν γε δὴ ἀπʼ αὐτῆς σπ??υδαῖός τις γένητεα· ἤδή γὰρ οὗτος εἰς τ τῆς ὡρετῆς σχῆμα ἥκει.
Therefore, virtue is also precious, at least when someone becomes excellent from it; for already this person has come into the form of virtue.
§1.2.2τὰ δʼ ἐπαινετά, εἷεν ὡρπαί· ὡπὸ γὰρ τῶν ποτ’ αὐτὰς πράξεων ἑ ἔπαινος γίνεται.
And the praiseworthy things would be the virtues; for praise comes from actions according to them.
τὰ δὲ δ??νάμεος, οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ?? σπονδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνηται χήσασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς·
Capacities are, for example, office, wealth, strength, beauty; for both the excellent person could use these well, and the base person badly.
§1.2.3διὸ δονώμεις τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθν ἀγαθὰ μὲν δὴ εἰσύν (δοκιμάζεται γὰρ τ τοῦ σπουδαίου αὐτῶν. ἕκαστον χρήσει, οὐ τῇ τοῦ φαύλου)· τοῖς δʼ αὐτοῖς ταύτοις συμβέβηκεν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν αἰτέαν εἶναι.
Therefore, such things are called capacities. They are indeed goods [for each of them is approved by the use of the excellent person, and not by that of the base person]; but it also happens to these same goods that fortune is the cause of their coming to be.
ἀπὸ τύχης γὰρ καὶ πλοῦτος γίνεται καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλως ὅσα εἰς δυνάμεως τάξιν ἥκει.
For from fortune both wealth comes to be, and office, and in general whatever comes into the class of capacity.
§1.2.4λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ σωστικὸν καὶ ποιηικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, οἷον γυμνάσια ὑγιείας καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
There remains also a fourth kind of goods, that which preserves and produces good, such as gymnastic exercises for health and any other such thing.
§1.2.5ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ ἄλλην ἔχει τἀγαθὰ διαίρεσιν· οἶόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἱρετά, τὰ δʼ οὔ.
But still goods have another division; for example, of goods some are desirable in every way and altogether, and some are not.
οἷον ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ πάντῃ καὶ πάντως αἴρεταί, ἰσχὺς δὲ καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ δύναμις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε πάντῃ οὔτε πάντως.
For example, justice and the other virtues are desirable both in every way and altogether, but strength and wealth and power and the like are neither in every way nor altogether.
ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως· §1.2.6τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν τέλη τὰ δʼ οὐ τέλη, οἷον ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια τέλος, τὰ δὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν οὐ τέλη.
Still in another way: for of goods some are ends and some are not ends, for example, health is an end, but things for the sake of health are not ends.
καὶ ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει, τούτων ἀεὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια βέλτιον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινά, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ καθόλου τοῦτο βέλτιον οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. — πάλιν αὐτῶν τῶν τελῶν βέλτιον ἀεὶ τὸ τέλειον τοῦ ἀτελοῦς.
And wherever things are so, the end among them is always better, for example, health is better than healthy things, and simply and always in general that is better for the sake of which the other things exist. — Again, among the ends themselves, the complete is always better than the incomplete.
§1.2.7τέλειον δέ ἐστιν οὗ παραγενομένου μηθενὸς ἔτι προσδεόμεθα, ἀτελὲς δέ οὗ παραγενομένου προσδεόμεθα τινός, οἷον τῆς δικαιοσύνης μὲν [μόνον] παραγενομένης πολλῶν προσδεόμεθα, τῆς δὲ εὐδαιμονίας παραγενομένης οὐδενὸς ἔτι προσδεόμεθα.
And complete is that which, when it is present, we need nothing further; and incomplete is that which, when it is present, we need something further, as when justice [alone] is present we need many things, but when happiness is present we need nothing further.
τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἡμῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὅ ἐστι τέλος τέλειον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλειον τέλος τἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
This, then, is the best for us which we are seeking, which is a complete end; and the complete end is the good and the end of goods.
§1.2.8ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου;
Is it so as being itself also counted in?
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον.
But this is strange.
τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδή ἐστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντίθεμεν· ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βέλτεστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῇς, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον.
For since the best is a complete end, and the complete end, to speak simply, would seem to be nothing other than happiness, and we compose happiness from many goods; if, indeed, in considering the best you also count it in itself, it will be better than itself.
αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἐστίν.
For it is itself the best.
οἷον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεὶς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκόπει τί τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον· βέλτιστον δέ ἐστιν ὑγίεια· εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ βέλπιστον.
For example, having posited the healthy things and health, consider what is the best of all these; and the best is health; if, then, this is the best of all, it is also better than itself.
§1.2.9ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει.
Indeed, a strange thing results.
οὐ δὴ ἴσως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον. — ἀλλὰ ἆρά γε οὕτω πως, οἷον χωρὶς αὐτοῦ;
Surely, then, perhaps we should not consider the best in this way. — But is it in some such way as being apart from it?
ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον;
Or is this also strange?
ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν ἔκ τινων ἀγαθῶν ένηή· τὸ δʼ ἐξ ὦν ἀγαθῶν σύγκειται, σκοπεῖν εἰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν βέλτιον, ἄτοπον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τι χωρὶς τούτων ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.
For happiness is composed of certain goods; and to consider whether it is better than the goods of which it is composed is strange; for happiness is not something else apart from these, but these very things.
§1.2.10— ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε οὑτωσί πως ἄν τις ὀρθῶς σκοποῖτο συγκρίνων τὸ ἄριστον;
— But is it in some such way that one would consider correctly, comparing the best?
οἷον αὐτὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν συγκρίνων πρὸς ἄλλα ἃ μή ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνόντα, οὕτω τὸ ἄριστον σκοπῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν σκοποῖτο;
For example, comparing happiness itself, which is made up of these goods, with other things that are not contained in it, would one thus consider the best correctly?
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλοῦν τὸ ἄριστον ὃ ζητοῦμεν νῦν.
But the best we are seeking now is not simple.
οἷον λέγοι ἄν τις εἶναι ἄριστον τὴν φρόνησιν ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καθʼ ἓν συγκρινομένων.
For example, one might say that prudence is the best of all goods compared one by one.
§1.2.11ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως ζητητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν.
But perhaps we must not seek the best good in this way.
τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ζητοῦμεν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις μόνη οὖσα οὐ τέλειον· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ ἄριστον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, οὐδὲ τὸ οὕτως ἄριστον.
For we are seeking the complete good, and prudence being alone is not complete; therefore, this is not the best we are seeking, nor the best in this way.