§1.1.1Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν, πρῶτον ἄν εἴη σκεπτέον τίνος ἐστὶ μέρος τὸ ἦθος ὡς μὲν οὖν συντόμως εἰπτεῖν, δόξειεν 〈ἂν〉 οὐκ ἄλλης ἢ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι μέρος.
Since we purpose to speak about ethics, we must first consider of what character is a part of; to speak briefly, then, it would seem to be a part of nothing else than politics.
ἔστι γὰρ οὐθὲν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι, λέγω δʼ οἷον σπουδαῖον·
For it is impossible to do anything in political affairs without being of a certain character, by which I mean, for instance, excellent.
τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναί ἐστι τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν·
And to be excellent is to possess the virtues.
§1.1.2δεῖ ἄρα, εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ ἦθος εἶναι σπουδαῖος·
Therefore, if anyone is to be practical in political affairs, he must be excellent in his character.
§1.1.3μέρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς, τὸ δʼ ὅλον καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν δικαίως δοκεῖ ἄν μοι ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία οὐκ ἠθικὴν ἀλλὰ πολιτικήν.
Therefore, as it seems, the study concerning characters is both a part and a starting point of politics, and it seems to me that the study as a whole would justly bear the name not of ethics but of politics.
§1.1.4— δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρῶτον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται.
—Therefore, as it seems, we must first speak about virtue, both what it is and from what it arises.
σὐθὲν γὰρ ἴσως ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὲν τὴν ἀρετήν, πῶς δὲ ἔσται καὶ ἐκ τίνων μὴ ἐπαΐειν.
For it is perhaps of no use to know what virtue is, if we do not understand how it will arise and from what.
οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπως εἰδήσομεν τί ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται σκέψασθαι.
For we must not only consider in order to know what it is, but also examine from what it will arise.
ἅμα γὰρ εἰδῆσαι βουλόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ εἶναι τοιοῦτοι· τοῦτο δʼ οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἐὰν μή εἰδῶμεν καὶ ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς ἔσται.
For we wish both to know and to be such ourselves; but we shall not be able to do this unless we know both from what and how it will arise.
§1.1.5— ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν εἰδῆσαι τί ἐστιν ἀρετή (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται καὶ πῶς ἔσται, ἀγνοοῦντα τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν)·
—It is therefore necessary to know what virtue is (for it is not easy to know from what and how it will arise if one is ignorant of what it is, just as is the case in the sciences).
οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν οὐδʼ εἴ τινες πρότερον ὑπὲρ τούτων εἰρήκασιν.
But we must not overlook if any others have spoken of these things before.
§1.1.6πρῶτος μὲν οὗν ἐνεχείρησεν Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖο· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος.
First, then, Pythagoras attempted to speak about virtue, but not correctly; for by reducing the virtues to numbers, he did not make the inquiry proper to the virtues; for justice is not an equal times equal number.
§1.1.7μετὰ τοῦτον Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόμενος βέλτιον καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εἶπτεν ὑπὲρ τούτων, οὐκ δρθῶς δὲ οὐδʼ οὗτος.
After him, Socrates came along and spoke better and more extensively on these matters, but he too was not correct.
τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν εἶναι ἀδύνατον.
For he made the virtues sciences; but this is impossible.
αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστῆμοι πᾶσαι μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν τῷ δανοητικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεται μορίῳ· γίνονται οὗν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι κατ᾿ αὖτὸν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορἱῳ·
For all sciences are accompanied by reason, and reason arises in the intellectual part of the soul; therefore, according to him, all the virtues arise in the rational part of the soul.
συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος.
It happens, therefore, that by making the virtues sciences, he does away with the irrational part of the soul, and in doing this he also does away with both passion and character.
§1.1.8διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἥψατο ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν.
Therefore, he did not grasp the virtues correctly in this way.
μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Πλάτων δείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ [τὰς] ἀρετὰς προσηκούσας.
After this, Plato divided the soul correctly into the rational part and the irrational part, and assigned to each the fitting virtues.
μέχρι κὲν οὖν τούτου καλῶς·
So far, then, it was well done.
μετὰ μέντοι τοῦτο οὐκέτι ἐρθῶρ.
After this, however, it was no longer correct.
τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν κατέμιξεν [καὶ συνέζευξεν] εἰς τὴν πραχματείαν τὴν ὑπὴρ τἀγαθοῦ, οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον·
For he mixed up [and joined] virtue with the inquiry concerning the good, which is not correct; for it is not proper.
ὑαὲρ γὰρ νῶν ὅντν καὶ ἀληθείας λέγυντα οὐκ ἔδει ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ κἐικείνῳ κ??ιν??ν.
For in speaking about existing things and truth, he ought not to have discussed virtue; for there is nothing in common between the former and the latter.
§1.1.9—??ὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τ??σοῦτον ἐφήψαντο καὶ οὕτως·
—These men, then, touched upon it to this extent and in this way.
ἐχ??μενον δʼ ἂν εἴη μετὰ υαῦτα σκώψασθαι τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὑπὲρ τούτων.
It would be next after this to examine what we ourselves ought to say concerning these things.
πρῶτον μὰν??ὖν ἰδε??ν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήκης καὶ δυνάμεως ἐσπί τι τώλ??ς, καὶ τ??ῦτʼ ἀγαθόν· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὔτʼ ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δύναμες ἕνκεν κ??ῦ ἐστίν.
First, then, we must see that of every science and capacity there is some end, and this is good; for no science or capacity exists for the sake of evil.
§1.1.10εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τ?? τέλος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῆς βελσίστης βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη.
If, therefore, of all capacities the end is good, it is clear that of the best capacity the end would be the best.
ὠλλὰ μ??ν γε π??λισικὴ βελείστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλ??ς αὐτῇς ἂν εἴη ** ἀγαθόν.
But politics is the best capacity, so that its end would be the highest good.
ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, ὡς ἔικεν, ἡμῖν λεκτέον, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ κ??ῦ θεῶν ἀγωθοῦ· ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ μὲν τ??ύτου καὶ ἄλλος λόγος κα ἀλλοτρία ἡ σκέψις.
It is about the good, therefore, as it seems, that we must speak, and not about the good in the absolute sense, but that which is for us; for it is not about the good of the gods; for concerning that there is another discourse and the inquiry is of a different kind.