§1.10#110.
10.
Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ μίξεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τρίτον τῶν προτεθέντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
It remains to consider mixture in accordance with the same method of inquiry; for this was the third of the things proposed from the beginning.
σκεπτέον δὲ τί τ᾿ ἐστὶν ἡ μίξις καὶ τί τὸ μικτόν, καὶ τίσιν ὑπάρχει τῶν ὄντων καὶ πῶς, ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἔστι μίξις ἢ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι μιχθῆναί τι ἔτερον ἑτέρῳ, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες· ὄντων μὲν γὰρ ἔτι τῶν μιχθέντων καὶ μὴ ἠλλοιωμένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λον νῦν μεμῖχθαί φασιν ἢ πρότερον, ἀλλ᾿ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, θατέρου δὲ φθαρέντος οὐ μεμῖχθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ δ᾿ οὐκ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων εἶναι· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ εἰ ἀμφοτέρων συνελθόντων ἔφθαρται τῶν μιγνυμένων ἑκάτερον· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μεμιγμένα τά γε ὅλως οὐκ ὄντα.
And we must examine what mixture is, and what the mixable is, and to which of the things that exist it belongs and how, and further whether mixture exists or whether this is false; for it is impossible for one thing to be mixed with another, as some say; for if the things that were mixed are still existing and have not been altered, they say they are no more mixed now than before, but are in the same state; whereas if one of them has been destroyed, they have not been mixed, but the one exists and the other does not, while mixture is of things which are in a similar state; and in the same way even if, when they have come together, each of the things being mixed has been destroyed; for things which do not exist at all are not mixed.
Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἔοικε ζητεῖν διορίσαι τί διαφέρει μίξις γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς δεῖ διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ἔστιν.
This argument, then, seems to seek to define how mixture differs from coming-to-be and destruction, and what the mixable differs from the generable and destructible; for it is clear that they must differ, if indeed it exists.
ὥστε τούτων ὄντων φανερῶν τὰ διαπορηθέντα λύοιντ᾿ ἄν.
So that, if these things are clear, the difficulties raised would be resolved.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην τῷ πυρὶ μεμῖχθαί φαμεν οὐδὲ μίγνυσθαι καιομένην, οὔτ᾿ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τοῖς μορίοις οὔτε τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ φθείρεσθαι.
Yet, indeed, we do not say that the matter is mixed with the fire, nor that it is mixed when it is burning, neither itself with its own parts nor with the fire, but that the fire comes to be, and the matter is destroyed.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὔτε τῷ σώματι τὴν τροφὴν οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα τῷ κηρῷ μιγνύμενον σχηματίζειν τὸν ὄγκον· οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδ᾿ ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις οἷόν τε μίγνυσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν·
And in the same way neither does food mix with the body, nor does shape, by being mixed with the wax, shape the bulk; nor is it possible for body and white, nor in general for affections and states to be mixed with things; for they are seen to be preserved.
σωζόμενα γὰρ ὁρᾶται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λευκόν γε καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλο τῶν μὴ χωριστῶν οὐδέν.
Nay, indeed, it is not even possible for white and knowledge to be mixed, nor any other of the things that are not separable.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ πάντα ποτὲ ὁμοῦ φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ μεμῖχθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν ἅπαντι μικτόν, ἀλλ᾿ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ χωριστὸν ἑκάτερον τῶν μιχθέντων· τῶν δὲ παθῶν οὐδὲν χωριστόν.
But those who assert that all things were once together and mixed do not say this well; for not everything is mixable with everything, but each of the things mixed must be capable of existing separately; but of affections, none is separable.
ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δ᾿ ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδέχεται τὰ μιχθέντα εἶναί πως καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ γεγονότος ἐξ αὐτῶν, δυνάμει δ᾿ ἔτι ἑκατέρου ἅπερ ἦσαν πρὶν μιχθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολωλότα· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος διηπόρει πρότερον· φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μιγνύμενα πρότερόν τε ἐκ κεχωρισμένων συνιόντα καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν.
