§1.8#2ἀδιαίρετα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπείροις ὡρίσθαι σχήμασι [τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων στερεῶν ἕκαστον], ὁ δὲ ὡρισμένοις, ἐπεὶ ἀδιαίρετά γε ἀμφότεροι λέγουσι καὶ ὡρισμένα σχήμασιν.
...indivisible. And the one says that each of the indivisible solids is defined by infinite shapes, while the other by definite ones, since both say they are indivisible and defined by shapes.
ἐκ δὴ τούτων αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ διακρίσεις Λευκίππῳ μὲν [δύο τρόποι ἂν εἶεν,] διά τε τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς (ταύτῃ γὰρ διαιρετὸν ἕκαστον), Πλάτωνι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἁρὴν μόνον· κενὸν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναί φησιν.
From these, then, generation and separation would be, for Leucippus, in two ways: through the void and through contact (for in this way each is divisible), but for Plato through contact alone; for he says that void does not exist.
Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων ἐπιπέδων εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον λόγοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων στερεῶν τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον θεωρῆσαι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀφείσθω τὸ νῦν, ὡς δὲ μικρὸν παρεκβᾶσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαθές τε ἕκαστον λέγειν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων (οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πάσχειν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ) καὶ μηδενὸς ποιητικὸν πάθους·
And concerning the indivisible planes we have spoken in our previous works; but concerning the indivisible solids, let us for the present leave aside further consideration of what follows, but to speak by way of a brief digression it is necessary to say that each of the indivisibles is passive to nothing (for it is not possible to be acted upon except through the void) and productive of no affection; for it is possible for it to be neither cold nor hard.
οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε σκληρὸν οἶόν τ᾿ εἶναι. καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἄτοπον, τὸ μόνον ἀποδοῦναι τῷ περιφερεῖ σχήματι τὸ θερμόν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοὐναντίον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἄλλῳ τινὶ προσήκειν τῶν σχημάτων.
And yet this indeed is absurd, to assign heat only to the spherical shape; for of necessity the contrary, cold, must belong to some other of the shapes.
ἄτοπον δὲ κὲν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, λέγω δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, βαρύτης δὲ καὶ κουφότης καὶ σκληρότης καὶ μαλακότης μὴ ὑπάρξει· καίτοι βαρύτερόν γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν φησιν εἶναι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θερμότερον.
And it would be absurd if these exist, I mean heat and cold, but heaviness, lightness, hardness, and softness do not exist; and yet Democritus says that each of the indivisibles is heavier according to its excess of size, so that it is clear that it is also hotter.
τοιαῦτα δ᾿ ὄντα μὴ πάσχειν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἀδύνατον, οἷον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολὺ ὑπερβάλλοντος θερμοῦ τὸ ἡρέμα θερμόν.
But being such, it is impossible that they are not acted upon by one another, for example, the slightly hot by that which is greatly exceeding in heat.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ σκληρόν, καὶ μαλακόν.
Furthermore, if there is hard, there is also soft.
τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν ἤδη τῷ πάσχειν τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ ὑπεικτικὸν μαλακόν.
And the soft is already spoken of in terms of being acted upon by something; for that which yields is soft.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄτοπον καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἀλλ᾿ ἢ μόνον σχῆμα· καὶ εἰ ὑπάρχει, ἓν δὲ μόνον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν τὸ δὲ θερμόν·
Moreover, it is also absurd if nothing exists but shape alone; and if they exist, but only one, for example, one cold and another hot; for their nature would not even be one.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μία τις εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ εἰ πλείω τῷ ἑνί· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἕξει τὰ πάθη, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν πάσχῃ εἴπερ ψύχεται, ταύτῃ τι¹ καὶ ἄλλο ποιήσει ἢ πείσεται.
Likewise, it is also impossible if there are more than one in the same; for being indivisible, it will hold the affections in the same place, so that even if it is acted upon, if indeed it is cooled, in this respect it will also do or suffer something else.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς στερεὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπίπεδα λέγουσιν ἀδιαίρετα συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· οὔτε γὰρ μανότερα οὔτε πυκνότερα οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι κενοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαιρέτοις.
The same way holds also for the other affections; for this happens in the same way both to those who speak of solids and to those who speak of planes as indivisible; for it is possible for them to become neither rarer nor denser when there is no void in the indivisibles.
ἔτι. δ᾿ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ μικρὰ μὲν ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι, μεγάλα δὲ μή· νῦν μὲν γὰρ εὐλόγως τὰ μείζω θραύεται μᾶλλον τῶν μικρῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ διαλύεται ῥᾳδίως, οἷον τὰ μεγάλα· προσκόπτει γὰρ πολλοῖς· τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ὅλως διὰ τί μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τῶν μεγάλων τοῖς μικροῖς;
Further, it is also absurd that small things are indivisible, but large ones are not; for now, reasonably, larger things are broken more than small ones, since some are dissolved easily, namely the large ones, for they collide with many things; but why does indivisibility belong at all to small things rather than to large ones?
