§1.8#18.
8.
Πῶς δὲ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, πάλιν λέγωμεν.
And how this can happen, let us state again.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πάσχειν ἕκαστον διά τινων πόρων εἰσιόντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐσχάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν ἡμᾶς φασὶ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσας, ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶσθαι διά τε ἀέρος καὶ ὑδατος καὶ τῶν διαφανῶν, διὰ τὸ πόρους ἔχειν ἀοράτους μὲν διὰ μικρότητα, πυκνοὺς δὲ καὶ κατὰ στοῖχον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔχειν τὰ διαφανῆ μᾶλλον.
To some, indeed, it seems that each thing is acted upon through certain pores, the last and most dominant active agent entering in, and they say that in this way we also see and hear and perceive with all the other senses, and furthermore that we are seen through air and water and transparent things because they have pores which are invisible due to their smallness, but are dense and in row, and the transparent things have them all the more.
Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπί τινων οὕτω διώρισαν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πασχόντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μίγνυσθαί φασιν ὅσων οἱ πόροι σύμμετροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν·
Now, some defined it in this way in the case of certain things, as indeed Empedocles did, not only in the case of active and passive things, but they also say that those things mix whose pores are symmetrical to one another.
ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος, ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἥπερ ἐστίν.
But Leucippus and Democritus have defined it most systematically and about all things with a single account, making their starting point in accordance with nature as it is.
ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔδοξε τὸ ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἓν εἶναι καὶ ἀκίνητον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, κινηθῆναι δ᾿ οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κεχωρισμένου, οὐδ᾿ αὖ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ διείργοντος.
For to some of the ancients it seemed that being is of necessity one and motionless; for they thought that void is non-being, and that there could be no motion if there were no separate void, nor again could there be many things if there were no separating agent.
τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ συνεχὲς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ᾿ ἅπτεσθαι διῃρημένον, τοῦ φάναι πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν εἶναι καὶ κενόν.
And they thought that this differs in no way—if someone thinks that the universe is not continuous but touching and divided—from saying that there are many things and not one, and void.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντῃ διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἕν, ὥστε οὐδὲ πολλά, ἀλλὰ κενὸν τὸ ὅλον· εἰ δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, πεπλασμένῳ τινὶ τοῦτ᾿ ἐοικέναι·
For if it were divisible everywhere, nothing would be one, so that there would not even be many things, but the whole would be void; whereas if it were divisible in one part and not in another, this would resemble a fiction.
μέχρι πόσου γὰρ καὶ διὰ τί τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει τοῦ ὅλου καὶ πλῆρές ἐστι, τὸ δὲ διῃρημένον;
For up to what point and for what reason is one part of the whole in this state and full, while another is divided?
ἔτι ὁμοίως φάναι ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν.
Further, they thought it necessary to say likewise that there is no motion.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναί φασι, καὶ ἄπειρον ἔνιοι· τὸ γὰρ πέρας περαίνειν ἂν πρὸς τὸ κενόν.
From these arguments, then, bypassing perception and disregarding it on the ground that one must follow reason, they say that the universe is one and motionless, and some say it is infinite; for they argue that limit would limit against the void.
οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἀπεφήναντο περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· ἔτι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων δοκεῖ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων μανίᾳ παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ δοξάζειν οὕτως·
These men, then, declared in this way and for these reasons concerning the truth; but though in arguments these things seem to follow, yet in terms of facts to believe this is close to madness.
οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μαινομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὥστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διὰ συνήθειαν, ταῦτ᾿ ἐνίοις διὰ τὴν μανίαν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.
For no madman is so far out of his mind as to think that fire and ice are one, but only the beautiful things and those that appear so through habit—these, because of madness, seem to some to differ in no way.
Λεύκιππος δ᾿ ἔχειν ᾠήθη λόγους οἵτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων.
But Leucippus thought he had arguments which, while stating what was in agreement with perception, would not abolish generation, corruption, motion, or the multiplicity of beings.
ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἓν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ¹ ἂν κίνησιν οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὐδὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι.
