§7.1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης.
After this we must make a new start and state that there are three forms of character traits to be avoided: vice, incontinence, and beastliness.
τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δʼ ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν·
The contraries of two of these are clear: for we call the one virtue and the other continence.
πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστʼ ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,
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οὐδὲ ἐῴκει
ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
To beastliness, however, it would be most appropriate to oppose a virtue that is above us, a heroic and divine sort of virtue, just as Homer has Priam say of Hector that he was exceedingly good, "and he did not seem to be the child of a mortal man, but of a god.
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ὥστʼ εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ διʼ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις·
"So that if, as they say, men become gods through an excess of virtue, such a state would clearly be that which is opposed to the beastly state.
καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδʼ ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἣ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἣ δʼ ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας.
For just as there is neither vice nor virtue of a beast, so there is none of a god, but the state of a god is more honorable than virtue, and that of a beast is some other kind than vice.
ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δʼ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δʼ ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν.
And since a divine man is rare—just as the Laconians are accustomed to say, when they admire someone exceedingly, "he is a divine man"—so too the beastly person is rare among men; he is found mostly among barbarians, but some such states also come about through disease and mutilation; and we also use this as a term of abuse for those who exceed other men in vice.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας·
But about this kind of disposition we must make some mention later, and about vice we have spoken before; but we must speak about incontinence, softness, and luxury, and about continence and endurance.
οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθʼ ὡς ἕτερον γένος.
For we must not conceive of either of these two states as being the same as virtue and vice respectively, nor yet as belonging to another genus.
δεῖ δʼ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα·
We must, as in other cases, set down the observed facts and, after first raising difficulties, in this way prove, if possible, all the common opinions about these passions, or, if not all, at least the most numerous and most important.
ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
For if the difficulties are resolved and the common opinions are left standing, the proof will have been sufficient.
δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ.
Now, both continence and endurance seem to belong to the class of things that are serious and praiseworthy, while incontinence and softness belong to the class of things that are base and blameworthy. And the same person is thought to be continent and ready to abide by his calculation, and incontinent and ready to abandon his calculation.
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον.
And the incontinent person, knowing that what he does is base, does it because of passion, while the continent person, knowing that his appetites are base, does not follow them because of his reason.
καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἳ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἳ δʼ οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἳ δʼ ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν.
And some say that the temperate person is continent and enduring, while others say that such a person is always temperate and some say not; and some say that the intemperate person is incontinent and the incontinent intemperate, confusing them, while others say they are different.
τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι.
And about the practically wise person, some say that it is not possible for him to be incontinent, while others say that some who are practically wise and clever are incontinent.
ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους.
Further, people are said to be incontinent also with respect to anger, honor, and gain.
τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.
These, then, are the things that are said.