ἔτι δὲ πότερον μία πάντων ἡ φύσις ἐκείνων τῶν στερεῶν, ἢ διαφέρει θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὰ μὲν εἴη πύρινα, τὰ δὲ γήϊνα τὸν ὄγκον;
Further, is the nature of all those solids one, or does one differ from another, as if some were fiery and others earthy in bulk?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀπάντων, τί τὸ χωρίσαν;
For if there is one nature of all, what is it that separated them?
ἢ διὰ τί οὐ γίνεται ἁψάμενα ἕν, ὥσπερ ὕδωρ ὕδατος ὅταν θίγῃ;
Or why do they not become one when they touch, just as water when it touches water?
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ὕστερον τοῦ προτέρου.
For the latter differs in no way from the former.
εἰ δ᾿ ἕτερα, ποῖα ταῦτα;
But if they are different, what are they?
καὶ δῆλον ὡς ταῦτα θετέον ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας τῶν συμβαινόντων μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σχήματα.
And it is clear that these must be posited as principles and causes of what happens rather than shapes.
ἔτι δὲ διαφέροντα τὴν φύσιν, κἂν ποιῇ κἂν πάσχῃ θιγγάνοντα ἀλλήλων.
Further, differing in nature, they would both act and be acted upon when they touch one another.
ἔτι δὲ τί τὸ κινοῦν;
Further, what is that which moves them?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον, παθητικά¹· εἰ δ᾿ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἢ διαιρετὸν ἔσται, κατ᾿ ἄλλo μὲν κινοῦν κατ᾿ ἄλλο δὲ κινούμενον, ἢ κατὰ ταὐτὸ τἀναντία ὑπάρξει, καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐ μόνον ἀριθμῷ ἔσται μία ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνάμει.
For if it is another, they are passive; but if each moves itself, it will either be divisible, moving in one part and being moved in another, or contrary qualities will belong to it in the same respect, and the matter will be one not only in number but also in capacity.
Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν διὰ τῆς τῶν πόρων κινήσεως φασι τὰ πάθη συμβαίνειν, εἰ μὲν καὶ πεπληρωμένων τῶν πόρων, περίεργον οἱ πόροι· εἰ γὰρ ταύτῃ τι πάσχει τὸ πᾶν, κἂν μὴ πόρους ἔχον ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸ συνεχὲς ὂν πάσχοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.
As many, then, as say that affections happen through the movement of pores, if indeed this is so even when the pores are filled, the pores are superfluous; for if in this way the whole is acted upon in some respect, even if it did not have pores but were itself continuous, it would be acted upon in the same way.
ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἐνδέχεται περὶ τοῦ διορᾶν συμβαίνειν ὡς λέγουσιν;
Further, how is it possible for seeing through to happen as they say?
οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἁφὰς ἐνδέχεται διιέναι διὰ τῶν διαφανῶν, οὔτε διὰ τῶν πόρων, εἰ πλήρης ἕκαστος· τί γὰρ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν πόρους;
For it is possible to pass through transparent things neither by contacts, nor through the pores, if each is full; for what will it differ from having no pores?
πᾶν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔσται πλῆρες.
For the whole will be full in like manner.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ κενὰ μὲν ταῦτα (ἀνάγκη δὲ σώματα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν), ταὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν.
But indeed, even if these are void (and it is necessary to have bodies in themselves), the same will happen again.
εἰ δὲ τηλικαῦτα τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε μὴ δέχεσθαι σῶμα μηδέν, γελοῖον τὸ μικρὸν μὲν οἴεσθαι κενὸν εἶναι, μέγα δὲ μὴ μηδ᾿ ὁπηλικονοῦν, ἢ τὸ κενὸν ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι λέγειν πλὴν χώραν σώματος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παντὶ σώματι τὸν ὄγκον ἴσον ἔσται κενόν.
But if they are of such a size as not to receive any body, it is ridiculous to think that a small void exists, but a large one does not, of whatever size, or to think that void means anything other than place of a body, so that it is clear that for every body there will be a void equal to its bulk.
Ὅλῶς δὲ τὸ πόρους ποιεῖν περίεργον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν ποιεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν πόρων ποιήσει διιόν· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν πείσεται τὰ δὲ ποιήσει τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πεφυκότων.
In general, to make pores is superfluous; for if it does nothing by contact, neither will it do anything by passing through the pores; but if by touching, even when there are no pores, some things will be acted upon and others will act among those that are of such a nature in relation to one another.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως λέγειν τοὺς πόρους ὥς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ μάταιον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν· διαιρετῶν δ᾿ ὄντων πάντῃ τῶν σωμάτων πόρους ποιεῖν γελοῖον· ᾗ γὰρ διαιρετά, δύναται χωρίζεσθαι.
That, therefore, to speak of pores in the way some assume is either false or vain, is clear from these; and when bodies are divisible everywhere, it is ridiculous to make pores; for in so far as they are divisible, they can be separated.