§1.1.11ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄρα ἡμῖν λεπτέον ὡγαθοῦ. — πάλιν δὲ καὶ τρῦτο διελεῖν δεῖ.
Therefore, we must speak about the political good. — Again, we must also make a distinction here.
ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ πῶς λεγεμένου;
About the good in what sense?
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἁπαλεῦν.
For it is not simple.
λέχεται γὰρ ἀγαθ??ν ἢ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ διὰ?? αὐσ?? φύσιν αἱρετόν· ἢ οὗ τἆλλο μεκασχόντα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, το??το δέ ἐστιν ἡ ίδέα τὰγαθοῦ.
For a thing is called good either as the best in each of existing things—this being that which is desirable for its own nature—or that by partaking in which other things are good, which is the Idea of the good.
§1.1.12—τότερον οὖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεἴ, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ κοινὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχον ἀγακθόν;
—Should we, then, speak about the Idea of the good, or not, but rather about the common good that exists in all things?
ἕτέρον γὰρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦτο δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.
For this would seem to be different from the Idea.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἰδέα χωριστὸν καὶ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὐτό· τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἐν ἅπεασιν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστιν δὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ χωριστῷ.
For the Idea is separate and exists by itself, whereas the common exists in all things, and so is certainly not the same as the separate.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς αὐτὸ καθʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχοι.
For the separate and that which is by nature suited to exist by itself could never exist in all things.
§1.1.13πότερον οὖν ὑπὲρ τούτου δεῖ λέγειν τἀγαθοῦ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ οὔ;
Should we, then, speak about this inherent good, or not?
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ κοινόν, ὡς ὁ ὁρισμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπαγωγή·
Because this is the common, as definition and induction show.
ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς βούλεται τὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν λέγειν, ἤτοι ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὅτι κακὸν ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο ᾖ λέγει δὲ ὁ ὅρος ὅτι τὸ τοιόνδʼ ἀγαθὸν καθόλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ αὐτὸ διʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν·
And definition wishes to state the essence of each thing, either that it is good, or that it is bad, or whatever else it may be; and the definition states that such and such is the universal good, which is desirable for its own sake.
τὸ δὲ ἐν ἅποσιν ἐνυπάρχον ὅμοιον τῷ ὅρῳ ἐστίν·
And that which is inherent in all things is similar to the definition.
§1.1.14ὁ δὲ ὅρος λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἐπιστήμη δέ γε οὐδὲ δύναμις οὐδεμία λέγει ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἄλλης δυνάμεώς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι (οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς οὔτε ὁ οἰκοδόμος λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγίεια οὐδὲ ἡ οἰκία, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ὃ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, καὶ ὡς ποιεῖ, ὃ δʼ οἰκίαν)·
But while the definition states that it is good, no science or capacity states concerning its own end that it is good, but to contemplate this belongs to another capacity (for neither the physician nor the builder says that health or the house is good, but the former says that he produces health, and how he produces it, and the latter says the same of the house).
§1.1.15δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ τῇ πολιτικῇ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀμαθοῦ λεκτέον τοῦ κοινοῦ.
It is clear, then, that neither must politics speak about the common good.
μία γάρ ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς ἦν λέγειν οὔτε δυνάμεως οὔτʼ ἔπιστήμης ὡς τέλος· οὐδʼ ἄρα τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστιν τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ὁρισμόν.
For it too is one of the remaining sciences; and it was the task of no capacity or science to speak of its end as good; therefore, it is not the task of politics to speak about the common good according to the definition.
§1.1.16ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν κοινοῦ.
Moreover, nor about the common good according to induction.
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι ὅταν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαί [καί] τι τῶν μέρος ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῷ ὁρισμῷ δείκνυμεν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐφαρμόττει ἐπί τε τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαι ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὅταν θέλωμεν δεῖαι ὅτι ἡ μεγαλνψυχία ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, φαμὲν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἀπλῶς αἱ ἀρεταί, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία ἀρετή, ὥστε καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυγία ἀγαθόν
Because when we wish to show that some particular thing is good, we either show by definition that the same account applies both to the good and to this which we wish to show is good, or by induction, as when we wish to show that greatness of soul is good, we say that justice is good and courage and simply the virtues, and greatness of soul is a virtue, so that greatness of soul is also good.
§1.1.17οὐδὲ δὴ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λεπτέον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀδύνατα συμβήσεται τούτῳ καὶ τ κατὰ τὸν ὅρον κοινῷ ἀγαθῷ.
Neither, indeed, must politics speak about the common good according to induction, because the same impossibilities will result for this as for the common good according to the definition.
ὅτι γὰρ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ ἐρεῖ. — δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀρίστου τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀρίστου
For that it is good, it will say here too. — It is clear, then, that we must speak about the best good, and the best that is best for us.
§1.1.18τὸ δʼ ὅλον ἴδοι ἄν τις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν μιᾶς οὔτʼ ἐπιστήμης οὔτε δυνάμεως τὸ ὑπὲρ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ σκοπεῖν.
And on the whole, one might see that it is the task of no single science or capacity to consider about every good.
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι τἀγαθὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἐστίν· καὶ γάρ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ πότε καὶ πρός τι [καὶ τινὶ] καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν ἀπάσαις.
Because the good is in all the categories: both in the "what" (substance) and in the "of what sort" (quality) and in the "how much" (quantity) and "when" (time) and "relation" and simply in all of them.