§5.9#1ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως
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μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.
One might raise the question of whether suffering injustice and committing injustice have been sufficiently defined. First, whether it is as Euripides said, speaking strangely: "I killed my mother, a brief tale.
ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;
Voluntarily she willing, or she unwilling and I unwilling?
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πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὒ ἀλλʼ ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον;
"For is it truly possible for someone to suffer injustice voluntarily, or is it not, but rather all suffering of injustice is involuntary, just as all committing of injustice is voluntary?
καὶ ἆρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δʼ ἀκούσιον;
And is it all one way or the other, or is some voluntary and some involuntary?
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ὥστʼ εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθʼ ἑκάτερον, τό τʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι.
The same question applies to being treated justly; for all acting justly is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar opposition in each case, and that both suffering injustice and being treated justly should be either voluntary or involuntary.
ἄτοπον δʼ ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἑκόντες.
But it would seem strange, even in the case of being treated justly, if all of it were voluntary; for some are treated justly not voluntarily.
ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν·
Next, one might also raise this question: whether everyone who has suffered what is unjust is treated unjustly, or whether, just as it is with doing, so it is with suffering.
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων·
For in both doing and suffering it is possible to partake of what is just coincidentally; and similarly, it is clear that it is so with what is unjust.
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ τἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι·
For doing what is unjust is not the same as committing injustice, nor is suffering what is unjust the same as suffering injustice; and similarly in the case of acting justly and being treated justly.
ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.
For it is impossible to suffer injustice if there is no one committing injustice, or to be treated justly if there is no one acting justly.
εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα τινά, τὸ δʼ ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τʼ ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
But if committing injustice is simply to injure someone voluntarily, and "voluntarily" means knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner, and the incontinent person voluntarily injures himself, then he would voluntarily suffer injustice, and it would be possible for a person to treat himself unjustly.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
This is also one of the problems raised: whether it is possible for a person to treat himself unjustly.
ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις διʼ ἀκρασίαν ὑπʼ ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστʼ εἴη ἂν ἑκόντʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
Furthermore, a person might, through incontinence, be voluntarily injured by another acting voluntarily, so that it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.
ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὣς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν;
Or is the definition incorrect, and must we add to "injuring someone knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner" the condition "contrary to that person's wish"?
βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δʼ οὐδεὶς ἑκών· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδʼ ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει·
Thus, a person is indeed injured voluntarily and suffers what is unjust, but no one suffers injustice voluntarily; for no one wishes it, not even the incontinent person, but he acts contrary to his wish.
οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει.
For no one wishes what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent person does not do what he thinks he ought to do.
ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει
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χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοιʼ ἐννεαβοίων,
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οὐκ ἀδικεῖται·
But the person who gives away his own property, as Homer says Glaucus gave to Diomedes: "gold for bronze, what was worth a hundred oxen for what was worth nine, "is not treated unjustly.
ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δʼ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.
For giving is in his power, but suffering injustice is not in his power, but there must be someone committing injustice.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.
Regarding suffering injustice, then, it is clear that it is not voluntary.