§7.12ὅτι δʼ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
But that it does not follow from these arguments that pleasure is not a good, nor even the chief good, is clear from the following points.
πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἳ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δʼ οὒ ἀλλʼ αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δʼ οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἱρεταί, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ·
First, since "good" is said in two ways (for one is good simply, and another for someone), the natures and states will also follow, and consequently so will the movements and processes. And of those that seem bad, some are bad simply, but not for a particular person, rather being desirable for this person; while some are not even for this person, but desirable at some time and for a short time, though not simply.
αἳ δʼ οὐδʼ ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων.
Others are not even pleasures but only appear so, namely, all those accompanied by pain and for the sake of cure, such as the pleasures of the sick.
ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δʼ ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν· ἔστι δʼ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης.
Furthermore, since of the good one kind is activity and another is state, those processes which restore us to our natural state are pleasant accidentally; but the activity in the case of desires is that of the remaining state and nature, since there are also pleasures without pain and desire, such as those of contemplation, when nature is not deficient.
σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθʼ ἁπλῶς ἡδύ.
A sign of this is that people do not enjoy the same pleasant thing when their nature is being replenished as when it is established: when established they enjoy things simply pleasant, but when being replenished they enjoy even the opposite things; for they enjoy sour and bitter things, none of which is pleasant either by nature or simply.
ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων.
Consequently, neither are the pleasures; for as the pleasant things differ from one another, so also do the pleasures derived from them.
ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλʼ ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that something else be better than pleasure, as some say the end of a process is better than the process; for they are not processes, nor are they all accompanied by a process, but are activities and an end; nor do they happen to us when we are becoming something, but when we are using our faculties; and the end of all of them is not some other thing, but only of those processes which are being led toward the perfection of nature.
διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον.
Therefore, it is not well to say that pleasure is a sensible process, but rather it should be called "activity of a natural state," and instead of "sensible," "unimpeded." But it seems to some to be a process because it is a good in the primary sense; for they think activity is a process, but they are different.
τὸ δʼ εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
And that some pleasures are bad because some pleasant things produce disease is the same as saying that some healthy things are bad for money-making.
ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλʼ οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν.
In this respect, then, both are bad, but they are not bad because of this; since even contemplation is sometimes harmful to health.
ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθʼ ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφʼ ἑκάστης ἡδονή, ἀλλʼ αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.
And pleasure from each activity does not impede either prudence or any state, but alien pleasures do; since pleasures from contemplating and learning will make one contemplate and learn more.
τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.
And that no pleasure is the work of an art is reasonably to be expected; for there is no art of any other activity either, but only of the capacity; although indeed the art of perfumery and the art of cookery do seem to be arts of pleasure.
τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα.
And the arguments that the temperate person avoids pleasure, and that the prudent person pursues a life free from pain, and that children and beasts pursue pleasure, are all solved by the same explanation.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετʼ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικάς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθʼ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος.
For since it has been said in what sense pleasures are good simply, and in what sense not all are good, beasts and children pursue pleasures of this kind, and the prudent person pursues freedom from the pain of these, namely, those accompanied by desire and pain, and the bodily ones (for these are of this nature), and the excesses of these, in respect of which the licentious person is licentious.
διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.
This is why the temperate person avoids these, since there are also pleasures belonging to the temperate person.