§5.6ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής;
Since it is possible for one who does an unjust act not yet to be an unjust man, what kind of unjust acts must one commit to be already unjust in terms of each specific injustice, such as a thief, an adulterer, or a robber?
ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει;
Or will there be no difference in this way?
καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ᾗ, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος.
For indeed, one might have intercourse with a woman knowing who she is, yet not from a starting point of choice but because of passion.
ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Thus, he commits injustice, but is not an unjust man, just as he is not a thief, though he stole, nor an adulterer, though he committed adultery; and similarly in other cases.
πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.
Now how reciprocity is related to the just has been said before; but we must not fail to notice that what we are seeking is both the unconditionally just and the politically just.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατʼ ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα.
This exists among those who share a life for the purpose of self-sufficiency, being free and equal, either proportionally or numerically; so that for those who do not have this, there is no political justice toward one another, but only a certain kind of justice by similarity.
ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὑτούς· νόμος δʼ, ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου.
For justice exists among those for whom there is also law in relation to one another; and law exists among those in whom there is injustice; for judgment is the decision of the just and the unjust.
ἐν οἷς δʼ ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν.
And among those in whom there is injustice, there is also doing injustice (though in whom there is doing injustice, there is not in all of them injustice), and this is to assign to oneself more of the unconditionally good things, and less of the unconditionally bad things.
διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος.
For this reason we do not allow a human being to rule, but reason, because a human being does this for himself and becomes a tyrant.
ἔστι δʼ ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου.
But the ruler is a guardian of the just, and if of the just, then also of the equal.
ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)·
Since, then, he is thought to have no advantage if indeed he is just (for he does not assign more of the unconditionally good to himself, unless it is proportional to him; for this reason he labors for another, and because of this, they say that justice is "another's good," just as was said before).
μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.
Therefore some reward must be given, and this is honor and privilege; and those for whom such things are not sufficient become tyrants.
τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλʼ ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν δʼ οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐδʼ ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν·
The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as these, though they are similar; for there is no injustice in an unconditional sense toward one's own things, and a possession or a child, as long as he is of a certain age and not separated, is like a part of oneself, and no one chooses to harm himself; for this reason there is no injustice toward oneself, and therefore neither the politically unjust nor the politically just exists for them.
κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.
For this was according to law, and among those in whom law naturally exists; and these were those who share in equality of ruling and being ruled.
διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.
Therefore justice is more directed toward a wife than toward children and possessions; for this is household justice; and this too is different from political justice.
§5.7τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη.
Of political justice, one part is natural and the other is legal: the natural is that which has the same validity everywhere, and not because of thinking so or not; the legal is that which at first makes no difference whether it is this way or another way, but when people have established it, does make a difference, such as that a ransom be a mina, or that a goat be sacrificed and not two sheep, and furthermore all laws passed for individual cases, such as sacrificing to Brasidas, and decrees.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν.
But some think that all justice is of this sort, because what is by nature is unchangeable and has the same validity everywhere—just as fire burns both here and in Persia—while they see that rules of justice are changing.
τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς, παρʼ ἡμῖν δʼ ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δʼ οὐ φύσει.
This is not so, yet there is a sense in which it is; although among the gods it is perhaps not so at all, yet among us there is something that is even by nature, though all of it is subject to change; yet nevertheless, one part is by nature and the other is not by nature.
ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὒ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον.
Which sort of things that can be otherwise are by nature, and which are not but are legal and by agreement, if indeed both are equally changeable, is clear.
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι.
And the same distinction will fit other cases; for by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible for everyone to become ambidextrous.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλʼ οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω.
Rules of justice based on agreement and utility are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal everywhere, but where they buy, they are larger, and where they sell, they are smaller.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλʼ ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη.
Similarly, the rules of justice that are not natural but of human origin are not the same everywhere, since constitutions are not either; but only one is everywhere by nature the best.
τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δʼ ἕκαστον ἕν· καθόλου γάρ.
Each of the rules of justice and law stands as the universal to the particulars; for the things done are many, but each of those rules is one, being a universal.
διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλʼ ἄδικον.
An unjust act and that which is unjust, and a just act and that which is just, differ; for a thing is unjust by nature or by ordinance, but this very thing, when it is done, is an unjust act, whereas before it is done, it is not yet that, but only unjust.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος.
Similarly also with a just act; but the common term is rather "just action," and "just act" means the correction of an unjust act.
καθʼ ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
Each of these, what kinds they are, how many, and with what things they are concerned, must be examined later.