§7.8ἔστι δʼ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει·
But the licentious person, as was said, is not prone to regret; for he abides by his choice.
ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς.
On the other hand, every incontinent person is prone to regret.
διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ἀνίατος ὃ δʼ ἰατός·
Therefore, the case is not as we raised as a puzzle, but rather the former is incurable and the latter curable.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἣ δʼ οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία.
For vice is like such diseases as dropsy and consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; for the former is a continuous wickedness, while the latter is not continuous.
καὶ ὅλως δʼ ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
And in general, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice; for vice is latent, whereas incontinence is not latent.
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπʼ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι·
But among these themselves, those who are prone to ecstasy are better than those who possess reason but do not abide by it; for the former are defeated by a lesser passion, and they are not without prior deliberation like the others.
ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπʼ ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί.
For the incontinent person is like those who get drunk quickly and by a small amount of wine, or by less than most people.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν·
It is clear, then, that incontinence is not a vice (though perhaps in a certain way it is); for the one is contrary to choice, and the other is in accordance with choice.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους
"
Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δʼ οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι,
"
καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ.
Nevertheless, they are at least similar in their actions, just like Demodocus' saying about the Milesians: "The Milesians are indeed not stupid, but they act just as stupid people do." So too, the incontinent are not unjust, but they will do unjust deeds.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ·
And since the one is of such a character as to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to right reason, not because he is convinced of it, while the other is convinced because he is the sort of person who pursues them, the former is easily persuaded to change, but the latter is not.
ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις·
For virtue preserves the principle, while vice destroys it, and in actions the "that for the sake of which" is the principle, just as hypotheses are in mathematics.
οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλʼ ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.
Neither there, then, is reason capable of teaching the principles, nor is it here; but it is virtue, either natural or habituated, that produces right opinion concerning the principle.
σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δʼ ὁ ἐναντίος.
Therefore, the temperate person is such a one, and the licentious is the opposite.
ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δʼ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ·
But there is a person who, because of passion, is out of his mind contrary to right reason, whom passion masters so far as to prevent him from acting according to right reason, but does not master so far as to make him the sort of person who is convinced that he ought to pursue such pleasures unreservedly.
οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή.
This is the incontinent person, who is better than the licentious, and not simply bad; for the best thing, the principle, is preserved in him.
ἄλλος δʼ ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος.
But another is the opposite, the one who abides and does not abandon reason, at least because of passion.
φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἣ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἣ δὲ φαύλη.
It is clear from these things, then, that the former is a good state, and the latter a bad one.