§8.8οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί·
Most people, on account of love of honor, seem to wish to be loved rather than to love; hence most people are lovers of flatterers.
ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.
For the flatterer is a friend who is in an inferior position, or at least pretends to be so and to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be near to being honored, which indeed most people aim at.
οὐ διʼ αὑτὸ δʼ ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
But they do not seem to choose honor for its own sake, but accidentally.
χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρʼ αὐτῶν, ἄν του δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)· οἱ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν· χαίρουσι δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
For most people enjoy being honored by those in authority because of hope (for they think they will obtain from them whatever they may need; so they enjoy honor as a sign of receiving benefits); whereas those who desire honor from decent people who know them aim at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they enjoy it, then, because they believe they are good on the basis of the judgment of those who say so.
τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθʼ αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθʼ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.
But they enjoy being loved for its own sake; wherefore being loved would seem to be better than being honored, and friendship would seem to be desirable for its own sake.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.
But friendship seems to consist in loving rather than in being loved.
σημεῖον δʼ αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δʼ οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλʼ ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
A sign of this is mothers who enjoy loving; for some give their children to be brought up by others, and they love them knowing them to be theirs, but they do not seek to be loved in return if both are not possible; rather, it seems to be enough for them if they see them doing well, and they themselves love them even if those children, through ignorance, render to their mother nothing of what is her due.
μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστʼ ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατʼ ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία.
Since, then, friendship consists more in loving, and those who love their friends are praised, loving seems to be the virtue of friends, so that those in whom this occurs in accordance with worth are lasting friends and their friendship is lasting.
οὕτω δʼ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστʼ εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν.
And in this way even those who are unequal would be friends in the highest degree; for they would be equalized.
ἡ δʼ ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθʼ αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθʼ ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτʼ αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν.
And equality and similarity are friendship, and especially the similarity of those in accordance with virtue; for being stable in themselves they remain stable toward one another, and they neither need bad things nor minister to such, but, so to speak, even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good people neither to err themselves nor to allow their friends to do so.
οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπʼ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ.
But wicked people have no stability; for they do not even remain similar to themselves; and they become friends for only a short time, enjoying each other's wickedness.
οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις.
But useful and pleasant friends remain so longer; for they do so as long as they provide pleasures or utility to one another.
ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο.
And friendship based on utility seems to arise most of all from opposites, for example, a poor person toward a rich, an ignorant toward one who knows; for what a person happens to be in need of, desiring this he gives something else in return.
ἐνταῦθα δʼ ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.
Here indeed one might drag in also a lover and a beloved, or a beautiful and an ugly person.
διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον.
Wherefore lovers also appear ridiculous sometimes, expecting to be loved in the way that they love; if they are similarly lovable, perhaps they might expect it, but when they have nothing of the sort, it is ridiculous.
ἴσως δὲ οὐδʼ ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δʼ ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως.
But perhaps the opposite does not desire the opposite for its own sake, but accidentally, and the desire is for the mean; for this is good, as for the dry not to become wet but to come to the mean, and likewise for the hot and the others.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.
Let these things, however, be dismissed; for indeed they are somewhat foreign.