§8.14διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία.
Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each expects to get more, and when this happens, the friendship is dissolved.
οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὑτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας.
For the better person thinks it is fitting for him to have more, since more should be assigned to the good; and likewise also the more useful person; for they say that one who is useless should not have an equal share, since it becomes a public service and not a friendship, unless what comes from the friendship is in accordance with the worth of their services.
οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ.
For they think that, just as in a financial partnership those who contribute more receive more, so it should be in friendship also.
ὁ δʼ ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν;
But the needy and the inferior person take the opposite view; for they say that it is the mark of a good friend to assist those in need; for what, they say, is the use of being a friend to a virtuous person or a powerful one, if one is to derive no benefit from it?
ἔοικε δʼ οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δʼ ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δʼ ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.
It seems, then, that each of them is right in his claim, and that one should assign more from the friendship to each, but not of the same thing; rather, to the superior one should assign honor, and to the needy gain; for honor is the prize of virtue and of benefaction, while gain is the assistance for need.
οὕτω δʼ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν.
This appears to be the case also in political constitutions; for he who provides no good to the community is not honored; for what is common is given to the one who benefits the community, and honor is a common thing.
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι.
For it is not possible to make money from the common funds and at the same time be honored.
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
For in all matters no one submits to having the smaller share; therefore they assign honor to the one who gets less in money, and money to the one who takes gifts; for what is in accordance with worth equalizes and preserves friendship, as has been said.
οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
In this way, then, one must also associate with unequal persons, and the one who is benefited in money or in virtue must return honor, rendering what is possible.
τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτʼ ἂν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.
For friendship demands what is possible, not what is in accordance with worth; for this indeed is not possible in all cases, as in the honors paid to the gods and to parents; for no one could ever return what they are worth, but he who serves them to the best of his power seems to be a decent person.
διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δʼ υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστʼ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δʼ ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή.
Therefore it would seem that a son is not permitted to disown his father, though a father may disown his son; for a debtor must pay, but a son, no matter what he has done, has done nothing worthy of what has been previously done for him, so that he is always in debt; but those to whom a debt is owed have the power to release the debtor, and therefore the father has this power.
ἅμα δʼ ἴσως οὐδείς ποτʼ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι.
At the same time, however, no father would ever seem to abandon his son unless he was excessively wicked; for apart from natural friendship, it is only human not to reject assistance.
τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές.
But for a son who is wicked, assisting his father is something to be avoided or at least not eagerly pursued; for most people wish to receive benefits, but avoid doing them, as being unprofitable.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
Let this, then, suffice as our discussion of these matters.