§8.13τριττῶν δʼ οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθʼ ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατʼ ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δʼ ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.
Since there are three kinds of friendship, as has been said at the beginning, and in each kind some are friends on a footing of equality, and others on that of superiority (for equally good people become friends, and also a better person with a worse one, and likewise also those who are pleasant and those who are friends for utility, being equal in their benefits or differing in them), those who are equal should make things equal by loving and other things on a footing of equality, while those who are unequal should render what is proportional to the superiorities.
γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως.
Accusations and complaints arise in friendship based on utility, either alone or most of all, and naturally so.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ διʼ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δʼ ἁμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλʼ ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν.
For those who are friends because of virtue are eager to do good to one another (for this is the mark of virtue and of friendship), and when they are vying for this there are no complaints or fights; for no one is displeased with one who loves and does good to him, but if he is gracious, he retaliates by doing good.
ὁ δʼ ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται.
And the one who excels, obtaining what he aims at, would not complain of his friend; for each desires the good.
οὐ πάνυ δʼ οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς διʼ ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δʼ ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνημερεύειν.
Nor do complaints arise very much in friendships based on pleasure; for what they desire comes to both of them at the same time, if they delight in spending their time together; and indeed he would appear ridiculous who complains of someone for not delighting him, when it is open to him not to spend his days with him.
ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δʼ εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται.
But friendship based on utility is full of complaints; for using one another for benefit, they always want more, and think they have less than is proper, and complain because they do not get as much as they want, though they deserve it; and those who do good cannot supply as much as those who receive it want.
ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἣ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἣ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι.
And it seems that, just as justice is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal, so also of friendship based on utility, one is moral and the other is legal.
γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθʼ ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται.
Accusations therefore occur most of all when they do not make their exchange and dissolve it according to the same kind.
ἔστι δʼ ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθʼ ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος.
The legal kind is that which is on stated terms, either entirely commercial, from hand to hand, or more liberal, for a period of time, but by agreement as to what is given for what.
δῆλον δʼ ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλʼ οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας.
In this kind, the debt is clear and not disputed, but has a friendly element in the postponement; wherefore in some places there are no actions at law for these matters, but they think that those who have made a contract on trust should be content.
ἡ δʼ ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει.
The moral kind is not on stated terms, but a person gives a gift or anything else as to a friend; but he expects to receive the equal or more, as if he had not given but lent; and if he dissolves the relation not in the same way as he entered it, he will complain.
τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι.
And this happens because all or most people wish for what is noble, but choose what is useful; and it is noble to do good not in order to receive in return, but it is useful to be benefited.
δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφʼ οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ διʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον)· καὶ †ὁμολογήσαι δʼ† ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δʼ οὐδʼ ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν.
He who is able, then, must return the value of what he has received (for one should not make a friend against his will; indeed, one should act as if he had made a mistake at the start and received a benefit from whom he should not—for it was not from a friend, nor from one who did it for this very reason—and so he should dissolve it as if he had received a benefit on stated terms); and he would indeed agree to pay back if he were able; and if he were unable, even the giver would not expect it.
ὥστʼ εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον.
So, if it is possible, he must return it.
ἐν ἀρχῇ δʼ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφʼ οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή.
But at the start he should consider by whom he is benefited and on what terms, so that he may accept them on these terms or not.
ἀμφισβήτησιν δʼ ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ.
It is a matter of dispute whether one should measure by the utility to the receiver and make the return to this, or by the benefaction of the doer.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρʼ ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἳ δʼ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρʼ αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρʼ ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις.
For the receivers say that they received from their benefactors such things as were small to them and could have been obtained from others, minimizing them; while the doers, on the contrary, say they were the greatest of the things they had, and could not have been had from others, and were given in dangers or such emergencies.
ἆρʼ οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν;
Is it then because the friendship is for utility that the benefit to the receiver is the measure?
οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ.
For he is the one in need, and the other assists him as expecting to receive the equal in return; the assistance, therefore, has been as great as the benefit received, and so he must return as much as he gained, or even more, for that is nobler.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δʼ ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.
But in friendships based on virtue there are no complaints, and the choice of the doer seems to be the measure; for the decisive element of virtue and character is in the choice.