§3.11τῶν δʼ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἳ δʼ ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν.
Of desires, some seem to be common, and others peculiar and acquired; for example, that for food is natural; for everyone who is in need desires dry or wet food, and sometimes both, and also the marriage bed, as Homer says, when one is young and in his prime; but to desire this or that particular kind is no longer for everyone, nor of the same things.
διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι.
Therefore it appears to be our own.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων.
Nevertheless, it has also something natural about it; for different things are pleasant to different people, and some things are more pleasant to everyone than chance things.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφʼ ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.
In the natural desires, then, few people err, and only in one direction, namely toward excess; for to eat or drink whatever comes to hand until one is overfilled is to exceed what is natural in quantity; for natural desire is the replenishment of a deficiency.
διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν.
Therefore these people are called gluttons, as filling it beyond what is right.
τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις.
And those who become such are the exceedingly slavish.
περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν.
But concerning peculiar pleasures, many people err, and in many ways.
τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δʼ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν·
For of those called lovers of such-and-such, they err either by rejoicing in things they ought not, or more than most people, or not as they ought; and in all these ways the licentious exceed.
καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν.
For they rejoice in some things in which they ought not (since they are hateful), and if one ought to rejoice in any of such things, they do so more than they ought, and more than most people do.
ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδʼ ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή, ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
That excess, then, concerning pleasures is licentiousness and is blameworthy, is clear; but concerning pains, one is not called temperate by enduring them, nor licentious by not doing so, as is the case with courage; but the licentious person is so called by grieving more than he ought because he does not obtain pleasant things (and indeed pleasure itself produces pain for him), and the temperate person by not grieving at the absence of and abstinence from what is pleasant.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθʼ αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δʼ ἔοικε τὸ διʼ ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.
The licentious person, then, desires all pleasant things or those that are most pleasant, and is led by his desire so as to choose these instead of other things; therefore he also grieves both when he fails to get them and when he desires them; for desire is accompanied by pain; yet it seems absurd to grieve because of pleasure.
ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δʼ οὔ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δʼ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.
But people who fall short concerning pleasures and rejoice less than they ought do not very much occur; for such insensibility is not human; for the other animals also distinguish foods, and rejoice in some and not in others; and if to anyone nothing is pleasant and one thing does not differ from another, he would be far from being a human; and such a person has not obtained a name because he does not very much occur.
ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτʼ ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδʼ ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτʼ ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδʼ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδʼ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.
But the temperate person is moderately disposed concerning these things; for he neither rejoices in the things in which the licentious person rejoices most, but rather dislikes them, nor at all in the things he ought not, nor excessively in any such thing, nor is he pained at their absence, nor does he desire them, or only moderately, and not more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor any such thing at all; but whatever pleasant things tend to health or good condition, these he will desire moderately and as he ought, and also other pleasant things that are not obstacles to these, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means.
ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
For he who is otherwise disposed loves such pleasures more than they are worth; but the temperate person is not such, but is as right reason prescribes.