§7.9πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον;
Is the continent person, then, one who abides by any reason and any choice whatsoever, or by the right one? And is the incontinent person one who does not abide by any choice and any reason whatsoever, or by the reason that is not false and the right choice, as we raised as a puzzle earlier?
ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν, καθʼ αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δʼ οὐκ ἐμμένει;
Or is it that accidentally he abides or does not abide by any whatsoever, but essentially by the true reason and the right choice?
εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον.
For if someone chooses or pursues this (A) for the sake of that (B), essentially he pursues and chooses that (B), but accidentally the former (A).
ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθʼ αὑτό.
And by "simply" we mean "essentially".
ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δʼ ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ τῇ ἀληθεῖ.
So, in a sense, the one abides by any opinion whatsoever and the other abandons it, but simply they do so in relation to the true opinion.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι·
But there are some who are firm in their opinion, whom people call obstinate, who are hard to convince and not easily persuaded to change.
οἳ ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δʼ ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά.
These have some resemblance to the continent person, just as the prodigal resembles the liberal and the rash resembles the brave, but they are different in many ways.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν.
For the former does not change because of passion and desire, since the continent person will be easily persuaded when the occasion arises; whereas the latter do not change under the influence of reason, since they do conceive desires, and many of them are led by pleasures.
εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες διʼ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ.
The obstinate include the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish; the opinionated are so because of pleasure and pain, for they rejoice in conquering if they are not persuaded to change, and they are pained if their own opinions, like decrees, are invalidated; so they resemble the incontinent rather than the continent.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ διʼ ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος· καίτοι διʼ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι.
But there are some who do not abide by their opinions not because of incontinence, such as Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes; and yet it was because of pleasure that he did not abide by it, but a noble pleasure; for speaking the truth was noble to him, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie.
οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ διʼ ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτʼ ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτʼ ἀκρατής, ἀλλʼ ὁ διʼ αἰσχράν.
For not everyone who does something because of pleasure is licentious, bad, or incontinent, but only the one who does so because of a base pleasure.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής·
And since there is also a sort of person who rejoices in bodily things less than he ought, and who does not abide by reason, the intermediate between this person and the incontinent is the continent.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ διʼ ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.
For the incontinent person does not abide by reason because of some excess, and this person because of some deficiency; but the continent person abides and does not change on account of either.
δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.
But if continence is something excellent, both the opposite states must be bad, as indeed they appear to be; but because the one is manifest in few people and on rare occasions, just as temperance is thought to be opposite only to licontaneousness, so too continence is thought to be opposite to incontinence.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθʼ ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν·
And since many things are spoken of by similarity, the continence of the temperate person has also followed by similarity.
ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δʼ οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δʼ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
For both the continent person and the temperate person are such as to do nothing contrary to reason because of bodily pleasures, but the former has while the latter does not have base desires, and the latter is of such a character as not to take pleasure contrary to reason, while the former is of such a character as to take pleasure but not to be led by it.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δʼ οὐκ οἰόμενος.
The incontinent and the licentious are also similar, although they are different, for both pursue bodily pleasures, but the former thinking that he ought to, and the latter not thinking so.