§6.8ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς.
Politics and practical wisdom are the same state, but their essence is not the same.
τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἣ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον.
Of the wisdom concerned with the city, one part, as masterly, is legislative wisdom, while the other, as concerned with particulars, has the common name of politics; and this is practical and deliberative, for a decree is a doable thing, being the ultimate.
διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι.
This is why people say that only these men participate in politics, for only these men act, like handcraftsmen.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστʼ εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις·
It is also thought that practical wisdom is especially that which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this has the common name, practical wisdom.
ἐκείνων δὲ ἣ μὲν οἰκονομία ἣ δὲ νομοθεσία ἣ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἣ μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἣ δὲ δικαστική.
Of those other kinds, one is household management, another legislation, another politics, and of this last, one part is deliberative and another judicial.
εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλʼ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν·
To know for oneself, then, would be a kind of knowledge; yet it has a great difference.
καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης
"
πῶς δʼ ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
And the man who knows and busies himself with his own affairs is thought to be practically wise, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence Euripides says: "How could I be wise, when it was possible for me to share equally, without trouble, numbered among the multitude of the army?
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον
"
ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν.
For those who are extraordinary and do something more... "For they seek their own good, and think they ought to do this.
ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδʼ ἄνευ πολιτείας.
From this opinion, then, has come the view that these men are practically wise; though perhaps one's own well-being is not possible without household management nor without politics.
ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.
Furthermore, how one should manage one's own affairs is unclear and must be examined.
σημεῖον δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δʼ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι.
A sign of what has been said is also that young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in such things, but a young man is not thought to be practically wise.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δʼ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν·
The cause is that practical wisdom is also of particulars, which become known from experience, and a youth is not experienced, for a lapse of time produces experience.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτʼ ἄν, σοφὸς δʼ ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ.
For one might also consider this: why indeed a boy may become a mathematician, but not wise or a natural philosopher.
ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν διʼ ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δʼ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας·
Is it because the objects of the former are by abstraction, while the principles of the latter come from experience?
καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;
And the youth do not believe the latter principles but only repeat them, whereas the essence of the former is not unclear?
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.
Further, error in deliberation is either about the universal or about the particular; for it is either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular water is heavy.
ὅτι δʼ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is manifest; for it is of the ultimate, as has been said, since the doable thing is of this nature.
ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλʼ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλʼ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ.
It is indeed opposed to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the definitions, for which there is no formula, while practical wisdom is of the ultimate, of which there is no scientific knowledge but rather perception—not of the special senses, but such as that by which we perceive that the ultimate figure is a triangle; for there too it will stop.
ἀλλʼ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δʼ ἄλλο εἶδος.
But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another species than the other perception.