§3.1#2τὸ δὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ διʼ ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδʼ αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε.
On the other hand, that which is done through ignorance is in all cases "not voluntary" (οὐχ ἑκούσιον), but it is "involuntary" (ἀκούσιον) only when it causes pain and is accompanied by regret; for he who has done anything through ignorance, and yet is not at all vexed by his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he feels no pain.
τοῦ δὴ διʼ ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.
Therefore, of those who act through ignorance, he who regrets his act is thought to act involuntarily, while he who does not regret it, since he is in a different state, may be called "not voluntary"; for since there is a difference, it is better that he should have a name of his own.
ἕτερον δʼ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ διʼ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ διʼ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλʼ ἀγνοῶν.
Moreover, acting through ignorance seems to be different from acting in ignorance; for a man who is drunk or angry is not thought to act through ignorance but through one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance.
ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται·
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and through such error men become unjust and generally bad.
τὸ δʼ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδʼ ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλʼ ἡ καθʼ ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις·
But the term "involuntary" does not tend to be used if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage; for ignorance in choice is the cause not of the involuntary but of wickedness, nor is universal ignorance the cause of it (for people are blamed for this), but rather ignorance of particulars, in which and about which the action consists.
ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
For in these there is both pity and pardon; since he who is ignorant of any of these particulars acts involuntarily.
ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.
Perhaps then it is not a bad thing to define them, what they are and how many, namely, who acts, what he does, and with reference to what or in what he does it, and sometimes also with what (for example, with an instrument), and for what end (for example, safety), and in what manner (for example, gently or violently).
ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δʼ ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε;
Now, no one could be ignorant of all of these unless he were mad, and it is manifest that he cannot be ignorant of the agent; for how could he be ignorant of himself?
ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην.
But a man might be ignorant of what he is doing, as they say "it slipped out in speaking," or that he did not know they were secrets, as Aeschylus did regarding the mysteries, or wishing to show something he let it go, as the man did with the catapult.
οἰηθείη δʼ ἄν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ θῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν.
Again, one might think one's son was an enemy, like Merope, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was a pumice stone; or one might kill someone by giving him a drink to save him; or wishing to touch someone, as those do who spar, one might strike him.
περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δʼ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.
Since ignorance may affect all these particulars in which the action consists, he who was ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially in the most important points; and the most important points seem to be the circumstances of the action and the end.
τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.
While the involuntary by reason of such ignorance is so called, the action must besides be painful and accompanied by regret.
ὄντος δʼ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ διʼ ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.
Since the compulsory and that which is done through ignorance are involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he knowing the particular circumstances in which the action consists.
ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν.
For perhaps it is not correct to say that actions due to anger or appetite are involuntary.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδʼ οἱ παῖδες· εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δʼ αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως;
For, first, if we do, no other animal will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it the case that we do nothing voluntarily that is due to appetite or anger, or do we do noble actions voluntarily and base actions involuntarily?
ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
But is this not ridiculous when there is one and the same cause?
ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
And it is perhaps odd to call involuntary those things which we ought to desire; and we ought both to feel anger at certain things and to desire certain things, for example, health and learning.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.
Besides, while involuntary actions are thought to be painful, those due to appetite are thought to be pleasant.
ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα;
Furthermore, what difference is there, in respect of being involuntary, between errors committed after calculation and those committed in anger?
φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
For both are to be avoided, and the irrational passions seem to be no less human than reason, so that the actions of a human being arising from anger and appetite are also human.
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.
It is odd, then, to class them as involuntary.