Having agreed on these points with the appearances, and with those who establish the one on the ground that there could be no motion without void and that void is non-being, he says that none of being is non-being.
τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὂν παμπληθὲς ὄν· ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων.
For that which is properly being is completely full; but such being is not one, but infinite in number and invisible because of the smallness of their bulks.
ταῦτα δ᾿ ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν.
And these move in the void (for he says there is void), and when they come together they produce generation, and when they dissolve, corruption.
ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν ᾗ τυγχάνουσιν ἁπτόμενα (ταύτῃ γὰρ οὐχ ἓν εἶναι), καὶ συντιθέμενα δὲ καὶ περιπλεκόμενα γεννᾶν·
And they act and are acted upon in so far as they happen to touch (for in this respect they are not one), and when they are put together and become entangled, they generate.
ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν ἑνὸς οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι πλῆθος, οὐδ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἀληθῶς πολλῶν ἕν, ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι τοῦτ᾿ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινές φασι πάσχειν διὰ πόρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ πάσχειν τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον, διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ γινομένης τῆς διαλύσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως, ὑπεισδυομένων στερεῶν.
But from what is truly one a multiplicity could not come to be, nor from what is truly many could one come to be, but this is impossible; rather, just as Empedocles and some of the others say that we are acted upon through pores, so all alteration and all being acted upon occur in this way, dissolution and corruption occurring through the void, and likewise also growth, solids creeping in.
Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Λεύκιππός φησιν· εἶναι γὰρ ἄττα στερεά, ἀδιαίρετα δέ, εἰ μὴ πάντῃ πόροι συνεχεῖς εἰσίν.
And it is almost necessary for Empedocles also to say just what Leucippus says; for there must be some solids, which are indivisible, unless pores are continuous everywhere.
τοῦτο δ᾿ ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον στερεὸν παρὰ τοὺς πόρους, ἀλλὰ πᾶν κενόν.
But this is impossible; for there will be nothing else solid besides the pores, but everything will be void.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὰ μὲν ἁπτόμενα εἶναι ἀδιαίρετα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν κενά, οὓς ἐκεῖνος λέγει πόρους.
It is necessary, then, that the touching things be indivisible, and the spaces between them be void, which he calls pores.
οὕτως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος λέγει περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
And in this way Leucippus also speaks concerning acting and being acted upon.
Οἱ μὲν οὗν τρόποι καθ᾿ οὓς τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ πάσχει, σχεδὸν οὗτοι λέγονται· καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων, καὶ πῶς λέγουσι, δῆλον, καὶ πρὸς τὰς αὐτῶν θέσεις αἷς χρῶνται σχεδὸν ὁμολογουμένως φαίνεται συμβαῖνον.
The ways, then, in which some things act and others are acted upon are spoken of in this manner; and concerning these, and how they speak, it is clear, and in relation to their own positions which they employ, it appears to follow almost consistently.
τοῖς δ᾿ ἄλλοις ἧττον, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, οὐ δῆλον.
But for the others it is less so; for example, in the case of Empedocles, it is not clear in what way there will be generation, corruption, and alteration.
τοῖς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετα τὰ πρῶτα τῶν σωμάτων, σχήματι διαφέροντα μόνον, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων σύγκειται καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα διαλύεται· Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φανερὸν ὅτι μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πῶς γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται τὸ σωρευόμενον μέγεθος, οὔτε δῆλον οὔτε ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγοντι καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς εἶναι στοιχεῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφε Πλάτων·
For to some (the atomists) the primary bodies are indivisible, differing only in shape, from which primary things they are composed and into which last things they dissolve; whereas for Empedocles, while it is clear that other things have their generation and corruption up to the elements, how the accumulated bulk of these elements themselves comes to be and is corrupted is neither clear, nor is it possible for him to say unless he admits that there is an element even of fire, and likewise of all the others, just as Plato wrote in the Timaeus.
τοσοῦτον γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον Λευκίππῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν στερεὰ ὁ δ᾿ ἐπίπεδα λέγει τὰ
For this is how much he differs from not speaking in the same way as Leucippus: namely, that the one speaks of solids, while the other speaks of planes as the...