§6.5περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.
Regarding practical wisdom, we might grasp it in this way, by considering whom we call practically wise.
δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.
Now, it seems to be characteristic of a practically wise man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in a particular respect, as for instance what sort of things contribute to health or strength, but what sort of things contribute to the good life as a whole.
σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη.
A sign of this is that we also call people practically wise in some particular respect, when they calculate well towards some valuable end, in matters where there is no art.
ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.
So that, in general, the man who is capable of deliberating would be practically wise.
βουλεύεται δʼ οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι.
But no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, nor about things that it is impossible for him to do.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετʼ ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δʼ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις (π̔άντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δʼ ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.
So that if scientific knowledge is accompanied by demonstration, and there is no demonstration of things whose starting-points can be otherwise (for all such things can also be otherwise), and it is not possible to deliberate about things that exist of necessity, practical wisdom would be neither scientific knowledge nor art; not scientific knowledge because what is doable can be otherwise, and not art because the genus of action is different from that of making.
λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.
What remains, then, is that it is a true state joined with reason, capable of action in relation to what is good and bad for human beings.
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.
For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.
διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς.
This is why we think Pericles and men like him to be practically wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings; and we regard as such those who are skilled in household management and politics.
ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν.
Hence also we call temperance by this name, as preserving practical wisdom.
σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν.
And it preserves this kind of judgment.
οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν.
For pleasure and pain do not destroy or distort every judgment (for example, whether a triangle has two right angles or not), but only those concerned with action.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ διʼ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθʼ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.
For the starting-points of actions are the ends for which they are performed; but to the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain, the starting-point is at once not apparent, nor does he see that he ought to choose and perform everything for the sake of this end and because of it; for vice is destructive of the starting-point.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.
So that practical wisdom must be a true state joined with reason, capable of action in relation to human goods.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
Moreover, while there is an excellence of art, there is no excellence of practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom he is less so, just as in the case of the virtues.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.
It is clear, then, that it is a sort of virtue and not an art.
δυοῖν δʼ ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.
And since there are two parts of the soul that possess reason, it must be the virtue of one of them, namely, of the part that forms opinions; for both opinion and practical wisdom are concerned with what can be otherwise.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.
But yet it is not only a state joined with reason; and a sign of this is that whereas there can be forgetfulness of such a state, there is no forgetfulness of practical wisdom.
§6.6ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δʼ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτʼ ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἳ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν.
Since scientific knowledge is a judgment about universals and things that exist of necessity, and there are starting-points of what is demonstrable and of all scientific knowledge (for scientific knowledge is joined with reason), of the starting-point of what is scientifically known there can be neither scientific knowledge, nor art, nor practical wisdom; for what is scientifically known is demonstrable, while these other states happen to be concerned with things that can be otherwise.
οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν.
Nor indeed is philosophical wisdom concerned with these starting-points; for it is characteristic of the wise man to have demonstration about some things.
εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.
If, then, the states by which we possess truth and are never deceived about things that cannot or even can be otherwise are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophical wisdom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of these three (I mean by the three, practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, and philosophical wisdom), what remains is that intuitive reason is of the starting-points.