Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §4.5

Gentleness as the Mean Concerned with Anger and Its Extremes

Passage 46 of 123 · Greek

Summary

This section discusses 'gentleness' as the mean concerned with anger, examining its extremes of excess (such as irascibility, sullenness, and harshness) and deficiency (unirascibility), while noting the difficulty of defining the exact boundary of the mean in specific situations.

§4.5πραότης δʼ ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς·
Gentleness is a mean concerned with anger.
ἀνωνύμου δʼ ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν.
Since the mean is unnamed, and almost the extremes as well, we apply the term "gentleness" to the mean, though it inclines towards the deficiency, which is also unnamed.
ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτʼ ἄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δʼ ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα.
The excess might be called a sort of "irascibility." For the passion is anger, while its causes are many and diverse.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφʼ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται·
Now, the person who gets angry at the right things and with the right people, and also in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time, is praised.
πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται.
This person, then, would be gentle, if gentleness is praised.
βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν·
For the gentle person wishes to be undisturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason directs.
ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός.
But he seems to err rather on the side of deficiency; for the gentle person is not inclined to take revenge, but is rather forgiving.
ἡ δʼ ἔλλειψις, εἴτʼ ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθʼ ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται.
The deficiency, whether it is a sort of "unirascibility" or whatever it may be, is blamed.
οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφʼ οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδʼ ὅτε μηδʼ οἷς δεῖ·
For those who do not get angry at the things they ought to seem to be foolish, as do those who do not do so in the right way, at the right time, or with the right people.
δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες.
For such a person seems to have no perception and to feel no pain, and since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and to overlook the abuse of his own people is slavish.
ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.
The excess occurs in all ways (for it is possible to get angry with whom one ought not, at what one ought not, more than one ought, too quickly, and for too long a time), yet all these characteristics do not belong to the same person.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτʼ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.
Indeed, they could not; for evil destroys even itself, and if it is complete, it becomes unbearable.
οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν.
Now, choleric people get angry quickly, with whom they ought not, at what they ought not, and more than they ought, but they cease being angry quickly, which is their best feature.
συμβαίνει δʼ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλʼ ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτʼ ἀποπαύονται.
This happens to them because they do not repress their anger but retaliate, which makes it obvious due to their quickness, and then they stop.
ὑπερβολῇ δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα.
But those who are hot-tempered are excessively quick and angry at everything and on every occasion; hence their name.
οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν.
Sullen people, on the other hand, are hard to appease and remain angry for a long time, because they repress their passion.
παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
Relief comes when they retaliate; for revenge puts an end to anger, producing pleasure instead of pain.
τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ.
But if this does not happen, they carry a heavy burden; for since their anger is not apparent, no one even tries to persuade them to be appeased, and digesting anger within oneself requires time.
εἰσὶ δʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις.
Such people are most troublesome to themselves and to their closest friends.
χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφʼ οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
We call those people harsh who get angry at what they ought not, more than they ought, and for longer, and who do not make peace without revenge or punishment.
τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους.
We oppose the excess to gentleness more than the deficiency; for it occurs more frequently (since taking revenge is more natural to humans), and harsh people are worse for living together.
ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει.
What was also said before is clear from what we are saying: it is not easy to define how, with whom, at what, and for how long a person ought to get angry, and up to what point he does so rightly or errs.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν.
For the person who deviates only a little is not blamed, whether on the side of excess or deficiency; for sometimes we praise those who are deficient and call them gentle, and those who get angry we call manly, as being capable of ruling.
ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις.
It is not easy, then, to state in words how far and in what way a person must deviate to be blameworthy; for the decision lies in individual cases and in perception.
ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθʼ ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφʼ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δʼ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
But at least this much is clear, that the mean state is praiseworthy, according to which we get angry with whom we ought, at what we ought, as we ought, and all other such things, while the excesses and deficiencies are blameworthy—gently so if they occur to a small degree, more so if to a greater degree, and extremely so if to a large degree.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον.
It is clear, then, that we must cling to the mean state.
αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
Let this suffice for the states of character concerned with anger.

Notes

  1. 1125b28πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν — The participle ἀποκλίνουσαν is a feminine singular accusative modifying πραότητα (indicating that gentleness inclines towards the deficiency). The subsequent participle clause ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν, also a feminine singular accusative, modifies the adjacent τὴν ἔλλειψιν. Given the preceding statement that the extremes are almost nameless, interpreting this as 'the deficiency, which is also unnamed' fits the context best.
  2. 1126a16ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα — The relative ᾗ functions here as a dative of manner or means. It refers to the manner in which choleric people retaliate: 'in the way they make their anger obvious due to their quickness (or sharpness)'. This emphasizes that they do not conceal their anger but express it openly.
  3. 1126a24ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ — The impersonal verb δεῖ takes the genitive of the thing required, which is χρόνου (time). The infinitive πέψαι functions as an adverbial or epexegetical infinitive indicating what the necessity applies to; thus the construction means 'to digest the anger within oneself requires time'.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §4.5. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:4.5

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