But since some of the things that exist are potentially and others actually, it is possible for the things mixed to be in a way and not to be: that which has come to be from them being actually something else, but each of them still being potentially what they were before they were mixed, and not destroyed; for this is what the argument was raising as a difficulty before; and the things being mixed are seen to come together from being previously separated, and to be capable of being separated again.
οὔτε διαμένουσιν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ ὥσπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκόν, οὔτε φθείρονται, οὔτε θάτερον οὔτ᾿ ἄμφω· σώζεται γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν.
Therefore, they neither remain actually as body and white do, nor are they destroyed, neither one nor both; for their potentiality is preserved.
διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτοις ἀπόρημα διαιρετέον, πότερον ἡ μίξις πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν τί ἐστιν.
Therefore, let these matters be dismissed; but we must distinguish the difficulty contiguous to these, namely, what mixture is in relation to perception.
Ὅταν γὰρ οὕτως εἰς μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τεθῇ παῤ ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὥστε μὴ δῆλον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, τότε μέμικται ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ὥστε ὁτιοῦν παῤ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι μόριον τῶν μιχθέντων;
For when the things being mixed are divided into such small parts, and are placed alongside one another in this way so that each is not clear to perception, is it then mixed, or not, but is it such that any part whatever of the things mixed is alongside any other?
λέγεται μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως, οἷον κριθὰς μεμῖχθαι πυροῖς, ὅταν ἡτισοῦν παῤ ὁντινοῦν τεθῇ.
It is indeed said in that former way, as that barley is mixed with wheat, when any grain of one is placed alongside any of the other.
εἰ δ᾿ ἐστὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, εἴπερ καὶ ἔστι σῶμα σώματι μικτὸν ὁμοιομερές, ὁτιοῦν ἂν δέοι μέρος γίνεσθαι παῤ ὁτιοῦν.
But if every body is divisible, if indeed also body is mixable with body so as to be homoeomerous, any part whatever would have to come to be alongside any part whatever.
ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς τἀλάχιστα διαιρεθῆναι, οὔτε σύνθεσις ταὐτὸ καὶ μίξις ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερον, δῆλον ὡς οὔτε κατὰ μικρὰ σωζόμενα δεῖ τὰ μιγνύμενα φάναι μεμῖχθαι (σύνθεσις γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐ κρᾶσις οὐδὲ μίξις, οὐδ᾿ ἕξει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μόριον.
But since it is not possible to be divided into least parts, and composition is not the same as mixture but different, it is clear that we must not say that the things being mixed have been mixed when they are preserved in small parts (for it will be composition and not blending nor mixture, nor will the part have the same definition as the whole.
φαμὲν δὲ δεῖν,1 εἴπερ μέμικται,2 τὸ μιχθὲν ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὥσπερ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέρος ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος.
But we say that,1 if indeed it has been mixed,2 the mixed thing must be homoeomerous, and just as a part of water is water, so also is a part of the blended.
ἂν δ᾿ ᾗ κατὰ μικρὰ σύνθεσις ἡ μίξις, οὐθὲν συμβήσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν μεμιγμένον, ἐὰν μὴ βλέπῃ ὀξύ, τῷ Λυγκεῖ δ᾿ οὐδὲν μεμιγμένον οὔτε τῇ διαιρέσει ὥστε ὁτιοῦν παῤ ὁτιοῦν μέρος· ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὕτω διαιρεθῆναι.
But if mixture is composition in small parts, none of these things will result, but they will only be mixed in relation to perception; and the same thing will be mixed to one person, if he does not see sharply, but to Lynceus nothing will be mixed, nor by division so that any part whatever is alongside any part whatever; for it is impossible to be divided in this way.
ἢ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις, ἢ λεκτέον τοῦτο πῶς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι πάλιν.
Either, therefore, there is no mixture, or we must say again how this is possible to come to be.