§9.3ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας.
There is also a difficulty concerning whether to dissolve friendships, or not, with those who do not remain the same.
ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτʼ ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι;
Or is it not at all strange to dissolve them towards those who were friends for the sake of utility or pleasure, when they no longer have these?
ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν.
For they were friends of those things, and when those fail, it is reasonable not to love.
ἐγκαλέσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος.
But one might complain if, while loving for the sake of utility or pleasure, one pretended to do so for the sake of character.
ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι φίλοι.
For, as we said at the beginning, the greatest differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the same way they think they are.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτʼ ἄν·
When, therefore, one has been deceived and has supposed that one was loved for one's character, while the other was doing nothing of the sort, one should blame oneself.
ὅταν δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.
But when one is deceived by the other's pretense, it is just to complain of the deceiver, and even more so than of those who counterfeit currency, in proportion as the wrongdoing concerns something more valuable.
ἐὰν δʼ ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρʼ ἔτι φιλητέον;
If one accepts another as good, but he becomes wicked and seems so, should one still love him?
ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν;
Or is it not possible, if indeed not everything is lovable but only the good?
οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δʼ ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον.
What is evil is neither lovable nor should it be loved; for one ought not to be a lover of evil, nor to become like a base person; and it has been said that like is friend to like.
ἆρʼ οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον;
Should one, then, dissolve the friendship immediately?
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
Or not with all, but only with those who are incurable in their wickedness?
ἐπανόρθωσιν δʼ ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον.
But to those who are capable of reform one should rather assist with respect to their character than their property, in proportion as this is better and more akin to friendship.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται.
And he who dissolves the friendship would seem to do nothing strange; for he was not a friend to such a person; therefore, being unable to restore him when he has changed, he withdraws.
εἰ δʼ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι ὃ δʼ ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ;
But if one remained the same while the other became better and far excelled in virtue, should one still treat him as a friend?
ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
Or is it not possible?
ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὃ δʼ ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτʼ ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι;
It becomes most clear in a great distance, as in childhood friendships; for if one should remain a child in intellect while the other was a man of the highest caliber, how could they be friends when they neither like the same things nor share joys and sorrows?
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθʼ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε.
For neither will these things belong to them even in relation to each other, and without these it was not possible to be friends; for it is not possible to live together.
εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων.
And we have spoken of these matters.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε;
Should one, then, behave in no way differently towards him than if he had never been a friend?
ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ διʼ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.
Or must one keep a memory of the past intimacy, and just as we think we ought to favor friends rather than strangers, so also to those who have been friends must something be rendered on account of the past friendship, when the dissolution does not occur because of an excess of wickedness?