§1.99.
9.
Τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσι γεννᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λέγωμεν λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν πολλάκις εἰρημένην.
Let us state in what way it belongs to existing things to generate, to act, and to suffer, taking as our starting point the principle that has been frequently mentioned.
εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ᾿ ἐντελεχείᾳ τοιοῦτον, πέφυκεν οὐ τῇ μὲν τῇ δ᾿ οὒ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ καθ᾿ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, ἧττον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ᾗ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ ἧττον· καὶ ταύτῃ πόρους ἄν τις λέγοι μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς μεταλλευομένοις διατείνουσι τοῦ παθητικοῦ φλέβες συνεχεῖς.
For if one thing is potentially such and another actually such, it is natural for it to suffer not in one part but not in another, but everywhere in so far as it is such, though less and more in so far as it is more and less such; and in this way one might rather speak of pores, just as in mined materials continuous veins of the passive part extend.
συμφυὲς μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀπαθές.
Therefore, each thing that is grown together and is one is passive to nothing.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ θιγγάνοντα μήτε αὑτῶν μήτ᾿ ἄλλων, ἃ ποιεῖν πέφυκε καὶ πάσχειν.
Likewise also when things which are of such a nature as to act and to suffer touch neither themselves nor other things.
λέγω δ᾿ οἷον οὐ μόνον ἁπτόμενον θερμαίνει τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄποθεν ᾗ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ, ὁ δ᾿ ἀὴρ τὸ σῶμα θερμαίνει, πεφυκὼς ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
And I mean, for example, that fire warms not only by touching, but also if it is at a distance; for the fire warms the air, and the air warms the body, being of such a nature as to act and to suffer.
τὸ δὲ τῇ μὲν οἴεσθαι πάσχειν τῇ δὲ μή, διορίσαντας ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦτο λεκτέον.
But as for thinking that a thing is acted upon in one part but not in another, we must speak of this after having defined it at the beginning.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ πάντῃ διαιρετὸν τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι σῶμα ἀδιαίρετον ἢ πλάτος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πάντῃ παθητικόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ συνεχὲς οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος καὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει διῃρῆσθαι μὲν ἅπτεσθαι δέ, ἢ διαιρετόν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατὰ τὰς ἁφάς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, κἂν μήπω ᾖ διῃρημένον, ἔσται διῃρημένον· μένον· δυνατὸν γὰρ διαιρεθῆναι· γίνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον.
For if magnitude is not divisible everywhere, but there is an indivisible body or plane, it would not be passive everywhere, nor would anything be continuous; but if this is false and every body is divisible, it makes no difference whether it has been divided and is in contact, or is divisible; for if it can be separated along the contacts, as some say, even if it has not yet been divided, it will be divided; for it is capable of being divided, since nothing impossible happens.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον σχιζομένων τῶν σωμάτων ἄτοπον· ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀλλοίωσιν, ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα συνεχὲς ὂν ὁτὲ μὲν ὑγρὸν ὁτὲ δὲ πεπηγός, οὐ διαιρέσει καὶ συνθέσει τοῦτο παθόν, οὐδὲ τροπῇ καὶ διαθιγῇ, καθάπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος· οὔτε γὰρ μετατεθὲν οὔτε μεταβαλὸν τὴν φύσιν πεπηγὸς ἐξ ὑγροῦ γέγονεν· οὐδ᾿ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ πεπηγότα ἀδιαίρετα τοὺς ὄγκους· ἀλλ᾿ ὁμοίως ἅπαν ὑγρόν, ὁτὲ δὲ σκληρὸν καὶ πεπηγός ἐστιν.
In general, it is absurd for things to happen in this way by bodies being split; for this argument does away with alteration, but we see the same body, which is continuous, being at one time liquid and at another solid, having suffered this not by division and composition, nor by turning and contact, as Democritus says; for neither by having changed its position nor by having changed its nature has it become solid from liquid; nor do hard and solid things exist within it as indivisible bulks; rather, the whole is likewise liquid, and at another time hard and solid.
ἔτι δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ αὔξησιν οἷόν τ᾿ εἶναι καὶ φθίσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ἔσται γεγονὸς μεῖζον, εἴπερ ἔσται πρόσθεσις, καὶ μὴ πᾶν μεταβεβληκός, ἢ μιχθέντος τινὸς ἢ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μεταβαλόντος.
Further, it is also not possible for there to be growth and decay; for any part whatever will not have become larger, if it is to be an addition, and not the whole having changed, either by something having been mixed or by itself having changed.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τίνα φασὶ μέν τινες οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δέ, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
That, therefore, generating, acting, and coming to be and being acted upon by one another exist, and in what way they are possible, and in what way some say they are but are not possible, let it be defined in this way.