§9.5ἡ δʼ εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δʼ οὔ.
Goodwill resembles a friendly feeling, but it is not indeed friendship; for goodwill arises both toward people who are unknown to us and without their being aware of it, whereas friendship does not.
καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτʼ εἴρηται.
And this has been said before.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδʼ ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτʼ ἀκολουθεῖ·
Nor is it loving; for it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany loving.
καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δʼ εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν.
And while loving is accompanied by familiarity, goodwill can arise even on the spur of the moment, as happens, for instance, in the case of competitors in contests; for spectators become well-disposed toward them and wish them well, but they would do nothing to help them; for as we said, they become well-disposed on the spur of the moment and love them only superficially.
ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή·
Goodwill, then, seems to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of sight is the beginning of erotic love.
μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλʼ ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ·
For no one falls in love without first being pleased by the beloved's appearance; yet he who delights in the form of another is not for all that in love, but only when he also longs for the other in absence and desires the other's presence.
οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δʼ εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δʼ ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδʼ ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.
So too, it is impossible to be friends without first having become well-disposed, but those who are well-disposed do not for all that love; for they only wish what is good to those to whom they are well-disposed, but they would do nothing to help them, nor would they trouble themselves on their behalf.
διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται.
Hence, by a metaphor, one might say that goodwill is inactive friendship, which, when it endures and arrives at familiarity, becomes friendship—yet not friendship based on utility or pleasure, for goodwill does not arise on those grounds.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθʼ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τινʼ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας διʼ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικʼ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν.
For he who has received a benefit returns goodwill in exchange for what he has received, thereby doing what is just; but he who wishes someone to prosper, in the hope of enrichment through him, does not seem to be well-disposed to that person, but rather to himself, just as he is not a friend either, if he flatters him for some utility.
ὅλως δʼ εὔνοια διʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.
In general, goodwill arises because of some virtue and goodness, when someone appears to another noble or brave or something of the sort, just as we said in the case of the competitors.
§9.6φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται.
Concord too appears to be a friendly relation.
διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν·
For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for this might exist even between people who do not know each other.
οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα.
Nor do we say that those who are of one mind on any subject whatever are in concord, for instance, those who agree about heavenly phenomena (for to agree on these is not a friendly relation); rather, we say that cities are in concord when they are of one mind about their interests, and choose the same things, and do what has been resolved in common.
περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.
They are in concord, then, about practical matters, and among these, about matters of importance which can belong to both or to all—for instance, when cities agree that offices should be elective, or that they should make an alliance with the Lacedaemonians, or that Pittacus should rule when he himself was willing.
ὅταν δʼ ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.
But when each wishes himself to rule, like the characters in the Phoenissae, they fall into faction; for concord is not each thinking of the same thing whatever it may be, but thinking of the same thing in the same relation—for instance, when both the commons and the better class agree that the best men should rule; for in this way all get what they desire.
πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα.
Concord, then, appears to be political friendship, as indeed it is said to be; for it is concerned with interests and the things that affect life.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται.
And such concord exists among virtuous men; for these are in concord both with themselves and with one another, being, so to speak, on the same ground (for the wishes of such men remain stable and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus), and they wish for what is just and advantageous, and these are also what they aim at in common.
τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας·
But bad men cannot be in concord, except to a small extent, just as they can only be friends to a small extent; for they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, but fall short in labors and public services.
ἑαυτῷ δʼ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται.
And since each wishes for these advantages for himself, he keeps a close watch on his neighbor and thwarts him; for if they do not guard the common interest, it is ruined.
συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
The result is, then, that they fall into faction, forcing one another to do what is just, while they themselves are unwilling to do so.