§5.9#2ἔτι δʼ ὧν προειλόμεθα δύʼ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτʼ ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν.
Furthermore, of the questions we proposed to discuss, two remain to be addressed: namely, whether the one who distributes more than is deserved contrary to worth commits injustice, or the one who has it; and whether it is possible for a person to treat himself unjustly.
εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ·
For if the former statement is possible, and the distributor commits injustice rather than the one who has more, then if someone, knowingly and voluntarily, distributes more to another than to himself, he treats himself unjustly.
ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν.
This is indeed what moderate people seem to do; for the equitable person tends to take less than his share.
ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν;
Or is even this not so simple?
ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ.
For he may, perhaps, get more of some other good, such as reputation or what is unconditionally noble.
ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.
Furthermore, the difficulty is solved by the definition of committing injustice; for he suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that he is not treated unjustly, at least in this respect, but if anything, he is only injured.
φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί·
And it is clear that the distributor commits injustice, and not always the one who has the larger share.
οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλʼ ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
For it is not the one in whom the unjust thing is present who commits injustice, but the one who does this voluntarily.
τοῦτο δʼ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι.
And this is the person in whom the origin of the action lies, which is in the distributor, not in the receiver.
ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
Moreover, since "doing" is used in many senses, and there is a sense in which inanimate objects kill, or a hand does, or a servant by order of his master, these do not commit injustice, though they do what is unjust.
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδʼ ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δʼ ὡς ἄδικος·
Furthermore, if a judge has passed judgment in ignorance, he does not commit injustice according to legal justice, nor is his judgment unjust, though in a sense it is unjust.
ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον·
For legal justice is different from primary justice.
εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας.
But if, knowing what he did, he passed an unjust judgment, he himself also takes an unfair advantage, either of favor or of vengeance.
ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει·
Just as if he were to share in the unjust gain, so the one who judges unjustly for these reasons gets more than his share.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλʼ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν.
For even the judge who awards a field in those circumstances has received, not the field indeed, but money.
οἱ δʼ ἄνθρωποι ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον.
But men think that committing injustice is in their own power, and for this reason that being just is easy.
τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν·
But it is not so.
συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς.
For to lie with a neighbor's wife, to strike a neighbor, or to give money with one's hand is easy and in their power, but to do these things as a result of a certain character is neither easy nor in their power.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλʼ οὐ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)·
Similarly, they think that to know what is just and what is unjust requires no special wisdom, because it is not hard to understand the things the laws prescribe (though these are not the just things, except coincidentally).
ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι·
But how actions must be done and how distributions must be made in order to be just, this indeed is a harder task than to know what is healthy.
ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι.
For even in medicine, to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, and surgery is easy, but to know how, to whom, and when these must be applied to produce health is as hard a task as being a physician.
διʼ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτʼ ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων·
For this very reason, they think that committing injustice is no less possible for the just man, because the just man would be not less but even more able to perform each of these actions.
καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφʼ ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν.
For indeed, he could lie with a woman or strike a blow; and the brave man could throw away his shield and turn and run in either direction.
ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί.
But to play the coward and to commit injustice is not to do these things, except coincidentally, but to do them while being in a certain state, just as practicing medicine and healing is not a matter of cutting or not cutting, or drugging or not drugging, but doing these things in a certain way.
ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δʼ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν·
The relations of justice exist among those who share in things that are unconditionally good, and who can have an excess or a deficiency of them.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δʼ οὐδὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ·
For to some, like perhaps the gods, there is no excess of them, while to others, the incurably wicked, no share in them is beneficial, but all such things injure them; and to others they are beneficial up to a point.
διὰ τοῦτʼ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
For this reason, justice is a human thing.