§3.1#1τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.
Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and praise and blame are bestowed on voluntary actions, while pardon, and sometimes even pity, are bestowed on involuntary ones, it is perhaps necessary for those who examine virtue to define the voluntary and the involuntary, and it is also useful for legislators with a view to honors and punishments.
δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ διʼ ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα·
Those things seem to be involuntary which take place under compulsion or through ignorance.
βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.
That is compulsory of which the moving principle is from without, being of such a character that the agent or the person acted upon contributes nothing to it; for example, if a wind should carry one somewhere, or men who have us in their power.
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σῴζοιντο μὴ πράξαντος δʼ ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια.
But as for the things that are done through fear of greater evils or for some noble object—for instance, if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, so that if one did it they would be saved, but if not they would die—it is a matter of dispute whether they are involuntary or voluntary.
τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δʼ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.
Something of this sort happens also in the case of casting goods overboard in storms; for abstractly no one throws them away voluntarily, but for the safety of oneself and the others, any sensible person does so.
μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν.
Such actions, then, are mixed, but they are more like voluntary ones; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion.
καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον.
Therefore, the voluntary and the involuntary must be spoken of with reference to the time of action.
πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν·
And he acts voluntarily; for the principle of moving the instrumental parts in such actions is in himself.
ὧν δʼ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπʼ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή.
And those things of which the principle is in himself, it is also in his power to do or not to do.
ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δʼ ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθʼ αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
Such actions, then, are voluntary, though abstractly they are perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any of such things for its own sake.
ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δʼ ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχισθʼ ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου.
For such actions, people are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful for the sake of great and noble objects; but if the reverse, they are blamed, for to endure the basest things for nothing noble or moderate is the mark of a base person.
ἐπʼ ἐνίοις δʼ ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δʼ, ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι.
On some actions praise is not bestowed, but pardon is granted, when one does what one ought not to do on account of such things as overstrain human nature and which no one could endure.
ἔνια δʼ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι.
But there are some things, perhaps, which one cannot be compelled to do, but rather one must die, suffering the most terrible things; for the reasons that compelled Euripides' Alcmaeon to murder his mother appear ridiculous.
ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δʼ ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή.
It is difficult sometimes to distinguish what is to be chosen in place of what, and what is to be endured in place of what, and still more difficult to abide by our decisions; for generally the expectations are painful and the things one is compelled to do are base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who are compelled or not.
τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια;
What kinds of things, then, are to be called compulsory?
ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότʼ ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται;
Shall we say that, abstractly, they are so whenever the cause is in external things and the agent contributes nothing?
ἃ δὲ καθʼ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθʼ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια.
But those things which are in themselves involuntary, but now and in return for these objects worthy of choice, and whose principle is in the agent, are in themselves involuntary, but now and in return for these objects voluntary.
μᾶλλον δʼ ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δʼ ἑκούσια.
They are, however, more like voluntary actions; for actions lie among particulars, and these are voluntary.
ποῖα δʼ ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα.
But what kinds of things are to be chosen in place of what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences among particulars.
εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.
But if anyone should say that pleasant and noble things are compulsory (for they constrain us, being external), everything would be compulsory for him; for it is for the sake of these that everyone does everything.
καὶ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθʼ ἡδονῆς·
Moreover, those who act under compulsion and involuntarily do so with pain, but those who act for the sake of the pleasant and the noble do so with pleasure.
γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δʼ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα.
It is ridiculous, then, to blame external things rather than oneself as being easily caught by such things, and to attribute the noble actions to oneself, but the base ones to pleasant things.
ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
The compulsory, then, seems to be that of which the principle is from without, the person compelled contributing nothing.