§8.7ἕτερον δʼ ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθʼ ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.
Another species of friendship is that based on superiority, for example that of a father toward a son, and in general of an older person toward a younger, and of a husband toward a wife, and of any ruler toward a subject.
διαφέρουσι δʼ αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδʼ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα.
And these differ also from one another; for that of parents toward children is not the same as that of rulers toward subjects, nor is that of a father toward a son the same as that of a son toward a father, nor that of a husband toward a wife the same as that of a wife toward a husband.
ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστου τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ διʼ ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
For the virtue and the function of each of these are different, and the reasons for which they love are also different; therefore their lovings and their friendships are also different.
ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία.
Thus, the same things do not come to each from the other, nor should they be sought; but when children render to parents what they ought to those who begot them, and parents render what they ought to their children, the friendship of such persons will be lasting and decent.
ἀνάλογον δʼ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
And in all friendships that are based on superiority, the loving also ought to be proportional, for example, the better person should be loved more than he loves, and the more useful person likewise, and each of the others similarly; for when the loving is in accordance with worth, then a sort of equality arises, which indeed is thought to belong to friendship.
οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀξίαν δευτέρως.
But equality does not appear to hold in the same way in just relations and in friendship; for in just relations equality in accordance with worth is primary, and that in accordance with quantity is secondary, whereas in friendship that in accordance with quantity is primary, and that in accordance with worth is secondary.
δῆλον δʼ, ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἀξιοῦσιν.
This becomes clear if a great interval arises in virtue or vice or wealth or anything else; for they are no longer friends, nor do they even expect to be.
ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν.
This is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass all in all good things to the greatest degree.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι.
And it is clear also in the case of kings; for those who are much inferior do not expect to be friends with them, nor do those of no worth expect to be friends with the best or wisest.
ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι.
In such cases, then, there is no precise definition up to what point they remain friends; for though many things are taken away, it still remains, but when one is separated by a great distance, as the god is, it no longer remains.
ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτʼ οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά.
Hence indeed a puzzle is raised, whether friends ever do not wish for their friends the greatest of goods, for instance, to be gods; for then they will no longer be friends to them, and so not even goods; for friends are goods.
εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά.
If, then, it has been well said that a friend wishes goods to his friend for his sake, the friend would need to remain such as he is; so, to him as a human being, he will wish the greatest goods.
ἴσως δʼ οὐ πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθʼ ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.
But perhaps not all goods; for each wishes goods to himself most of all.