§9.4τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι.
Friendly feelings toward one's neighbors, and the things by which friendships are defined, seem to have come from those toward oneself.
τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες.
For people define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good, or what appears to be so, for the sake of his friend, or who wishes his friend to exist and live for his own sake; which is what mothers feel toward their children, and friends who have had a falling out.
οἳ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει.
Others define a friend as one who lives with another and chooses the same things, or who shares the sorrows and joys of his friend; and this too happens especially in the case of mothers.
τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται.
And by some one of these characteristics they also define friendship.
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ.
Now each of these characteristics belongs to the virtuous man in relation to himself (and to the rest of men in so far as they suppose themselves to be such; and yet, as has been said, virtue and the good man seem to be the measure of each thing)—for he is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with all his soul; and he wishes for himself what is good and what appears so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to work hard for the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual part in him, which is what each person seems to be); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially this part by which he thinks.
ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δʼ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δʼ ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντʼ ἔχειν (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλʼ ὢν ὅ τι ποτʼ ἐστίν·
For existence is a good thing for the virtuous man, and each wishes good things for himself; but no one chooses to possess everything by becoming someone else (for even now God possesses the good, but He does so while being whatever He is); rather, he wishes to have them while remaining whatever he is.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα.
And the thinking part would seem to be each person, or most of all.
συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δʼ ἡδεῖαι.
And such a person wishes to live with himself; for he does so with pleasure, since the memories of his past deeds are delightful, and his hopes for the future are good, and such hopes are pleasant.
καὶ θεωρημάτων δʼ εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ.
And his mind is well provided with subjects for contemplation.
συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθʼ ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν.
He also shares joys and sorrows most of all with himself; for the same thing is always painful or pleasant to him, and not different things at different times; for he is, so to speak, free from regret.
τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει.
Since, then, each of these characteristics belongs to the virtuous man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self), friendship also seems to be one of these, and those to whom these belong seem to be friends.
πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δʼ ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.
But whether or not there is friendship toward oneself may be dismissed for the present; though it would seem that friendship exists in this way, in so far as two or more parts are present, judging from what has been said, and because the excess of friendship resembles friendship toward oneself.
φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις.
But the things we have mentioned seem to belong to the majority of people also, even though they are bad.
ἆρʼ οὖν ᾗ τʼ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
Do they, then, share in them in so far as they are pleased with themselves and suppose themselves to be good?
ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις·
For indeed, to no one who is utterly bad and impious do these things belong, nor do they even appear to do so.
διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα·
And they belong hardly even to the bad in general; for they are at variance with themselves, and desire some things but wish for others, like the incontinent; for instead of what they themselves think to be good, they choose pleasant things that are harmful.
οἳ δʼ αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι.
Others, again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think is best for themselves.
οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς.
And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even flee from life and destroy themselves.
ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθʼ ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθʼ ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθʼ ἑτέρων δʼ ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.
And wicked men seek people with whom to spend their days, but flee from themselves; for they remember many unpleasant deeds, and expect other such deeds in the future, when they are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget.
οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς.
And since they possess nothing lovable, they feel no friendly feeling toward themselves.
οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δʼ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δʼ ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα.
Indeed, such people do not even share joys and sorrows with themselves; for their soul is in a state of faction, and one part, because of wickedness, is pained at abstaining from certain things, while another part is pleased, and one pulls this way and another that, as if tearing them apart.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν.
And if it is impossible to be pained and pleased at the same time, yet at least after a short interval he is pained because he was pleased, and wishes those pleasant things had not happened to him; for bad men are full of regrets.
οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν.
Therefore, the bad man does not seem to be friendly disposed even to himself, because he has nothing lovable.
εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.
If, then, to be in this state is utterly miserable, one must strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and try to be virtuous; for in this way one may be friendly disposed toward oneself and become a friend to another.