§6.1ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.
Since we have previously said that one ought to choose the mean, and not the excess nor the defect, and since the mean is as the right reason says, let us define this.
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
For in all the states we have mentioned, as in other matters too, there is a certain target at which the person who possesses reason looks when he tightens and slackens, and there is a certain standard for the means, which we say lie between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right reason.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτʼ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτʼ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.
But to speak thus is indeed true, but not at all clear; for in all other practices too, about which there is science, it is true to say that one ought not to labor or be remiss too much or too little, but to hit the mean and as the right reason says; but if one possessed only this, one would know nothing more, just as if in the case of what to apply to the body, someone were to say: "whatever medicine bids, and as the person who possesses medicine bids." Therefore, in the case of the states of the soul as well, it is necessary not only that this should be truly said, but also that it be defined what the right reason is, and what is its standard.
§6.2τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας.
Having then divided the virtues of the soul, we said that some are of character and others of intellect.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως.
Now we have discussed the moral virtues, and about the rest, speaking first about the soul, let us discuss as follows.
πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύʼ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.
Previously, indeed, it was said that there are two parts of the soul, the one possessing reason and the irrational; now we must divide the part possessing reason in the same way.
καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθʼ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.
And let us assume that there are two parts possessing reason, one by which we contemplate those kinds of existing things whose principles cannot be otherwise, and one by which we contemplate those which can be otherwise; for to things genericly different, those parts of the soul which are by nature fitted to each must also be genericly different, since knowledge belongs to them in virtue of a certain likeness and affinity.
λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.
Let one of these be called the scientific part, and the other the calculative part; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same, and no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise.
ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
So the calculative part is one part of the part possessing reason.
ληπτέον ἄρʼ ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.
We must grasp, then, what is the best state of each of these; for this is the virtue of each, and virtue is relative to its proper work.
τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις.
There are, indeed, three things in the soul which control action and truth: sensation, intellect, and desire.
τούτων δʼ ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.
Of these, sensation is the principle of no action; this is clear from the fact that beasts have sensation but do not share in action.
ἔστι δʼ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτʼ ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν.
What affirmation and negation are in intellect, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of choice, and choice is deliberate desire, for these reasons the reason must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the same things must be asserted by the one and pursued by the other.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
This, then, is the intellect and the truth that is practical; but of the contemplative intellect, which is neither practical nor productive, the good and bad state are truth and falsity (for this is the work of everything intellectual); but of the practical and intellectual part, the work is truth in agreement with right desire.
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος.
Now the principle of action is choice—the source of motion, not that for the sake of which—and that of choice is desire and reason for the sake of something.
διὸ οὔτʼ ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτʼ ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν.
Therefore, choice does not exist without intellect and thought, nor without a moral state; for good action and its contrary in action do not exist without thought and character.
διάνοια δʼ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δʼ ὄρεξις τούτου.
Thought itself moves nothing, but thought which is for the sake of something and practical; for this also rules productive thought; for everyone who makes makes for the sake of something, and the thing made is not an end absolutely (but is relative to something and of someone), but the thing done is; for good action is the end, and desire is for this.
διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.
Therefore, choice is either desiderative intellect or intellectual desire, and such a principle is a man.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
"
μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσʼ ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα. "
ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.
But nothing past is an object of choice, for instance, no one chooses to have sacked Ilium; for no one deliberates about the past, but about the future and what is possible, and what is past cannot not have happened; therefore Agathon says rightly: "For of this alone even God is deprived, To make undone whatever things have been done." The work of both intellectual parts, then, is truth.
καθʼ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.
Therefore, those states in accordance with which each part will most of all attain truth are the virtues of both.