§3.12ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
Licentiousness seems to be more voluntary than cowardice.
ἣ μὲν γὰρ διʼ ἡδονήν, ἣ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν·
For the former is because of pleasure, and the latter because of pain, of which the one is choice-worthy and the other to be avoided.
καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ.
And while pain deranges and destroys the nature of the person who has it, pleasure does nothing of the sort.
μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον.
Therefore it is indeed more voluntary.
διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν.
Therefore it is also more blameworthy; for indeed it is easier to be habituated to these things; for there are many such things in life, and the habituations are free from danger, whereas in the case of fearful things it is the reverse.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι.
But cowardice would seem not to be voluntary in the same way as the particular acts; for cowardice itself is painless, but these, because of pain, derange a person, so as to make him even throw away his arms and behave unseemly in other ways; and for this reason they are also thought to be forced.
τῷ δʼ ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθʼ ἕκαστα ἑκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δʼ ὅλον ἧττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.
In the case of the licentious person, on the contrary, the particular acts are voluntary (for he acts with desire and appetite), but the whole state is less so; for no one desires to be licentious.
τὸ δʼ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα.
We also apply the name of licentiousness to the errors of children; for they have a certain similarity.
πότερον δʼ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δʼ ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.
Which is named after which makes no difference for our present purposes, but it is clear that the later is named after the prior.
οὐ κακῶς δʼ ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις.
And the transfer of the name does not seem to have been badly made; for that which desires shameful things and has a great capacity for growth ought to be chastened, and such a character belongs especially to desire and to a child; for children also live according to desire, and the appetite for the pleasant is most of all in them.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.
If, then, it is not obedient and subject to the ruling power, it will go to great lengths; for in an irrational person the appetite for the pleasant is insatiable and comes from every quarter, and the activity of desire increases its kindred tendency, and if the desires are great and violent, they even knock out reason.
διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
Therefore they ought to be moderate and few, and to oppose reason in nothing—and such a state we call obedient and chastened—and just as the child ought to live according to the prescription of his tutor, so also the appetitive part according to reason.
διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος.
Therefore the appetitive part of the temperate person ought to harmonize with reason; for the target of both is the noble, and the temperate person desires the things he ought, as he ought, and when; and this is also what reason prescribes.
ταῦτʼ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.
Let this, then, be our discussion of temperance.