§7.3#1πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης.
First, then, we must consider whether they act with knowledge or not, and in what way they know; next, regarding what sort of objects the incontinent and the continent person are to be placed, I mean whether they are concerned with all pleasures and pains or with certain definite ones, and whether the continent and the resilient person are the same or different; and similarly with regard to all other questions akin to this study.
ἔστι δʼ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ ὣς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὒ ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτʼ εἰ περὶ πάντʼ ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ.
The starting point of the inquiry is whether the continent and the incontinent person differ in respect of their objects or in respect of their attitude, I mean whether the incontinent person is incontinent merely by being concerned with these particular objects, or not, but rather by his attitude, or not by this either, but by both; next, whether incontinence and continence are about all things or not.
οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν.
For the incontinent person in the unqualified sense is not concerned with all things, but with the very same things as the profligate person, nor does he differ by being concerned with them in an unqualified sense (for then incontinence would be the same as profligacy), but by being concerned with them in this particular way.
ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὃ δʼ οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ.
For the latter is led on by his own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure; while the former does not think so, but nonetheless pursues it.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρʼ ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλʼ οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι.
Now, as to the argument that it is true opinion and not knowledge contrary to which they act incontinently, this makes no difference to the argument; for some of those who hold opinions do not hesitate, but think they know exactly.
εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δʼ Ἡράκλειτος.
If, then, it is because they believe only weakly that those who hold opinions will act contrary to their judgment more than those who know, knowledge will differ in no way from opinion; for some people believe what they hold in opinion no less than others believe what they know, as Heraclitus clearly shows.
ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.
But since we use the word 'to know' in two senses (for both the person who has knowledge but does not use it, and the person who uses it, are said to know), it will make a difference whether a person does what he ought not to do while possessing but not contemplating his knowledge, or while contemplating it; for the latter seems terrible, but not the former when he is not contemplating.
ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα.
Further, since there are two kinds of premises, there is nothing to prevent a person who possesses both from acting contrary to his knowledge, if he uses the universal premise but not the particular one; for actions are concerned with particulars.
διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλʼ εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ·
And there is also a difference in the universal itself; for one refers to the agent himself, and the other to the object; for instance, 'dry food is good for every man', and 'I am a man', or 'such-and-such food is dry'; but whether 'this food before me is of this kind', he either does not possess this knowledge or does not activate it.
κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν.
Consequently, there will be an immense difference between these ways of knowing, so that to know in the former way seems not at all absurd, but in the latter way it would be astonishing.
ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον.
Further, possessing knowledge in another way besides those just mentioned belongs to human beings; for in the state of possessing but not using knowledge we see that the disposition differs, so that in a way one both has and does not have it, as is the case with someone sleeping, mad, or drunk.