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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §4.4

Virtue Concerned with Moderate Honor and Its Extremes

Passage 45 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle discusses the existence of an unnamed virtue concerned with moderate honor, standing in a similar relation to magnanimity as liberality does to magnificence, and explains the asymmetrical relations between this mean and its extremes.

§4.4ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν.
It seems that there is also a certain virtue concerned with honor, as was said in our first remarks, which would seem to stand to magnanimity in a relation similar to that in which liberality stands to magnificence.
ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δʼ ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
For both of these stand aloof from what is great, and dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and small things; and just as in the getting and giving of wealth there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency, so also in the desire for honor there is a more and a less than is right, and a desire from the right sources and in the right way.
τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι.
For we blame both the ambitious person as aiming at honor more than is right and from wrong sources, and the unambitious person as not choosing to be honored even for noble deeds.
ἔστι δʼ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δʼ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν.
But sometimes we praise the ambitious person as manly and a lover of what is noble, and the unambitious as moderate and self-controlled, as we also said in our first remarks.
δῆλον δʼ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλʼ ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.
It is clear, however, that since "lover of such-and-such" is used in more than one sense, we do not always apply the term "ambitious" to the same thing, but when we praise we apply it to one who is more ambitious than most, and when we blame to one who is more so than is right.
ἀνωνύμου δʼ οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα.
Since the mean has no name, the extremes seem to dispute for its place as if it were vacant.
ἐν οἷς δʼ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
But where there is excess and deficiency, there is also a mean; and people desire honor both more than is right and less; therefore, they also desire it as is right.
ἐπαινεῖται δʼ οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος.
At all events, this state is praised, being an unnamed mean concerned with honor.
φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως.
It appears as unambitiousness when compared with ambition, and as ambition when compared with unambitiousness, and as both in a way when compared with both.
ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτʼ εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δʼ ἐνταῦθʼ οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.
This seems to be the case with the other virtues also; but in this case the extremes appear to be opposed to each other because the mean has not been named.

Notes

  1. 1125b1περὶ ταύτην — Referring back to "honor" (τιμή) from the end of the previous chapter (1124b35). The feminine singular demonstrative pronoun `ταύτην` finds its antecedent in `τιμήν`.
  2. 1125b14πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου — Genitive absolute. `τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου` is a neuter substantival expression meaning "the love of such-and-such" (referring to words prefixed with φιλο-), indicating that the term or the concept is used in multiple senses (`πλεοναχῶς`).
  3. 1125b17ὡς ἐρήμης — Genitive absolute with the omission of the participle `οὔσης`. `ἐρήμης` is feminine singular, modifying an implied noun like "place" or "region of the mean." `ὡς` expresses a subjective comparison or metaphor ("as if it were vacant/unoccupied").
  4. 1125b21ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ — Corresponds to the preceding `ὀρέγονται ... καὶ μᾶλλον ... καὶ ἧττον` (they desire... both more... and less). The verb `ἔστι` functions here as "it is possible to [desire]" (with an elliptical infinitive like `ὀρέγεσθαι`), which is modified by `ὡς δεῖ` (as is right).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §4.4. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:4.4

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