§5.8ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ·
Now, rules of justice and injustice being as we have described, a person commits injustice and acts justly whenever he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he neither commits injustice nor acts justly, except coincidentally; for they do things that happen to be just or unjust.
ὅταν δʼ ἄκων, οὔτʼ ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ·
An unjust act and a just act are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary; for whenever it is voluntary, it is blamed, and at the same time it is then an unjust act.
ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότʼ ἐστίν· ὥστʼ ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δʼ οὔπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.
Consequently, there will be something that is unjust but not yet an unjust act, unless the voluntary is also present.
λέγω δʼ ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών·
By voluntary, as has also been said before, I mean whatever a person does of the things in his power, knowingly and not in ignorance of the person, the instrument, or the end—for example, whom he strikes, with what, and for what end—and each of these neither coincidentally nor by force (as if someone, taking his hand, should strike another, he does not do it voluntarily, for it was not in his power).
οὐ γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δʼ ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.
And it is possible that the person struck is his father, and while he knows that it is a human being or one of those present, he is ignorant that it is his father; and let a similar distinction be defined also for the end, and for the whole action.
τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ δʼ ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον.
Thus, what is ignored, or what is not ignored but is not in one's power, or what is by force, is involuntary.
πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθʼ ἑκούσιον οὔτʼ ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.
For we both know and do and suffer many things that belong to us by nature, of which none is either voluntary or involuntary, such as growing old or dying.
ἔστι δʼ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
There is likewise coincidental occurrence in the case of unjust and just things; for one might return a deposit involuntarily and through fear, and such a person must be said neither to do what is just nor to act justly, except coincidentally.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν.
Similarly, the person who is compelled and involuntarily fails to return a deposit must be said to commit injustice and to do what is unjust only coincidentally.
τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δʼ οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσʼ ἀπροβούλευτα.
Of voluntary actions, we do some by choice and others not by choice; those by choice are those we have deliberated upon beforehand, and those not by choice are those not deliberated upon.
τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετʼ ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλʼ ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ.
Now, there being three kinds of injury in associations, those done in ignorance are mistakes, when one acts not toward the person, nor with the deed, nor with the instrument, nor for the end that one supposed; for he thought either that he was not throwing, or not with this, or not at this person, or not for this end, but the result was not what he thought—for example, not to wound but to prick, or not the person, or not with the instrument.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δʼ ὅταν ἔξωθεν)·
When, therefore, the injury happens contrary to expectation, it is a misadventure; but when it does not happen contrary to expectation, yet without malice, it is a mistake (for one makes a mistake when the origin of the cause is in oneself, but has a misadventure when it is from outside).
ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη·
But when one acts knowingly but without prior deliberation, it is an unjust act, such as all acts done through anger and other passions that are necessary or natural to human beings; for in causing these injuries and making these mistakes they commit injustice, and these are unjust acts, yet they are not on this account yet unjust or wicked people, for the injury is not due to vice.
ὅταν δʼ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.
But when one acts from choice, he is an unjust and wicked person.
διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλʼ ὁ ὀργίσας.
Therefore, actions from anger are rightly judged not to be from premeditation; for the one who acts in anger is not the originator, but the one who provoked the anger.
ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν.
Furthermore, the dispute is not about whether the act took place or not, but about its justice; for anger is at apparent injustice.
οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλʼ ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (ὁ δʼ ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὃ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὃ δʼ οὔ.
For they do not, as in contracts, dispute about whether the act took place, where one of the two must be wicked unless they do it through forgetfulness; but, agreeing about the facts, they dispute about which way is just (whereas the one who plotted is not ignorant), so that one thinks he is being treated unjustly, while the other does not.
ἐὰν δʼ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτʼ ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον.
But if one injures another from choice, he commits injustice; and in virtue of these unjust acts, the one who commits injustice is already an unjust person, whenever it is contrary to proportion or contrary to equality.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ.
Similarly, a person is just when he acts justly by choice; and he acts justly if he only does so voluntarily.
τῶν δʼ ἀκουσίων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δʼ οὐ συγγνωμονικά.
Of involuntary actions, some are pardonable and others are not pardonable.
ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλʼ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτʼ ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.
For those mistakes which people make not only in ignorance but also through ignorance are pardonable, but those not through ignorance, but which, though in ignorance, they make through a passion that is neither natural nor human, are not pardonable.