§2.6#16.
6.
Θαυμάσειε δ᾿ ἄν τις τῶν λεγόντων πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων ὥστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησί, πῶς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς εἶναι συμβλητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα.
One might wonder, in the case of those who say that the elements of bodies are more than one, so that they do not change into one another, as Empedocles says, how it is possible for them to say that the elements are comparable.
καίτοι λέγει οὕτω· “ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα. ” εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη ταὐτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἅπασι τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἶεν ἀέρος δέκα· τὸ αὐτό τι ἦν ἄρα ἄμφω, εἰ μετρεῖται τῷ αὐτῷ.
And yet he says thus: "For all these are equal." If indeed, then, in respect of quantity, there must be something identical belonging to all the comparable things by which they are measured, for example if from one kotyle of water there should be ten of air; so both were indeed something identical, if they are measured by the same.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συμβλητὰ ὡς ποσὸν ἐκ ποσοῦ, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσον δύναται, οἷον εἰ κοτύλη ὕδατος ἴσον δύναται ψύχειν καὶ δέκα ἀέρος, καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν οὐχ ᾗ ποσὸν συμβλητά, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ δύνανταί τι.
But if they are not comparable in respect of quantity in this way, as quantity from quantity, but in respect of their power, for example if a kotyle of water can cool as much as ten of air, even so they are comparable in respect of quantity, not qua quantity, but qua having a certain power.
εἴη δ᾿ ἂν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλεσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ὡς τόδε λευκὸν τόδε θερμόν.
And it would also be possible for the powers to be compared not by the measure of quantity, but by analogy, for instance as this is white, so that is hot.
τὸ δ᾿ ὡς τόδε σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιῷ τὸ ὅμοιον, ἐν δὲ ποσῷ τὸ ἴσον.
And "as this" means the similar in quality, but the equal in quantity.
ἄτοπον δὴ φαίνεται, εἰ τὰ σώματα ἀμετάβλητα ὄντα μὴ ἀναλογίᾳ συμβλητά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μέτρῳ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ εἶναι ἴσως¹ θερμὸν ἢ ὁμοίως2 πυρὸς τοσονδὶ καὶ ἀέρος πολλαπλάσιον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πλεῖον τῷ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἕξει τὸν λόγον.
It seems indeed absurd if, the bodies being unchangeable, they are comparable not by analogy, but by the measure of their powers, and by so much of fire and a multiple of air being equally or similarly hot; for the same thing, by being of the same genus, will have such a ratio in greater degree.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ αὔξησις ἂν εἴη κατ᾿ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν· πυρὶ γὰρ αὔξει τὸ πῦρ· “αὕξει δὲ χθὼν μὲν σφέτερον δέμας,3 αἰθέρα δ᾿ αἰθήρ. ” ταῦτα δὲ προστίθεται· δοκεῖ δ᾿ οὐχ οὕτως αὔξεσθαι τὰ αὐξανόμενα.
Indeed, neither could there be growth according to Empedocles, except by addition; for by fire he increases fire: "and earth increases its own body, and ether ether." But these are added; and growing things do not seem to grow in this way.
πολὺ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ φύσιν.
But it is much more difficult to give an account of natural generation.
τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα φύσει πάντα γίνεται ἢ ἀεὶ ὡδὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης.
For all things that come to be by nature come to be either always in this way or for the most part, but those contrary to the "always" and "for the most part" are from spontaneity and chance.
τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ πυρὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλαίαν;
What then is the cause of man coming from man either always or for the most part, and wheat from wheat but not an olive?
ἢ καί, ἐὰν ὡδὶ συντεθῆ, ὀστοῦν;
Or also, if they are put together in this way, of bone?
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ἔτυχε συνελθόντων οὐδὲν γίνεται, καθ᾿ ἃ4 ἐκεῖνός φησιν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινί.
For nothing comes to be from things coming together just by chance, as he says, but by a certain ratio.
τί οὖν τούτων αἴτιον;
What then is the cause of these?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε ἢ γῆ.
For surely not fire or earth.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως γὰρ μόνον, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἴτιον.
And indeed, neither is it Love and Strife; for the one is the cause of combination only, and the other of separation.
τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ μόνον “μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων,” ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνός φησιν.
And this is the substance of each thing, and not only "mixture and separation of things mixed," as he says.
τύχη δ᾿ ἐπὶ τούτων ὀνομάζεται, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ λόγος· ἔστι γὰρ μιχθῆναι ὡς ἔτυχεν.
And in these cases "chance" is named, but not "ratio"; for it is possible to be mixed just by chance.