§6.3ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
Starting then from the beginning, let us speak of them again.
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.
Let the states by which the soul possesses truth by affirmation or denial be five in number; and these are art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophical wisdom, and intuitive reason; for by belief and opinion it is possible to be mistaken.
ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν.
What scientific knowledge is, is clear from the following, if we are to speak accurately and not follow mere similarities.
πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδʼ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή.
For we all assume that what we scientifically know cannot be otherwise; whereas things that can be otherwise, when they are outside our view, escape our notice as to whether they exist or not.
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν.
Therefore, the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity.
ἀίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δʼ ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα.
It is therefore eternal; for all things that are of necessity absolutely are eternal, and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.
ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν.
Further, all scientific knowledge is thought to be teachable, and its object learnable.
ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἣ δὲ συλλογισμῷ.
And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we say also in the Analytics; for some is by induction, and some by syllogism.
ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.
Now induction is the starting-point even of the universal, while syllogism proceeds from universals.
εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα.
There are, therefore, starting-points from which syllogism proceeds, of which there is no syllogism; therefore they are reached by induction.
ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.
Scientific knowledge, then, is a demonstrative state, with all the other qualifying determinations we add in the Analytics; for when a man has a certain kind of conviction and the starting-points are known to him, he has scientific knowledge; for if he does not know them better than the conclusion, he will have scientific knowledge only accidentally.
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
Let this, then, be our definition of scientific knowledge.
§6.4τοῦ δʼ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δʼ ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως.
Of what can be otherwise, there is both what is made and what is done; and making and acting are different (on this point we trust even our external discussions); so that the rational state of action is different from the rational state of making.
διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν.
Therefore they are not included in each other; for neither is action making nor is making action.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική.
Since building is an art and is essentially a rational state of making, and there is no art which is not a rational state of making, nor any such state which is not an art, art must be the same as a state of making joined with true reason.
ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν.
All art is concerned with coming into being, and with contriving and contemplating how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose starting-point is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is neither concerned with things that are or come into being of necessity, nor with things that do so by nature; for these have their starting-point in themselves.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλʼ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι.
Since making and acting are different, art must be of making and not of action.
καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
"
τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην. "
ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις,περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same things, as Agathon also says: "Art loves chance, and chance loves art." Art, then, as has been said, is a certain state of making joined with true reason, and lack of art, on the contrary, is a state of making joined with false reason, concerned with what can be otherwise.