§2.6#2τῶν δὴ φύσει ὄντων αἴτιον τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ἑκάστου φύσις αὕτη, περὶ ἧς οὐδὲν λέγει.
Indeed, the cause of things that exist by nature is their being so, and this is the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing.
οὐδὲν ἄρα περὶ φύσεως λέγει.
Therefore, he says nothing about nature.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγαθόν· ὁ δὲ τὴν μίξιν μόνον ἐπαινεῖ.
Furthermore, this is also the well-being and the good; but he praises only the mixture.
καίτοι τά γε στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ· θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.
And yet, it is not Strife, but Love that separates the elements, which are by nature prior to the god; and these too are gods.
Ἔτι δὲ περὶ κινήσεως ἁπλῶς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν διότι ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτ᾿ ἦν φιλίᾳ εἶναι τὸ κινήσει τοιᾳδί, νείκει δὲ τὸ τοιᾳδί.
Furthermore, he speaks of motion in a simple manner; for it is not sufficient to say that Love and Strife move them, unless being-for-love was to move them in this particular way, and being-for-strife in that particular way.
ἔδει οὖν ἢ ὁρίσασθαι ἢ ὑποθέσθαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ ἀκριβῶς ἢ μαλακῶς, ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως. ἔτι δ᾿ ἐπεὶ.
It was necessary, therefore, either to define, or to assume, or to demonstrate this, either precisely or laxly, or in some other way.
φαίνεται καὶ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινούμενα τὰ σώματα, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν (οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω μὲν οὐ βίᾳ, κάτω δὲ βίᾳ), τῷ δὲ βίᾳ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ βίᾳ, ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι.
Moreover, since bodies are seen to be moved both by force and contrary to nature, and also according to nature (for instance, fire upwards not by force, but downwards by force), and what is according to nature is contrary to what is by force, and since force exists, there must also be motion according to nature.
ταύτην οὖν ἡ φιλία κινεῖ, ἢ οὔ;
Does Love, then, move them with this motion, or not?
τοὐναντίον γὰρ τὴν γῆν κάτω¹ καὶ διακρίσει ἔοικεν· καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ νεῖκος αἴτιον τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ἢ ἡ φιλία.
For, on the contrary, it seems to move earth downwards, and this by way of separation; and Strife is more the cause of motion according to nature than Love is.
ὥστε καὶ ὅλως παρὰ φύσιν ἡ φιλία ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον.
So that generally Love would rather be contrary to nature.
ἁπλῶς δὲ εἰ μὴ ἡ φιλία ἢ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐδεμία κίνησίς ἐστιν οὐδὲ μονή.
And simply, if neither Love nor Strife moves them, of the bodies themselves there is no motion or rest.
ἀλλ᾿ ἄτοπον.
But this is absurd.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαίνεται κινούμενα· διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἠνέχθη δ᾿ ἄνω ὁ αἰθὴρ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, ἀλλ᾿ ὁτὲ μέν φησιν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης (“οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι δ᾿ ἄλλως”), ὁτὲ δέ φησι πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ᾿ αἰθήρ, φησί, “μακρῇσι κατὰ χθόνα δύετο ῥίζαις. ” ἄμα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησὶν ἐπί τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας.
Moreover, they are also seen to be in motion; for though Strife separated them, the ether was carried upwards not by Strife, but sometimes he says as if by chance ("for thus it happened to run then, though often otherwise"), and sometimes he says that fire has a nature to be carried upwards, while the ether, he says, "sank down beneath the earth with long roots." At the same time, he also says that the world is in a similar state now under Strife and formerly under Love.
τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κινοῦν πρῶτον καὶ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως;
What, then, is the first mover and the cause of motion?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλά τινος κινήσεως ταῦτα σἴτια, εἴ ἐστιν¹ ἐκεῖνο ἀρχή.
For surely it is not Love and Strife, but these are causes of some particular motion, if that other is the principle.
Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἢ ἕν τι αὐτῶν· αἱ γὰρ ἀλλοιώσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς ἔσονται, οἶον τὸ μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἄμουσον, ἢ μνήμη ἢ λήθη;
It is also absurd if the soul is from the elements or is some one of them; for how will the alterations of the soul occur, such as being musical and again unmusical, or memory or forgetfulness?
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχή, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει αὐτῇ ὅσα πυρὶ ᾗ πῦρ· εἰ δὲ μικτόν, τὰ σωματικά· τούτων δ᾿ οὐδὲν σωματικόν.
For it is clear that if the soul is fire, as many affections will belong to it as belong to fire qua fire; and if it is a mixture, bodily affections; but none of these is bodily.