§6.9τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.
Deliberation and investigation differ, for deliberation is a certain kind of investigation.
δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος.
We must also grasp, concerning excellence in deliberation, what it is—whether it is a kind of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or happy guessing, or some other genus.
ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δʼ εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.
Now, it is certainly not scientific knowledge; for people do not investigate about things they know, whereas excellence in deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and the one who deliberates investigates and calculates.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως.
But indeed neither is it happy guessing; for happy guessing is without a rational account and is something quick, whereas people deliberate for a long time, and say that one should execute quickly what has been deliberated, but deliberate slowly.
ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δʼ εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια.
Furthermore, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; and readiness of mind is a kind of happy guessing.
οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία.
Nor indeed is excellence in deliberation any kind of opinion.
ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δʼ εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτʼ ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·
But since the one who deliberates badly errs, whereas the one who deliberates well deliberates correctly, it is clear that excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness—yet neither of scientific knowledge nor of opinion.
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δʼ ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν.
For there is no correctness of scientific knowledge (since there is no error either), while the correctness of opinion is truth; and at the same time, everything of which there is opinion is already determined.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία.
Yet indeed excellence in deliberation is not without a rational account.
διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις·
It remains, then, for it to belong to thought; for thought is not yet assertion.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.
For opinion is not investigation but already a kind of assertion, whereas the one who deliberates, whether he deliberates well or badly, investigates and calculates something.
ἀλλʼ ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation; hence we must first investigate what deliberation is, and about what.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται †ἰδεῖν† ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς.
But since correctness is used in many ways, it is clear that not every correctness is excellence in deliberation; for the incontinent or base man will, as a result of calculation, attain what he proposes to see, so that he will have deliberated correctly, yet have acquired a great evil.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική.
But to have deliberated well is thought to be a certain good; for excellence in deliberation is that kind of correctness of deliberation which is attainive of good.
ἀλλʼ ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, διʼ οὗ δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι·
Yet it is possible to attain even this by a false syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do, but not through the proper means, the middle term being false.
ὥστʼ οὐδʼ αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθʼ ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι διʼ οὗ ἔδει.
Thus, not even that is yet excellence in deliberation, according to which one attains what one ought, but not through the means one ought to have.
ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ.
Furthermore, it is possible to attain it by deliberating for a long time, and another quickly.
οὐκοῦν οὐδʼ ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλʼ ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε.
Therefore, not even the former is yet excellence in deliberation, but rather correctness in accordance with what is beneficial—both of what one ought, in the way one ought, and when one ought.
ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος.
Furthermore, it is possible to have deliberated well both without qualification and in relation to some end.
ἣ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τι τέλος.
That which is without qualification is that which directs correctly toward the end without qualification, while the specific is that which is in relation to some specific end.
εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.
If, then, to have deliberated well is characteristic of practically wise men, excellence in deliberation would be correctness in accordance with what is expedient toward the end, of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.