Aristotle · On Generation and Corruption §2.7
Formation of Mixtures through Intermediate Qualities
Summary
Aristotle addresses the generation of mixtures from elements by pointing out the difficulties in both Empedocles' theory of simple juxtaposition and the theory assuming a single common matter, and details the process of mixing as an intermediate state wherein contrary qualities compromise each other's excesses according to their proportions in actuality and potentiality.
§2.77.
7.
Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦτων ἑτέρας ἔργον ἐστὶ θεωρίας.
But concerning these things, it is the task of another inquiry.
περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα συνέστηκεν, ὅσοις μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινὸν ἢ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἅλληλα, ἀνάγκη εἰ θάτερον τούτων, καὶ θάτερον συμβαίνειν·
But concerning the elements out of which bodies are composed, for those who think there is some common substrate or that they change into one another, it is necessary, if one of these is the case, that the other also happens.
ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ποιοῦσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν μηδ᾿ ὡς ἐξ ἑκάστου, πλὴν ὡς ἐκ τοίχου πλίνθους, ἄτοπον πῶς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔσονται σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.
On the other hand, for those who do not make them generate from one another, nor make generation from each of them except as bricks from a wall, it is absurd how from them there will be flesh and bones and any other thing whatsoever.
ἔχει δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννῶσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕτερόν τι παρ᾿ αὐτά.
But what is being said also holds a difficulty for those who generate them from one another, namely, in what manner something else, distinct from them, comes to be from them.
λέγω δ᾿ οἶον ἔστιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ τούτου γίνεσθαι πῦρ· ἔστι γάρ τι κοινὸν τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
I mean, for example, that it is possible for water to come from fire and fire from this, for there is some common underlying substrate.
ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ σὰρξ ἐξ αὐτῶν γίνεται καὶ μυελός· ταῦτα δὴ γίνεται πῶς;
But indeed, flesh also comes from them, and marrow; how, then, do these come to be?
ἐκείνοις τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἔσται τρόπος;
For what will be the manner for those who speak like Empedocles?
ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μῖγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ᾿ ἄλληλα συγκειμένων.
For there must be composition, just as a wall is made of bricks and stones; and this mixture will consist of the elements being preserved, but put together beside one another in small parts.
οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον.
In this way, indeed, flesh and each of the other things will be.
συμβαίνει δὴ μὴ ἐξ ὁτουοῦν μέρους σαρκὸς γίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ᾿ ὅν ἐκ μὲν τουδὶ τοῦ μέρους σφαῖρα, πυραμὶς δ᾿ ἐξ ἄλλου τινός· ἀλλ᾿ ἐνεδέχετό γε ἐξ ἑκατέρου ἑκάτερον γενέσθαι.
It follows, then, that fire and water do not come from any part whatsoever of flesh, in the way that, while from wax a sphere might come from this part and a pyramid from some other part, it was at least possible for either to come from either part.
τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοῦτον γίνεται τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐξ ὁτουοῦν ἄμφω τοῖς δ᾿ ἐκείνως λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐκ τοίχου λίθος καὶ πλίνθος, ἑκάτερον ἐξ ἄλλου τόπου καὶ μέρους.
Now, indeed, on the one hand, this actually happens in this way: both [fire and water] come from any part whatsoever of the flesh; but on the other hand, for those who speak in that way, this is not possible, but rather, as stone and brick come from a wall, each comes from a different place and part.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἔσται τι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἶον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς.
Likewise, also for those who make one matter for them, there is a certain difficulty: how will there be something from both, as, for example, from cold and hot, or from fire and earth?
εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ᾿ αὗ σύνθεσις σωζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων;
For if flesh is from both and is neither of them, nor again is it a composition of them preserved, what remains except that what comes from them is matter?
ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἢ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην.
For the destruction of one of them produces either the other or the matter.
Ἆῤ οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπλῶς ᾖ θάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ. δυνάμει θάτερον ἔσται·
Is it then because there is both a 'more' and a 'less' of hot and cold, that when one of them is simply in actuality, the other will be in potentiality?
ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων, τότε οὔθ᾿ ἡ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ᾿ ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον;
And when they are not completely [one or the other], but the hot is cold-ish and the cold is hot-ish because, by being mixed, they destroy each other's excesses, then there will be neither matter nor either of those contraries simply in actuality, but something intermediate; and in accordance with its being potentially more hot than cold, or the contrary, in accordance with this ratio, is it potentially doubly hot, or triply, or in some other such manner?
ἔσται δὴ μιχθέντων τἆλλ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πως ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὕλη τὸ γινόμενον.
Then indeed, when they are mixed, the other things will come to be from the contraries or the elements, and the elements from those things which are in a way potentially, yet not in the way matter is, but in the manner mentioned; and in this way what comes to be is a mixture, but in that other way it is matter.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμόν, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα.
And since the contraries also act and are acted upon according to the definition in the first principles—for what is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that unless they are equalized, they change into one another.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων· καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γινομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον.
Likewise also with the other contraries; and first the elements change in this way, and from these come flesh and bones and such things, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they come to the mean; for there it is neither, but the mean is extensive and not indivisible.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τἆλλα.
Likewise also the dry and the wet, and such things, produce flesh and bone and the other things in accordance with a mean.
Notes
- 334a16περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων ... ὅσοις μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινὸν ἢ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἅλληλα — The dative phrase ὅσοις μὲν... ('for those who think...') depends on the main predicate ἀνάγκη... συμβαίνειν ('it is necessary... that the other also happens'). Within the conditional clause εἰ θάτερον τούτων ('if one of these [is the case]'), a predicate verb (such as ὑπάρχει or συμβαίνει) is omitted.
- 334a18ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ποιοῦσιν — Although this clause is contrasted with the preceding dative construction (ὅσοις μὲ... ) via the μέν... δέ... structure, it begins with the nominative (ὅσοι δέ) instead of the dative, forming a nominativus pendens (anacoluthon). The conclusion of this sentence is introduced by the impersonal predicate ἄτοπον [ἐστι] ('it is absurd...').
- 334b8Ἆῤ οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον — The question introduced by Ἆῤ οὖν ('Is it then...?') is an exceptionally long and complex sentence extending down to ἢ κατ᾿ ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον; ('or in some other such manner?') in line 17. The causal ἐπειδή clause sets the background, followed by the contrasting temporal-conditional clauses starting with ὅταν μέν (lines 9–10) and ὅταν δέ (lines 10–14). The core of the main clause lies in τότε οὔθ᾿ ἡ ὕλη ἔσται... ἀλλὰ μεταξύ ('then there will be neither matter... but something intermediate') in lines 13–14.
Cite this passage
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption §2.7. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg013.humanitext-grc1:2.7
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