§7.10οὐδʼ ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν.
Nor is it possible for the same person to be at once prudent and incontinent; for it has been shown that a prudent person is at the same time of excellent character.
ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος.
Furthermore, a person is prudent not merely by knowing, but also by being practical; but the incontinent person is not practical —and there is nothing to prevent the clever person from being incontinent; which is why it sometimes seems that some people are prudent but incontinent, because cleverness differs from prudence in the way mentioned in our first discussions, and while in terms of definition they are close, they differ in terms of choice—nor indeed is he like one who knows and contemplates, but like one who is asleep or drunk.
καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δʼ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθʼ ἡμιπόνηρος.
And he acts voluntarily (for in a sense he knows both what he does and for what end), but he is not wicked, for his choice is decent; so he is half-wicked.
καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως.
And he is not unjust, for he is not insidious; for one of them does not abide by what he has deliberated, while the other is melancholic and does not deliberate at all.
καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν
"
ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθʼ, ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει· "
ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ.
And indeed, the incontinent person resembles a city that decrees all that is required and has excellent laws, but makes no use of them, just as Anaxandrides joked: "The city willed it, which cares nothing for laws; "but the wicked person is like a city that uses its laws, but uses wicked ones.
ἔστι δʼ ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὃ δʼ ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.
Now incontinence and continence are concerned with what exceeds the state of most people; for the one abides more, and the other less, than the capacity of most.
εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ διʼ ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως·
And the most curable of the forms of incontinence is that which the melancholic suffer from, rather than those who deliberate but do not abide; and those who are incontinent through habit are more curable than those by nature; for it is easier to change habit than nature.
διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει
"
φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.
For this is also why habit is difficult, because it resembles nature, just as Evenus says: "I say that long-continued training is, my friend, and indeed this in the end becomes nature for men.
"
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.
"What continence, therefore, is, and what incontinence, and what endurance, and what softness, and how these states are related to each other, has been said.
§7.11περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν.
But to contemplate pleasure and pain belongs to the political philosopher; for he is the architect of the end, looking to which we call each thing simply bad or good.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθʼ ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.
And furthermore, it is necessary to examine them; for we established virtue and moral vice as being concerned with pains and pleasures, and most people say that happiness is accompanied by pleasure; which is why they named the blessed from rejoicing.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθʼ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν·
To some, then, no pleasure seems to be a good, either essentially or accidentally; for good and pleasure are not the same thing.
τοῖς δʼ ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι.
To others, some pleasures are good, but most are bad.
ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.
And a third of these views is that, even if all pleasures were a good, nevertheless pleasure cannot be the chief good.
ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ.
In general, then, it is not a good, because every pleasure is a sensible process into a natural state, and no process is of the same kind as its end, as no building process is a house.
ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς.
Furthermore, the temperate person avoids pleasures.
ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ.
Furthermore, the prudent person pursues freedom from pain, not the pleasant.
ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ.
Furthermore, pleasures are an impediment to thinking, and the more one rejoices, the more so, as in the pleasure of sex; for no one could think of anything during it.
ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον.
Furthermore, there is no art of pleasure; yet every good is the work of an art.
ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς.
Furthermore, children and beasts pursue pleasures.
τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων.
And that not all pleasures are excellent is because some are base and disgraceful, and because they are harmful; for some pleasant things produce disease.
ὅτι δʼ οὐ τἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.
And that pleasure is not the chief good is because it is not an end but a process.
τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.
These, then, are roughly the things said.