§7.2ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις.
One might raise the question how anyone who has a right conception can act incontinently.
ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
Now, some say it is impossible for one who has knowledge to do so; for it would be strange, as Socrates thought, if when knowledge is present in a person, something else should rule it and drag it about like a slave.
Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἄγνοιαν.
For Socrates indeed was entirely opposed to this view, on the ground that there is no such thing as incontinence; for no one, he thought, acts against what he judges best, but only through ignorance.
οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας.
Now this argument is in manifest conflict with the observed facts, and we must inquire about this passion—if it is through ignorance, what manner of ignorance it turns out to be.
ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν.
For it is clear that the person who acts incontinently does not think he ought so to act before he falls into the passion.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δʼ οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
But there are some who concede some points and not others; for they agree that nothing is stronger than knowledge, but they do not agree that no one acts contrary to what seemed best, and for this reason they say that the incontinent person, when he is mastered by pleasures, has not knowledge but opinion.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδʼ ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλʼ ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν.
Yet if indeed it is opinion and not knowledge, and not a strong conviction that resists, but a gentle one, as in those who hesitate, we must pardon a person for not abiding by them in the face of strong appetites; but we do not pardon vice, nor any of the other things that are blameworthy.
φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης;
Is it then practical wisdom that resists?
αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον.
For this is the strongest of all.
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δʼ οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα.
But that is absurd; for the same person would be at once practically wise and incontinent, and no one would say that it is characteristic of a practically wise person to do voluntarily the basest things.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.
Besides, it has been shown before that the practically wise person is a man of action (for he is concerned with the ultimate particulars) and has the other virtues.
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδʼ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν.
Further, if being continent consists in having strong and base appetites, the temperate person will not be continent nor the continent person temperate; for neither excessive nor base appetites belong to a temperate person.
ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθʼ ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δʼ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδʼ εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.
And yet they ought to; for if the appetites are good, the disposition that prevents one from following them is base, so that continence is not always excellent; but if they are weak and not base, it is nothing grand, and if they are base and weak, it is nothing great.
ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.
Further, if continence makes one ready to abide by any opinion, even a false one, it is base; and if incontinence makes one ready to abandon any opinion, there will be an excellent kind of incontinence, such as that of Sophocles' Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes; for he is praiseworthy for not abiding by what he was persuaded to do by Odysseus, because of the pain he felt at lying.
ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.
Further, the sophistical argument presents a difficulty; for because they wish to refute paradoxical views so that they may be thought clever when they succeed, the resulting syllogism becomes a difficulty; for the mind is bound when it does not wish to stand still because the conclusion does not please it, but cannot go forward because it cannot resolve the argument.
συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετʼ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει.
Thus indeed from one argument it turns out that folly combined with incontinence is virtue; for a person does the opposite of what he conceives because of his incontinence, but he conceives that good things are bad and that he ought not to do them, so that he will do what is good and not what is bad.
ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν.
Further, the person who acts and pursues what is pleasant because he is persuaded and chooses to do so would seem to be better than the one who does so not from calculation but from incontinence; for he is easier to cure, because he might be persuaded otherwise.
ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν
"ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν; "
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον πράττει.
But to the incontinent person applies the proverb in which we say: "When water chokes, what must one drink on top of it?" For if he had been persuaded to do what he does, he would have stopped if he had been persuaded otherwise; but as it is, although he is persuaded of one thing, he nevertheless does another.
ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής;
Further, if there is incontinence and continence with respect to everything, who is the incontinent person in the absolute sense?
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δʼ εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.
For no one has all the forms of incontinence, yet we say that some people are incontinent in the absolute sense.
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.
Such, then, are the difficulties that arise, and of these we must demolish some and leave others; for the resolution of a difficulty is a discovery.