§5.5#2οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπʼ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι.
In this way they are equal and associated, because this equality can occur in their case.
γεωργὸς α, τροφὴ γ, σκυτοτόμος β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ.
Let the farmer be A, food C, the shoemaker B, and his equalized work D.
εἰ δʼ οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία.
If it were not possible to have reciprocal action in this way, there would be no association.
ὅτι δʼ ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἅτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, †ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγήν.
And that need holds things together as if being some single thing is shown by the fact that when they are not in need of one another, either both or one of them, they do not make an exchange—unlike when someone needs what another has, for example wine, offering in return the export of corn.
† δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι.
Therefore, this must be equalized.
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθʼ ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν.
And for future exchange, if one needs nothing at present, money is as it were our guarantor that exchange will be possible if a need should arise; for it must be possible for one who brings this to receive what he needs.
πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.
Now this itself also suffers the same thing, for it is not always worth the same; nevertheless, it tends to remain more stable.
διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία.
Therefore, all things must have a price set on them; for in this way there will always be exchange, and if there is exchange, there will be association.
τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτʼ ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτʼ ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας.
Money, then, like a measure, equalizes by making things comparable; for there would not be association if there were no exchange, nor exchange if there were no equality, nor equality if there were no comparability.
τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς.
In truth, then, it is impossible for things so greatly different to become comparable, but in relation to need it is sufficiently possible.
ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δʼ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι.
There must, then, be some single thing, and this by agreement; for which reason it is called "money"; for this makes all things comparable, since all things are measured by money.
οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ.
Let a house be A, ten minae B, and a bed C.
τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β·
A is half of B, if the house is worth five minae, or equal to it; and the bed C is a tenth part of B.
δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε.
It is clear, then, how many beds are equal to a house, namely, five.
ὅτι δʼ οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
It is clear that exchange was conducted in this way before money existed; for it makes no difference whether five beds are given for a house, or the value of five beds.
τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.
Regarding what the unjust is and what the just is, have been said.
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δʼ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν.
These having been defined, it is clear that just action is a mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice; for the one is to have too much, and the other to have too little.
ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλʼ ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δʼ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων.
And justice is a sort of mean, not in the same way as the other virtues, but because it relates to a mean, while injustice relates to the extremes.
καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δʼ ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον.
And justice is that by which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of what is just, and to be distributer both between himself and another, and between another and another, not in such a way as to award more of the desirable to himself and less to his neighbor, and of the harmful the reverse, but to award what is equal according to proportion, and similarly in distributing between another and another.
ἡ δʼ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
Injustice, on the contrary, relates to the unjust; and this is excess and defect of the beneficial or the harmful, contrary to proportion.
διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφʼ αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν.
Therefore, injustice is excess and defect, because it is concerned with excess and defect—in one's own case, excess of what is unconditionally beneficial and defect of what is harmful; while in the case of others, though as a whole similarly, the distribution is contrary to proportion, in whichever direction it happens to turn.
τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
And of the unjust act, the lesser evil is to suffer injustice, and the greater is to do injustice.
περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.
Regarding, then, justice and injustice, what the nature of each is, let it have been spoken of in this manner, and similarly regarding the just and the unjust in general.